Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, May 30, 1954—3 p.m.

4607. Repeated information priority Geneva 321. Geneva eyes only Under Secretary. Limit distribution. Reference: Department telegram 4325. Second paragraph of reference telegram¹ may indicate extremely serious misunderstanding between US and French. French draw sharp distinction between (1) US intervention in present circumstances with Viet Minh bolstered by Chinese Communist matériel, technicians and possibly scattered troops and (2) US reaction against full-scale air attack mounted from Communist Chinese bases. Regarding point (1) French fully understand that conditions outlined Department telegram 4023² apply to any possible US intervention. As regards point (2), however, the French fully count on US military reaction against such an open Chinese Communist attack. The only limitation on such US reaction which French recognize is the time required for Congressional action which they would hope to be a matter of not more than a day or two. In second case, they feel that US statements to the effect that full-scale Chinese Communist intervention could not be permitted are still binding whether or not there is time to create collective action. The Secretary’s radio speech of May 7,³ indicating that while Chinese had given very considerable support at Dien Bien Phu they had avoided full-scale intervention, was taken to mean by French that if there had been full-scale Chinese intervention US would have responded differently to their request for military assistance.

Schumann reverted last night to this question of protection against a possible air attack and gave me more accurate information than that contained in Embassy telegram 4580⁴ regarding French apprehensions. He said that what French General Staff fear is an attack from bases on Hainan Island against Haiphong. Best French estimate is that Chinese jets coming from Hainan could remain over Haiphong for 20 minutes on each mission. A massive Chinese air attack (Schumann mentioned figure of 100 planes) could completely knock out French air capabilities in the delta and could so seriously damage the port of Haiphong that it would be impossible to conduct a successful withdrawal of French forces through the port. The loss of French air potential would drastically tip the scales in favor of the Viet Minh and make total defeat of French forces in the delta inevitable. It is against this eventuality that the French wish to have protection. Paragraph 9 of Embassy telegram 4605⁵ indicates Ely’s belief that he already has commitment from Admiral Radford on this type of attack. What French feel they are asking for now is not, in fact, a new commitment from US but assurances that US reaction will come within a matter of hours and even, if possible, in time to meet attacking Chinese planes. Schumann said he felt that only circumstances in which Chinese would make such an attack would be if they felt that US, for one reason or another, was not in a position to respond promptly and effectively. Therefore, Schumann suggested that if it should be impracticable to obtain preliminary approval of such military action from US Congress, it might be equally useful to have a clear warning from either the Secretary or the President that a massive Chinese air attack would meet with US opposition. Schumann said he felt certain that if Chinese realized that an air attack would cause US intervention they would never take the risk of mounting such an attack.

I have previously stated to Department that if we allowed delta to fall to the Viet Minh without a successful evacuation of the French Expeditionary Corps, the effect here would be disastrous. If such a disaster should come about because of open Chinese Communist air attack to which we had not responded by US military action, the result here would be nothing short of catastrophic. We would have to count on a strong movement in France that could well be successful in favor of making peace at any price with the Soviets rather than continuing to count on US support through NATO. The effect of such action by France on the North Atlantic Alliance is obvious. In addition, I do not feel that we could exclude possibility, if the Soviets play their cards right, of a popular front government arising to carry out such a new policy. This naturally would incur the danger of an eventual Communist take-over in France. I do not have any means of evaluating effect in Asia of a unilateral US response to a Chinese attack, but Department should be constantly aware that lack of US response to a full-scale Chinese Communist air attack on the delta would place in jeopardy the North Atlantic Alliance and our whole position in Western Europe.

Schumann has never asked me whether US response to a Chinese attack would be subject to same conditions posed in Department telegram 4023 and I have never, in any way, indicated to him what the US requirements would be for reaction in such an emergency except to point out that full clarification of the independence of Vietnam would be most important. See Embassy telegram 4580.⁶

Dillon

1. The paragraph under reference read as follows: “Schumann’s suggestion re discretionary authority to use US airpower would be disturbing if it indicated French are again thinking in terms of US committing itself to intervene alone. However we assume French understand fully preconditions to participation on our part, basic to which is that our participation would be part of a broader collective effort.” Regarding telegram 4325, see also footnote 5, p. 1630.
2. Dated May 11, p. 1534.
3. See footnote 5, p. 1496.
4. Dated May 28, p. 1628.
5. Supra.

6. Telegram 4332 to Paris (sent to Geneva as Tedul 142), May 31, stated the following: “Reference your 4607 … answer which should be made plainly to Schumann on matter possible Chinese Communist air intervention is clearly set forth in paragraph 3 of Department’s 4094, May 15. This remains U.S. position and you should not permit Schumann or anybody else in French Government to be under any misapprehension concerning it.

   “Question will be brought to Secretary’s personal attention immediately on his return Tuesday.” (751G.00/5–3054)

   In a memorandum of Monday, May 31, Deputy Under Secretary Murphy summarized the problem for the Secretary and recommended that the matter be discussed by the National Security Council. (Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 310)

   Ambassador Dillon reported in telegram 4625 from Paris, June 1, that he had advised Schumann in accordance with Department’s telegram 4332. The telegram indicated, however, that the Ambassador retained reservations regarding the clarity of the United States position and its acceptability to the French. For text of telegram 4625, see United States—Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 9, pp. 508–509.