751G.00/5–2854: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2574. Repeated information Paris 911, Geneva 165. DeJean told me yesterday he had attended a meeting of Franco-Vietnamese High Military Committee that morning. Decision had been reached to use all French Expeditionary Corps troops as a mobile striking force (this followed advice of General Ely) and to utilize Vietnamese forces for static duty. In particular practically all of south and central Vietnam will be entrusted to charge of Vietnamese National Army.
It has been decided to hold parallelogram in delta bounded by Hanoi and Haiphong to west and east and by Canal des Rapides and Canal des Bambous to north and south. Area south of Bambous Canal will be defended by Vietnamese National Army.
DeJean said that according to Ely’s estimate reinforcements of at least three divisions would be needed if Indochina could be held until December. Ely’s immediate recommendation (cf. Embtel 2520)1 was to bring out one Metropolitan division which would be used for static duty in Vietnam. However, neither he nor DeJean seemed sanguine at prospect of French Government releasing two additional divisions.
I told DeJean that last week in conversation with Korean General Choi latter had remarked that offer of Korean Government to send one or two divisions to Indochina still held good. However, Choi insisted that these troops must be maintained in divisional units and not intermingled with other forces here and said that of course necessary sea lift would have to be provided by US. DeJean, whose mood is now that of man grasping at straws, wondered if there might be some serious possibility of utilization Korea forces here. He likewise asked me if I thought there was any possibility of US intervention by air and naval arms, even though use of US ground forces was out of question.
DeJean said he could smell another Munich in the making at Geneva and if this did develop West would find itself so divided that Communists [Page 1628] would have won a world-wide victory. He thought that since balance of forces here was so nearly even and so little in effect was needed to redress balance in West’s favor, utmost should be done to find necessary reinforcements. He did not however seem to think they would be provided by France.
- In telegram 2520 from Saigon, May 24, not printed, McClintock reported that according to a French source, General Ely would recommend that one French metropolitan division be sent to Indochina. (751G.00/5–2454)↩