751G.00/5–2454
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) to the Counselor (MacArthur)1
top secret
[Washington,] May 24, 1954.
Subject:
- Comment on JCS Memorandum of 20 May regarding U.S. Military participation in Indochina2
In general, the JCS memorandum appears to envisage little more than a token military intervention in Indochina. It is doubtful if the JCS concept would meet French requirements which apparently are geared to a much larger and more active US intervention. If we should intervene, even on the basis apparently envisaged by the JCS, we should be prepared for changed circumstances which might compel us to intervene on a massive scale.
We have the following specific comments on certain of the numbered paragraphs.
- Paragraph 1: No comment.
- Paragraph 2b: Although we believe the numerical ratio of French Union forces over the enemy is now, as stated, approximately five to three, the changed circumstances under which the U.S. might participate in the defense of Indochina would very likely be accompanied by other factors which would effectively alter that ratio with respect to capability. A worsened anti-Communist position which would be a factor in causing U.S. intervention might quickly result in a lower capability or even in actual reduction in strength of the French Union forces. It would therefore be difficult to assess with any degree of accuracy the ratio in effect at the time of a necessary U.S. intervention.
- Paragraph 2d: It would appear to be possible that the primary need at the time of a necessary U.S. intervention might be a tactical defensive operation with the limited U.S. troops available rather than an expanded and intensified training program for local forces.
- Paragraph 2g: The use of atomic weapons whenever it is to our military advantage to do so might necessarily be coupled with a severe reaction by those Asian countries now attempting to maintain a neutralist posture. It should therefore be understood that, in our view, adverse political reactions should be expected from most of Asia to our use of such weapons.
- Paragraphs 3 and 4: These are basically military matters to be worked out in military circles.
- Paragraph 5: The circumstances under which the factors outlined in this paragraph are applicable are not clear. While we accept the thesis that the best military course for eventual victory is the [Page 1607] development of effective native armed forces, it is unclear as to what the U.S. objective should be, compared with the unsuccessful French efforts. We understand approximately 5,000 French officers and NCO’s are now engaging in a training function. We do not know if this training function is expected to continue at the same level of effectiveness. We believe that the relationship between any continuing French training function and a U.S. training mission should be carefully spelled out with respect to the distinction between their tasks as well as their control. We agree that firm requests from the French and Associated States are a prerequisite to American intervention.
- Paragraphs 6a and b: We believe that the command relationship between any U.S. naval and air force contributions should be carefully spelled out with respect to the command relationship to the Allied Commander in Chief. There would appear to be significant advantages to be gained (ignoring military requirements) if command of U.S. Naval and Air forces should remain with the U.S. and be considered as a contributory measure furnished in coordination with ground efforts which of course would be under the Allied Commander in Chief.
- Paragraph 7: The implications of bombing supply lines inside China raises a multitude of political considerations as well as strategic military problems. The existence of the Sino–Soviet treaty and other factors must be considered. We feel that consideration of bombing Communist China, if a necessary part of the problem of U.S. military participation in Indochina, should be part of a larger strategic study and that our determination to do so or not be the result of such a larger study. This applies to factor under 2f.
- Paragraph 8: From the political point of view it has been estimated that the fall of Indochina to Communist control would eventually result in the fall of the balance of Southeast Asia to Communist control. We are not sure if it is consistent with such an assessment to agree that the allocation of more than token U.S. forces would be a serious diversion of U.S. capabilities. While not arguing for the deployment of substantial U.S. forces to the area we believe that the concept outlined in paragraph 8 might more accurately be recast to indicate a planning ability to deploy in the area of Indochina sufficient forces to achieve our objective in Indochina. An extension of the war would necessarily call for a reassessment of such a decision. If the intervention of token U.S. forces in the area did not result in an extension of the war, it might be found that token U.S. forces were inadequate for the task. Under those circumstances it would appear they should be increased to a size to permit the successful completion of our mission.