Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–2854: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Paris, May 28, 1954—8 p.m.

4580. Repeated information priority Geneva 309. Limit distribution. I saw Schumann this afternoon and gave him information contained in Deptel 4286.¹ He made careful note of points 1 and 2, and said he felt personally that they were entirely satisfactory. He did not get into any discussion of details so subject matter in FYI portion of Deptel 4286 never came up. Schumann also told me that he had been informed by Parodi regarding my discussion with him yesterday and that Schumann again personally was very pleased with the information in Deptel 4272.²

While we do not as yet have formal French answer on either of these two Deptels, Schumann said that only things that now remained unsettled were military conversations to arrange details of training, command structure, and war plans. He said that French were most anxious to get at these conversations immediately. He then read me portion of telegram from Bidault in which Bidault said that an increased show of Franco-American solidarity in Indochina was now vitally necessary in order to have any hope of sound progress at Geneva. As possible concrete steps Bidault suggested:

1. US promptly take over responsibility for training Vietnamese National Army.

2. US agree to provide assistance toward improving airfields in Indochina for use of jet aircraft.

Schumann told me that at Cabinet meeting this morning it was decided to leave to Pleven’s discretion decision as to whether Ely or Valluy should represent France at 5-power military discussions opening in Washington next week. In view of French understanding that Radford will not be present for these meetings Ely has told Trapnell that he is disinclined to go himself. However, Schumann today asked whether it would be possible to undertake these Franco-US military negotiations in Washington at the same time or parallel with 5-power military talks. If so, he said he felt it was most important that Ely attend and he would so inform Pleven, who, he was sure, would agree. He requested a prompt answer so French could take necessary decision as to whether or not to send Ely. He said French had been anxious for some time to initiate these military discussions and he hoped that US was now ready and willing for them to begin.

During course of my visit he had a telephone conversation with Massigli in London regarding a telegram which Massigli had sent reporting on British attitude regarding Southeast Asia Pact. Schumann showed me the telegram, key portion of which indicated British reluctance, as expressed by Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick³ to undertake any sort of military operations in any portion of Indochina, as they thought that all Indochina, including Cambodia, was infested with Communists and so it was not practical for military operations. Schumann was quite upset by this telegram which he made clear to Massigli on the telephone, saying it was now clear that British were only interested in defending Southeast Asia when question became an immediate problem of the defense of Malaya. Schumann then brought up another question which he said was giving great concern to Pleven. This was possibility of Chinese air attack on the delta. He said that French Air Force has informed Pleven that Chinese Communist planes operating from present bases had capability of remaining over Hanoi for 15 minutes. This would be enough time to cause great destruction and Pleven felt that if such an attack were not opposed immediately by US jets, Communists in 3 to 5 days could cause enough damage to make the delta effectively indefensible. Schumann wondered whether something along following lines might be possible. Provided French decided to strongly reinforce the delta and use conscripts in Indochina, could the President go to Congress and ask for discretionary authority to use US air power to defend the delta if it should be attacked by Chinese Communist planes. A request to Congress coming after the event would necessarily cause a few days delay which, in Pleven’s view, would be fatal. Schumann thought present United Action Program might not be ready in time as he did not know what if any progress US was making with other powers in order to satisfy point 2b of conditions posed in Deptel 4023.⁴

I told Schumann naturally I could venture no opinion as to whether the President would be able to make such a limited request for discretionary authority but that from my personal knowledge of Washington thinking I felt that it would be absolutely necessary in any event that French take action along lines of paragraph 3 of Deptel 4272 regarding clarification of independence of Associated States.

As I left Schumann again emphasized his hope that a prompt reply would be forthcoming from Washington regarding possibility of holding Franco-US military talks in Washington next week.⁵

Dillon

1. Telegram 4286 to Paris, May 27, not printed, contained suggestions for meeting the French requirement that an agreement for joint action must allow France some flexibility in regard to the withdrawal of its forces from Indochina in the event of a substantial increase in the strength of the Vietnamese National Army. (751G.00/5–2254)
2. Dated May 26, p. 1618.
3. British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
4. Dated May 11, p. 1534.
5. In telegram 4325 to Paris, May 29, Dillon was instructed to inform Schumann that it would be most useful for General Ely to come to the United States at the time of the Five-Power talks to undertake secret U.S.-French military negotiations. (751G.00/5–2854) Dillon reported in telegram 4606 from Paris, May 30, that Schumann had stated that Ely would definitely go to Washington. (751G.00/5–3054)