751G.00/5–2454: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
4514. Repeated information Geneva 287, Saigon 542. Department limit distribution. Eyes only McClintock Saigon. Subject: Further clarification of independence of Associated States.
- A.
- If we wish to come to any agreement with French on this subject it is
clear to me that we will have to abandon concept of statement granting
right of withdrawal from French Union. French feeling on this subject is
highly emotional and is not confined to government and parliament, but
is shared by general public.
- 1.
- In eyes of Frenchmen the only reason for French to continue to fight in Indochina is their obligation toward the Associated States as part of the French Union. A statement by French Government that Associated States would have right to withdraw from French Union at any time would in eyes of all Frenchmen fatally compromise their attachment to the French Union, and therefore, remove remaining reasons to fight.
- 2.
- French Union comprises not only Associated States but also Metropolitan France, overseas departments (Algeria, Martinique, etc.) and “old colonies” (French equatorial Africa, Madagascar, etc.). Protectorates, Tunis and Morocco, are not in Union but French naturally hope that eventually they too will join as additional “Associated States” as defined in French Constitution. The French feel that any [Page 1605] statement regarding right of withdrawal would lead to disturbances in Africa and would be an invitation to nationalist forces in Tunis and Morocco to increase terroristic activities.
- 3.
- Associated States have never requested right of withdrawal so French cannot understand why it has come up. Also such a statement does not seem to have any precedent. Inquiry at British Embassy reveals that there is no statement or written document confirming right of Commonwealth countries to leave Commonwealth. However, it is understood by all that Commonwealth countries by unilateral action can sever ties with Commonwealth. Exactly same situation will exist in Vietnam after departure of French Expeditionary Corps. If Vietnam then should decide unilaterally to leave French Union, presumably by abrogating treaty of association or by any other legislative process of her own devising, there would be nothing to prevent her departure. No Frenchman would ever consider attempt to fight their way back into Indochina.
- B.
- After considerable thought I have been unable to conceive of any way
in which question of right of withdrawal can be compromised in a public
statement. Therefore, we will have to find some other means by which to
clarify the independence of Associated States. The following program
would appear appropriate.
- 1.
- Require the signature by France and Vietnam of at least the two basic treaties on independence and association with French Union which have already been approved by draft form. Neither French Government nor Vietnamese seem in a hurry to get these documents signed so it may require pressure on both sides. If signature of these documents were made a firm prerequisite for US assistance I feel confident that French Government for their part would agree to prompt signature and assume Bao Dai would as well.
- 2.
- At the time of signature Bao Dai should make a very clear statement regarding the full independence of Vietnam and the fact that Vietnam is joining French Union entirely of her own accord.
- 3.
- Public announcement be made that US is taking over substantial responsibility for training of Vietnamese National Army which will be trained in units of decision 6.
- 4.
- Statement by highest US authority that they are convinced that Vietnam is now a fully independent nation and that US will deal with Vietnam as such.1
In telegram 2531 from Saigon, May 25, repeated to Geneva and Paris, Chargé McClintock stated that he was mystified as to the apparent concern for publicizing the right of Vietnam to withdraw from the French Union. He contended that “we should leave well enough alone and not insist on something which Vietnamese themselves have never asked for.” (751G.00/5–2554) On the same day, Under Secretary Smith presented his views on the subject in telegram Dulte 109 from Geneva (repeated to Paris and Saigon), which read as follows:
↩“I would like to reinforce the last paragraph of Dillon’s message on independence Associated States. I believe that it is of the utmost importance to have prompt signature of the two basic treaties. Aside from the fact that we are in a false position here until these are signed, it is probable that when they are signed Bao Dai will return promptly and, to the extent his energy and ability permit, will try to assume national leadership.” (751G.00/5–2554)