Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1754: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, May 17, 1954—2 p.m.
[Received 10:10 p.m.]

2419. Repeated information Hanoi 462, priority Paris 856, Geneva 120. Re third paragraph Tosec 158, repeated Paris 4074, Saigon 2300, Hanoi 630.¹ Although as my telegrams have indicated immediate return of Bao Dai is measure most urged by local leaders such as Tri, Quat, Hinh, and DeJean, we should not assume that this will be an automatic salvation. If Bao Dai does come back, we shall have to keep him in Saigon and put him to work. He must not be permitted to relapse into his comfortable habits of big game shooting, conspiracy from such vantage points as Banmethuot and Dalat. A sine qua non is that Nguyen De not return.

If Bao Dai does not come back, I recommend that French and we place utmost pressure on local elements, it being recalled that most of this valorous Vietnamese Government is safely in Paris, to depose Bao Dai and establish a Council of Regency with a new government operating on a streamlined constitution which would have real powers. I would suggest as members of Regency Council Buu Loc, who would thus give a flavor of legitimacy to this group, Tran Van Huu as an elderly and well-known Cochin Chinese, and Bishop Le Huu Tu or Ngo Dinh Diem, who would combine support of Catholic elements as well as of Tonkinese.

Government would be entrusted to Governor Tri of North Vietnam, who as Hanoi telegram 660 to Department, repeated Saigon 580, Paris 304,² has most recently suggested has definite administrative capacity and has shown his ability under trying circumstances to maintain morale and good government in Tonkin. Streamlined constitution emanating from Regents would provide that all appointments such as governors and prefects of cities would come from Cabinet and not from Regency Council. Regents would in fact be figureheads and we would write their constitution. I would continue Quat as Minister of National Defense which would mean elimination of Hinh for time being. Tam might be offered Ministry of Interior.

Hinh would be invited to US to consult as to possibilities of training Vietnamese national army by US means and to investigate possibility of direct military aid. We would kee Hinh indefinitely in US as he is still a valuable asset and we might need him at a later date. Other members of Cabinet should appropriately be chosen by Tri, but we should not forget Pham Van Huyen (Embtel 2318, repeated Paris 807, Hanoi 436).³

Arrangement outlined above would have additional advantage of indicating clearly to Viet Minh that we do not contemplate partition of Vietnam and that we repose confidence in Tonkinese as well as in other elements of this country. Such a measure should in my estimation strengthen our hand at Geneva. To objection that this program is injurious to theory of sovereignty I would reply that Vietnamese will be far worse off under government presided over by Ho Chi Minh and that in case of bankruptcy which we now confront, bankers have right to organize a receivership.⁴

McClintock

1. For text of telegram Tosec 158 to Geneva, May 14, concerning the situation in Vietnam and the possible role of Bao Dai, see vol. xvi, p. 800. Paragraph three read as follows:

   “We are of course aware however of uncertainty as to what role Bao Dai could or would play under existing circumstances. Nevertheless Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam is the one remedial measure we might put into effect most quickly. If Bidault and USDel concur, and if Bao Dai does not respond affirmatively to first suggestion, might be put no to Bao Dai that unless he is willing accept our recommendation, French and US policy with regard to him and his regime will have to be reexamined.”

2. Dated May 13, p. 1550.
3. In telegram 2318 from Saigon, May 10, not printed, the Embassy reported that Pham Van Huyen, the Vietnamese Minister of Labor, had expressed his total disillusionment with the corrupt and unrepresentative nature of the Vietnamese Government. Pham had said that there were thoughts of establishing a revolutionary government. (751G.00/5–1054)
4. In telegram Secto 260 from Geneva, May 20, repeated to Saigon and Paris, the U.S. Delegation reported that Ambassador Heath felt that the United States must bear with the Bao Dai solution at least for the time being. For text of Secto 260, see vol. xvi, p. 857.