Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–3054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret

Paris, May 30, 1954—1 a.m.

4605. Repeated information Saigon 560, Geneva 318. Department pass DEPTAR for Ridgway from Trapnell. Limit distribution—eyes only Chiefs of Mission. Reference Embassy telegrams 4566,¹ 4598² and 4596.³ Trapnell, accompanied by Embassy officer, had second interview with Ely, accompanied by Colonel Brohon, this afternoon. Ely opened conversation by confirming fact that Prime Minister had instructed him to give us full information concerning reinforcement program, planning for defense of the delta and related matters.

(1) He stated that press reports concerning reinforcement program were substantially correct. The mobile group which Foreign Office had asked us to airlift to Indochina about June 15 (Embtel 4604)⁴ would consist approximately 3500 men. Reinforcements already despatched include two airborne battalions. Question of activating two air squadrons under consideration including whether B–29’s or B–26’s more suitable for requirements. Plans afoot for improving infrastructure. Eventually it is planned to send three divisions replacements and reinforcements.

(2) We informed Ely that information regarding reinforcements obtained from Prime Ministers and Jacquet’s officers was confused. We would like to have complete up-to-date picture. Ely agreed and instructed Brohon to make up paper breaking down reinforcement plan into three subdivisions—(a) already despatched, (b) in prospect for near future, and (c) under study. Portion of new troops will be used for duty in Cochin China in order release more seasoned troops there for duty in north.

(3) Ely described Cabinet decision of yesterday to call up last half 1954 conscript class six months in advance and to request Assembly for approval send conscripts to Indochina as major “wartime” decision. Manner and timing of government’s presentation to Assembly of request to change existing law preventing despatch of conscripts to combat areas overseas not yet decided. Government will either ask for blanket authority from Assembly or he will take each separate request to Parliament as required. Former obviously preferable but latter may have to be resorted to. Ely took great personal satisfaction from yesterday’s Cabinet decision for he had been pressing government to take such step for some time. Assembly action would have to be taken in very near future because troops now being readied for despatch to Indochina included conscripts. When we remarked on difficulty which would undoubtedly be encountered in Assembly, particularly in light next week’s Indochina debate, Ely replied everyone fully aware of this but government could not do otherwise.

(4) Trapnell asked for more precise definition of “Hanoi-Haiphong axis” included in delta defense plan. He asked Ely’s intentions regarding defense of Tourane area. Ely stated that Indochina defense plan was divided into three major divisions, in order of priority: (1) Red River delta including Hanoi-Haiphong axis; (2) Tourane-Hue area and (3) Cochin China. All plans purely defensive. No offensives would be mounted in Indochina for foreseeable future.

(5) Detailed discussion delta defense ensued in course of which Trapnell was shown French operations map. It provides for defense of a new perimeter to run as follows: West along northern perimeter to Tienchu—southwest to Camla (on the Red River)—south along the Day River to Nga-My—east to Tuongtin (Red River)—Red River to Bamboo Canal—Bamboo Canal to Quicao Song Thai Binh to the sea.

(6) Ely explained that French forces would be withdrawn inside new perimeter where they would be organized into mobile forces to meet attack wherever it occurred. Their number would be increased by other French units brought into the delta from outlying areas including Laos. They would constitute total force of between nine and twelve mobile groups. Area between the new perimeter and former perimeter would be defended by Vietnamese Army. Trapnell observed that this would fall to Viet Minh in short order, an opinion which Ely made no effort to contradict. Ely has already given orders to Navarre for withdrawal into new perimeter and plan is already in operation.

(7) Trapnell asked whether with this force French had not good prospect for holding out until autumn during rainy season. Ely replied the balance between success and failure very narrow (juste). In reply Trapnell’s question whether expecting Viet Minh attack on new perimeter before the autumn he replied “yes”.

(8) Ely then proceeded give broad review of present status of the Ambassador’s conversations with Laniel on possible US intervention. Wished have facts clearly in mind in order give General Valluy instructions he would need before proceeding Washington French representative forthcoming five-power talks. Ely anxious that proposed bilateral Franco-US military conversations take place as soon as possible. He would head French delegation. If they were to coincide with the five-power conversations he would be available for consultation on five-power questions but would not take part in conversations. French five-power delegation to be headed by Valluy who plans fly to Washington May 31. Ely hoped Valluy would be able do as much spadework on bilateral conversations as possible so that when Ely arrived in Washington he could get down to important points immediately. It was his understanding that now that agreement had been reached on the broad political basis for US intervention that bilateral military conversations would concern themselves only with details of that intervention and related questions including training Vietnamese forces, et cetera. It was clearly understood that any plans decided on would be put into effect only if Geneva failed.

(9) Ely wished place greatest possible emphasis on one point. Although he has commitment from Admiral Radford that US aircraft would intervene immediately in event Chinese air intervention, he believed it must be determined that there are no political obstacles to this commitment being carried out. We informed him that this question had already been discussed by Ambassador and Maurice Schumann and French Government’s concern had been reported to Washington (Embtel 4580).⁵

In closing Ely informed Trapnell that Valluy would be empowered to answer any further questions in Washington.

Trapnell now planning return Washington May 31.

Dillon

1. Dated May 27, p. 1621.
2. Telegram 4598 from Paris, May 29, read as follows: “Department of Army for Ridgway. Limit distribution. From Trapnell. Ambassador and Trapnell called on Prime Minister this morning. When he was informed that first Ely–Trapnell conversation has been limited in scope because of Ely’s lack of authority to speak with complete frankness, Laniel stated he would give Ely instructions today to give Trapnell details of reinforcement plan and other matters of joint interest in subsequent conversations. Accordingly, Trapnell now plans resume conversations with Ely later in the day.” (751G.00/5–2954)
3. Dated May 29, p. 1635.
4. Telegram 4604 from Paris, May 30, reporting the French request for airlift assistance, is not printed. (751G.00/5–3054)
5. Dated May 28, p. 1628.