751G.00/5–1454
Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day) to the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright)
Subject:
- Situation in Viet-Nam
Our present information indicates deterioration of the political strength of the Bao Dai regime in Viet-Nam. This seems to be more pronounced in the south than in the north.
The main causes of this seem to be the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the apprehension produced by the evident reluctance of French public opinion to support continuance of the French military effort in defense of the territory and lawful Government of Vietnam, and the negotiations at Geneva which may be heading for a cease-fire that will permit the Viet Minh to take over Viet-Nam. Nothing can be done about Dien Bien Phu beyond helping the wounded and placing the defeat in perspective. Its loss alone does not mean that the military situation cannot be retrieved. It should be possible to make clear to French opinion that the large number of French military and civilian nationals in Viet-Nam and the extent to which French prestige and [Page 1565] material interests are engaged make it impossible to give up the fight all at once and hastily withdraw unless the French are prepared to tolerate a complete debacle which will virtually ruin France’s prestige and position as a great power and will produce repercussions in North Africa harmful to the unity and strength of the free world. The negotiations at Geneva have left us close to the position of having to choose one of the following alternatives: (1) Abandoning support of France at Geneva; (2) agreeing to proposals which are likely to hand Viet-Nam over to the Communists; (3) breaking off the negotiations at Geneva on Indochina with French consent and either continuing the struggle with minimum help from France or drawing a line of defense which will leave Viet-Nam (or at least Northern Viet-Nam) in the hands of the Viet Minh and Laos and Cambodia at the mercy of the Viet Minh.
I am out of touch with high level political thinking on this problem but feel that I should give you my views after studying recent reports. These are that we should follow up Laniel and De Jean’s suggestions for a re-examination of the framework of our common effort with France in Indochina and seek to raise French will and determination up to the point at which France will be prepared to pursue vigorously the military measures which are necessary to consolidate the French and Vietnamese position in the Tonkin delta. If we are successful in persuading the French to do this we should be prepared to extend the fullest support short of involvement of American troops in combat to replace French troops, there is a good chance that a much stronger position can be quickly attained. Our present information suggests that we must achieve this by next October if the delta is to be held.
If the French are unwilling to pursue the military effort necessary to consolidate the position in the Delta, it would seem desirable to secure British and French consent to ending the Indochina discussions at the Geneva Conference as soon as possible. I think we should be prepared to take the matter to the UN.
In view of the unlikelihood of getting rapid action in the UN we should make plans to assist, if necessary, in removing French nationals from the Delta (as the NSC policy requires) and concert measures for air and naval action to retain the Tonkin delta at the same time that we vigorously pursue consultations directed toward strengthening the prospects of combined military action to defend the rest of Southeast Asia and political action to secure maximum support for all military measures that we find it necessary to take either alone or in conjunction with our allies.
In the absence of participation of Asian allies in a military operation under the aegis of the UN and at the request of the Associated States Governments I think it would be a tragic mistake to send American [Page 1566] ground troops into the Tonkin delta. I am sure we would take over all the problems which the French military have had with the risk of even greater opposition among the Vietnamese population. We would become embroiled, like the French are now, in a prolonged inconclusive political and military struggle from which it would be ever more difficult to emerge with either victory or honor. I believe also that if we act alone in this the policies and attitudes of governments and opinion in south and southeast Asia will shift from neutrality to opposition or hostility towards the US based on fear and a determination to prevent the US from gaining a foothold in the area which they think would enable it to expand its influence to ultimate political domination.
In covering causes of political disunity in Viet-Nam I have omitted reference to possible dissatisfaction with corruption which Bao Dai condones or from which he profits. This factor is not new and seems likely to be unchangeable if Bao Dai must remain chief of state. Perhaps we should re-examine the necessity of this.