Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 327

Memorandum of Conversations, by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Lodge)¹

secret

[New York,] May 28, 1954.

Subject:

• Indochina—Thailand’s Appeal to the Security Council²

Participants:

• Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and others, as stated below.

At Sir Pierson Dixon’s³ request I met him and M. Henri Hoppenot⁴ with respective staffs in Dixon’s office. Hoppenot read his instructions to the effect that while he is to cooperate with the United Kingdom and the United States in developing agreement on procedures, immediate submission of the Thai appeal would be “premature” and he is to delay agreement to submission pending decision by his government based on developments at Geneva. Hoppenot thus made it clear he is authorized to discuss only procedure but is unable to give any commitment on the timing of submission.

Dixon said his instructions, dated May 26, are to obtain agreement on answers to questions raised by Eden (Dulte 112)⁵ with the understanding final decision on the timing of the Thai appeal to be determined by Eden on receipt of a report on tripartite consultations and in light of the effect on the over-all Indochina problem. He said he asked Khoman⁶ to wait with submission of the letter at least over the weekend.

I repeated that according to General Smith both Bidault and Eden agreed on initiation of the Security Council proceeding now. I said that in view of current developments there is greatest urgency at least to bring the appeal before the Security Council; once the matter is there we might consider the pace of the proceedings. I said the Secretary wishes that the Thai letter to the Security Council President be submitted tomorrow and that I could not undertake more than to report to him the French and British view.

At my suggestion the meeting then considered the text of the Thai letter substantially along the lines of the Department’s Tosec 228.⁷ Dixon and Hoppenot strongly urged that the Thai letter should be focused solely on the threat to Thailand and at their urging I agreed to suggest to Khoman to modify the text as given in USUN’s telegram 781, May 28, to the Department.⁷ (You will note the new text omits any reference to observation outside of Thailand.) Dixon, supported by Hoppenot, argued in strongest terms that authorization to the POC to observe beyond Thailand would make it much more difficult to obtain the necessary majority in the Assembly which, in their view, might be difficult to obtain in any event. We pointed out that in our estimate it should not be difficult to obtain the necessary majority either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly. Dixon said that particularly the Asians might be worried about observation beyond Thailand and reported Dayal⁸ expressed to him doubts as to the wisdom of any initiative in New York when progress is being made in Geneva. He said that it is important to carry the Indians with us and Eden is in touch with them. Hoppenot again stressed the need for delay, in particular since in his view progress is being made in Geneva. I doubted the possibility of progress at the conference table when the Communists were having such success on the battlefield.

There followed some discussion of the British memorandum entitled “Assessment of Implications of an Appeal by Thailand to the UN”,⁷ pouched to the Department.

It was agreed the tripartite staff would go over this memorandum with a view to determining further procedures in the Security Council and the General Assembly. The consensus of opinion was that a special emergency session under the Uniting for Peace Resolution could not be held since the Thai move is under Chapter VI and not under Chapter VII. As between reconvening the 8th Session and requesting a special session I suggested the matter should be explored with Madame Pandit⁹ and others and it was agreed there was no immediate need to determine General Assembly procedure.

Following the meeting with Dixon and Hoppenot I telephoned Mr. Robert Murphy who was in charge of the State Department in the absence of Mr. Dulles. I read to him the changes in the draft letter from the Thai Representative to the President of the Council that I had agreed to tentatively with the British and the French. I told him that following our meeting Dixon took me aside privately and said that if we would not insist that the letter should go in on Saturday¹⁰ he would send it to Eden and recommend UK concurrence in filing it Monday. Mr. Murphy agreed that these changes did not damage our position. He emphasized that the most important consideration in Secretary Dulles’ mind was to initiate UN action at the earliest possible moment by filing the Thai letter. He agreed with me that this should be done on Saturday rather than waiting until Monday or Tuesday, despite British and French desire for delay, since we had no assurance whatever of British and French concurrence if we waited until Monday or Tuesday. The main thing was to take the first step. Then as a concession to the British and French views on timing we could indicate that we would not press for immediate Security Council consideration. For example, it perhaps might not be necessary for the Council to meet for a week.

It was agreed that I would suggest to Mr. Khoman that he go ahead and file his letter Saturday morning and that I would inform Hoppenot and Dixon in the sense agreed upon with Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Khoman came in to see me shortly thereafter at his request. I gave him the changes in his draft letter suggested by the British and the French and told him I thought they might be accepted. I suggested that it would be most desirable for him to file his letter Saturday morning. It was clear that Mr. Eden and Mr. Bidault favored this action, although the British and French were somewhat concerned about timing and some details of procedure. The details as to procedure could be worked out after the initial step had been taken. On the question of timing it would not be essential to hold a Security Council meeting immediately, certainly not on Tuesday. We could all work out in consultation together when a Security Council meeting should be held. It was up to the Thai Government to decide when they wanted the meeting. Either I or Ambassador Wadsworth¹¹ would be in the chair and we would give them a meeting any time they wanted one.

Mr. Khoman agreed with all this. He said he was planning to talk with Prince Wan¹² at eight o’clock Saturday morning but he would try to reach him by phone this evening in order to get the final go-ahead.

I telephoned Mr. Hoppenot and told him the State Department had agreed to the changes suggested in the draft letter. Secretary Dulles felt very strongly that action in the United Nations should be initiated by filing the letter at the earliest possible moment; on the other hand, in order to meet the French and British view on the question of timing it would not seem essential for the Security Council to meet right away. This, in effect, was the substance of a suggestion Mr. Hoppenot himself had made two days before. Mr. Hoppenot reacted very favorably, indicating he thought this solution was a personal victory for himself.

I telephoned Sir Pierson Dixon and informed him of our views. He was a little chagrined but seemed to accept our decision in good spirit.

Following the above conversations I called on UN Secretary General Hammarskjold at 6:00 p.m. to keep an appointment made at his request. He made the following points in what I consider to be a highly inappropriate and negative manner:

1. He was extremely irked at his lack of information as to what is transpiring at the Geneva Conference.

2. An approach to him by Prince Wan in Geneva caught him unprepared and was made only because of apparent initiative taken by Eden in an attempt to get them together. The first approach by Wan was last Tuesday, and Wan was full of urgency. The second meeting took place on Wednesday and Wan had calmed down somewhat.

3. To hold double discussions on Indochina here and in Geneva would be harmful in extreme.

4. He seriously questioned the propriety of timing this move.

5. He had strong doubts that such a move would obtain a favorable majority. His information was that there would be more members against than for such a proposition. Arab-Asians and dissident Latin Americans were what he had in mind. Western Europeans were also doubtful.

6. As a minor point he also stated he and the Secretariat were unprepared for a special session of the General Assembly, especially since many of his staff were or would be away. He mentioned particularly Protitch who is in London with the Disarmament Subcommittee.

The substance of my remarks to him in rebuttal follows:

1. I was uninformed until Thursday of this week when Khoman called on me as to the precise nature of Wan’s intentions in this regard. Since the Secretary General had the benefit of talking with Wan in Geneva earlier this week, he was obviously ahead of me. I stressed to him that this was Thai initiative and that I had only seen Khoman for the first time on this matter Thursday evening. Therefore I could not see how the United States could be blamed for not keeping him informed.

2. With regard to the Secretary General’s understanding of what was encompassed by the proposed action and his reasons for feeling it was improper at this time, I told him we intended to support a Thai request for observers to be sent to Thailand. This seemed to us to be a modest request which should appeal to all reasonable men of good will. Therefore I doubted his pessimistic estimate of the support such a moderate request would receive. He appeared impressed.

3. With regard to the timing of such appeal, I told the Secretary General we are not inflexible nor rigid in our thinking as to the convening of the Security Council. It is a perfectly normal thing for the Thais to request the Security Council to provide observation. I drew a careful distinction between the simple filing of a letter making this request and calling Council meetings to discuss the matter.

4. As for his point that double discussion would jeopardize Geneva deliberations, I pointed out that any sensible person could see that as long as the Communists were having military successes in Vietnam they were not interested in any genuine negotiations. I was therefore not sanguine of any accomplishment coming out of the present discussion in Geneva. I thought on the contrary that UN activation with respect to Indochina, like “thunder in the distance”, could have a salutary effect on Geneva proceedings.

5. I told Hammarskjold that I believed Eden and Bidault fully comprehended the scope of the problem, but domestic political difficulties forced them to go slowly and to negotiate to the hilt in Geneva. France and the United Kingdom, like the United States, had its demagogues who sought to and did embarrass their governments’ positions.

6. After considerable banter, the Secretary General said it was one thing to put a loaded gun on the table and another to pull it out and fire it. He felt the latter was better. (Comment: I am surprised that a Swedish national could make such a bellicose remark.) I expressed disagreement with this simile, saying it was more a question of providing a burglar alarm system, which might be optimum the UN could do. This I strongly favored. Hammarskjold seemed impressed by this comment.

1. Drafted by Eric Stein of UNP, and by D. Chadwick Braggiotti, Charles D. Cook, and John C. Ross of USUN.
2. Regarding the Thai appeal, May 29, see editorial note, p. 1635.
3. Permanent British Representative at the United Nations.
4. Permanent French Representative at the United Nations.
5. Dated May 25; for text, see vol xvi, p. 928.
6. Thanat Khoman, Deputy Permanent Thai Representative at the United Nations.
7. Not printed.
7. Not printed.
8. Rajeshwar Dayal of the Indian Delegation at the United Nations.
7. Not printed.
9. President of the General Assembly.
10. May 29.
11. James J. Wadsworth, Deputy U.S. Representative at the United Nations.
12. Prince Wan Waithayakon, Thai Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative of Thailand at the United Nations.