Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1454

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)¹

top secret

[Washington,] May 14, 1954.

Notes Made by Mr. MacArthur for his own information, following a meeting between the Secretary and Mr. Allen Dulles.²

In a conversation with the Secretary, Mr. Allen Dulles said he and some of his people had been thinking about steps which might be taken to bolster the situation in Indochina. He said they had come up with the following ideas as possibilities for further consideration:

1. It was important to bolster the internal political situation in Vietnam. The return of Bao Dai might be helpful but perhaps he should delegate his powers to a strong person. If Bao Dai would not return, perhaps he could make such a delegation of authority. The present situation was disintegrating because there was no real leadership and most of the key Vietnamese were in Europe.

The Secretary showed Mr. Dulles a draft telegram since despatched to Paris, Geneva, Saigon, and Hanoi requesting our people to discuss this matter with the French and give us any ideas which might be developed.³

2. The second point that seemed essential was to clean up the military command situation in Indochina. Navarre was pretty well discredited and Cogny seemed to be the only available individual who had the knowledge and ability to succeed him. If there was anything to be done to have Cogny replace Navarre, this would probably be helpful. The Secretary mentioned that Admiral Radford had indicated Cogny had been out in Indochina for three years and was not in too good health. Mr. Sturm was queried (he had seen Cogny three weeks ago before departure from Indochina) and he said that Cogny seemed to be in good shape. (There was no further discussion on this point and there was no decision on how it might be possible to encourage Navarre’s replacement by Cogny. There was general agreement, however, that this change would be most desirable.)

3. Mr. Dulles said it seemed important to get the general officer requested by Laniel over to Paris to talk to the French.

The Secretary said the officer had left this afternoon at 3 o’clock.

4. Mr. Dulles suggested that it might be useful to send one or two officers from our MAAG to Laos and Cambodia. They would be sent without fanfare, but their presence might help to bolster the Laotians’ and Cambodians’ morale as indicative of our interest.

The Secretary indicated that this might be a possibility but we wished to avoid building up extravagant expectations in either country or committing our prestige in the face of the present precarious situation, which might come apart in a matter of days or several weeks.

Mr. Dulles agreed and said his thought was that a couple of officers might go to each capital and be attached to our missions for observation purposes and to get a first-hand look at the situation. The Secretary indicated that he did not see objection to this. I had the impression that Mr. Dulles would explore this possibility further.

5. Mr. Dulles made reference to Ambassador Donovan’s proposal regarding the building of an airfield in Thailand.⁴ He said he knew the military objected to assigning and tying down a Wing in Thailand, but he thought we should go ahead and build an airfield, leaving open the question of the planes that would use it. This action, he felt, would bolster the morale of the Thais in their continued independence and security.

The Secretary expressed general agreement. He added that he had talked to Admiral Radford about this question, and Admiral Radford had indicated a strong reluctance to do much with respect to Thailand. The Admiral had expressed the view that we should go after the seat of Communist power in the Far East, namely, China. If we did not do this he felt that measures we took around the periphery of Indochina would be of little avail. It was pointed out to Admiral Radford that whereas Asiatic peoples might be very glad to receive the support of the US to enable them to maintain their integrity and independence, they would be reluctant or opposed to joining with the US in an attempt to destroy Communist power in China. Psychologically, any efforts we made in this direction would probably result in the Asiatics feeling that we were trying to use them in our efforts to get at China rather than that we had a general interest in supporting their independence.

6. Reference was made to the Cabinet meeting this morning and a question which arose there as to whether we could not stake out a line which if the Communists crossed would result in war.⁵ The difficulty in staking out such a line, with the Communists operating through subversion from within, was discussed. The Secretary said he had been turning over in his mind the possibility of negotiating security treaties in the immediate future with Formosa and Thailand. These treaties would in a sense stake out a position with respect to these two countries. Mr. Allen Dulles indicated that he thought this possibility was worth considering.

1. The source text bears the handwritten notation “No copies, no distribution.”
2. The appointment book of Secretary Dulles indicates that this meeting occurred at 4 p.m. Those present were the Secretary, Allen Dulles, MacArthur, and Sturm of PSA (for part of the meeting). (Princeton University, Dulles papers, “Daily Appointments”)
3. The telegram has not been identified.
4. For documentation on this subject, see volume XII.

5. The minutes of the Cabinet meeting of May 14 read in part as follows:

   “Indo-China—Sec. Dulles commented on the difficulty of preventing complete collapse in Indo-China in the face of French and English attitudes and situations. He believed the future of Indo-China would depend on the outcome of French negotiations at Geneva in the immediate future. He expressed some optimism over the increasing awareness by some Asiatic countries of the impending danger.

   “The President reported a suggestion that he make a national broadcast to clarify the people’s understanding of the situation in Indo-China and he requested Sec. Dulles’ comments on its desirability. Mr. Dulles believed such a broadcast might be best accomplished in about a week, after more can be known about the intent of our Allies.

   “Sec. Weeks inquired about the possible parallel between the situation in Indo-China and the international developments of the 1930’s. Sec. Dulles discussed some of the difficulties of ‘drawing a line’, particularly the differentiation made by foreign nations between overt aggression and internal subversion.” (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file)

   Sinclair Weeks was Secretary of Commerce.