751G.00/5–3154: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
4613. Repeated information Geneva 328, Saigon 562. Limit distribution. Department pass Defense for DEPTAR for Ridgway. This is joint Trapnell-Embassy message. Reference Embtels 45661 and 4605,2 repeated Geneva and Saigon. After interview with Laniel, Schumann and Ely (immediately preceding telegram),3 Trapnell accompanied by Embassy officer proceeded, at Ely’s request, to his office for further clarification of points covered earlier with Prime Minister.
- 1.
- Ely stated he had just received telegram from Navarre reporting he had again discussed question of US training of Vietnamese forces with O’Daniel. Latter had reported that Secretary Wilson had given his approval to O’Daniel’s concept of job. Ely wished to point out that there was a misunderstanding concerning his position in the matter. He thought that Radford believed him to be opposed to the principle of forming native troops in divisional units. Ely now favored such a plan. In his opinion, there were two considerations in the matter. First was the form of the division to be mounted. In his view it should not conform to the American form. He would not attempt to propose another form at this time but intended to study the matter in Washington with the US authorities. He wished, however, that a definite form be fixed and adhered to. Second consideration was a political one. He agreed that if only for political reasons the formation of Vietnamese divisions was desirable. It would give any Vietnamese a sense of responsibility under their independent status and should improve the morale and efficiency of the national army. He also agreed with the principle that US advisors and instructors should be placed at various levels within the division in a manner similar to that used in Korea.
- 2.
- Ely stated that there was need for clarification of question of US participation in planning operations. Although the principle of training of native forces was agreed to; there could not be any question at the moment of US sharing the responsibility of operational planning. There can be only one commander at the present time, and that must remain a French responsibility. On the other hand, provided an agreement is reached on US intervention and irrespective to the details of that agreement, it is agreed that US officers will be integrated into French planning staffs. Ely will also be prepared discuss details in Washington.
- 3.
- During this phase conversations Ely re-emphasized point that question US intervention will arise only if Geneva fails and question US participation in joint planning, training of native forces, et cetera, will arise only if agreement on intervention is reached.
- 4.
- We asked Ely to reiterate his concept of rough agenda for forthcoming Franco-US military conversation in Washington. He replied that talks would fit into three main headings. First, it being understood that the US would intervene in Indochina only under certain conditions and in accordance with a joint plan established in advance, task at Washington was to determine what that joint plan is to be. Parallel with determination this plan is question of what US will do if there is Chinese air intervention before plan is set. Although Ely has “commitment on this matter from Admiral Radford,” he must ascertain that there are no political obstructions to delay carrying out such commitment and if there are that they be removed. (Embtel 4607, repeated Geneva 321).4 Second heading is training of Vietnamese Army, details of which he is sure can be worked out easily and promptly. Third is form of command structure under which the Franco-US plan is to operate.
Ely again confirmed that Valluy would leave for Washington tonight as is Trapnell (Deptel 4326).5 Ely, himself, would follow some time next week dependent upon when Valluy informed him US was ready to proceed.