751G.00/5–1754: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
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[Received 10:30 a.m.]
4402. Repeated information Geneva 243. Department limit distribution; Geneva eyes only Under Secretary. Re Deptel 4023, paragraph 2d.1 I would like to propose for consideration a radically different approach to the clarification of the full independence of the Associated States, and in particular of Vietnam. The establishment of the right of withdrawal from the French Union seems to me to be a purely juridical approach, which does not go to the roots of the problem. It is also unacceptable to French opinion for a large number of reasons, among which are (1) that it throws into question the entire concept of the French Union as a union of free and independent peoples, and (2) it casts doubt on the veracity and honor of France in her recent statements that Vietnam has now been granted full independence and, subsequent to the granting of that independence, has chosen to retain membership in the French Union.
The real problem to me seems to be how to establish in US and Asian opinion the fact that the Associated States have, or will have, a similar degree of independence to that possessed by Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. I consider that the two basic treaties recently negotiated between France and Vietnam (a) granting full independence, and (b) establishing Vietnam’s membership in French Union do establish this type of independence for Vietnam. However, the situation is obscured and complicated by the following factors:
- 1.
- The presence on Vietnamese soil of a large French expeditionary corps.
- 2.
- The existence of a state of war requiring a French commander as supreme military commander in Vietnam.
- 3.
- The absence of a truly powerful Vietnamese national army.
The present situation in Indochina is in some ways comparable to that during the darkest early hours of the Korean war, when there was treachery and disaffection on all sides in South Korea, when the lines were being held primarily by American troops, and when a large part of world opinion regarded the South Korean Government as a US puppet. The real independence of the South Korean Government only became fully apparent when South Korea came into possession of an army of its own capable of independent action. I feel that independence of Vietnam will become perfectly clear after a strong national army has been created and after the bulk, if not all, of the French Expeditionary Corps has been withdrawn.
I would assume that the agreement which we will require regarding [Page 1575] training of troops would give the US primary responsibility for the training and equipping of a Vietnamese national army. There has in the past been doubt as to the ability and good faith of the French military command in this direction. An agreement giving this responsibility to the US should remove these doubts and do more than anything else to make clear the independence of Vietnam. In addition, I would think it possible for the French to make some sort of statement saying that after peace had been established, and a Vietnamese national army had been established, it was their intention to withdraw the Expeditionary Corps. In this connection, the base rights which the French have in Laos by virtue of the recently negotiated Franco-Laotian treaty, and those which they expect to acquire in Vietnam by virtue of military conventions now under negotiation in Paris, even if they should be maintained, are of no more importance, and probably of less importance, than US base rights in the Philippine Republic. Such a statement would be in accordance with general desire in France to withdraw troops from Indochina and should be useful as assurance to Chinese Communists that non-Asian troops were being withdrawn from proximity to her frontiers.
When and if peace is restored in Indochina and Vietnam has a strong national army, it is obvious that the fundamental ties between Vietnam and France will be cultural, i.e., language, and whatever financial self interest there may remain. Vietnam’s association with the French Union will be based on a treaty freely negotiated between Sovereign States, and it is obvious that if Vietnam so desires, it will then be in a position to abrogate or nullify this treaty at any time it so desires. A public statement by Bao Dai that Vietnam’s association with the French Union is the result of the free desire of the Vietnamese people might be helpful.
If this picture can be presented in clear terms, which presentation will in considerable measure be a US responsibility, I should think that the independence of the Associated States would be fully clarified in US opinion and in the opinion of friendly Asian states. I would appreciate receiving Department’s comments on this type of approach prior to discussing it with the French.