396.1 GE/5–1754: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
top
secret
priority
priority
Washington, May 17, 1954—7:37
p.m.
4117. Personal for Ambassador from Secretary. In your discussions with Laniel please bear in mind following two points: [Page 1576]
- 1.
- The practicability of US intervention is constantly subject to consideration in the light of day to day developments. If the French want to use possibility of our intervention primarily as a card to play at Geneva, it would seem to follow that they would not want to make a decision inviting our intervention until the Geneva game is played out. However, this is likely to be a long game particularly as the Communists may well be deliberately dragging it out so as to permit their creating a fait accompli before Geneva ends. It should not be assumed that if this happens, the present US position regarding intervention would necessarily exist after the Communists have succeeded in this maneuver.
- 2.
- The second point to bear in mind is that while we are anxious to bolster up the French position, we must also be on our guard lest Laniel is creating an alibi and he, or his successor, will in the end tell the French people that they had to capitulate because US terms were so rigorous that they were obviously unacceptable and that therefore US is to blame.
Dulles
- Drafted by the Secretary of State. Repeated to Geneva as Tedul 78, for the information of Under Secretary Smith.↩