751G.00/5–1454: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
niact
[Received 6:39 p.m.]
4383. Repeated information niact Geneva 237. Limit distribution. Eyes only Under Secretary. I saw Laniel and Schumann this evening regarding Deptel 4023.1 Before discussion started on reftel, Laniel made a number of observations and asked two additional questions. He said that he was sending General Ely to Indochina immediately. He will leave on Saturday2 or Sunday and will stay in Indochina only two to four days. Purpose of his visit is to check up on military situation on the spot and on physical and mental condition of General Navarre. Because of Ely’s prospective absence from Paris, Laniel suggested that General Trapnell, or whoever else we plan to send to Paris in answer to Laniel’s request for American military advice, arrive approximately Thursday of next week. General Ely will undertake such re-grouping of French forces and shortening of lines as may be necessary. This will probably include withdrawal of portion, and maybe large portion, of the French forces now in Laos. Final decisions, however, will only be taken upon return of General Ely to Paris.
Laniel then posed following two questions: One, could the United States find a way to guarantee the borders and the independence of Laos and Cambodia. If such a guarantee could be made, he felt it [Page 1567] would be of great help after the French forces had been withdrawn. Laniel’s second question dealt with action United States will take in the case of intervention by MIG 15’s aircraft. He said that for his own protection here he would like definite assurance, written if possible, that U.S. aviation would come instantly to the help of French forces in delta if they were attacked by MIG’s. He said that he would have no defense before parliament or French public opinion if he was not able to obtain some such assurance as there were no adequate antiaircraft defenses in the delta.
Finally, Maurice Schumann transmitted a request of Bidault’s that U.S. do everything possible in the next days to accelerate delivery of planes and equipment in the event that a cease fire should be negotiated at Geneva which would naturally bring to a halt such deliveries.
I then referred to question of location of negotiations and expressed Dept’s views in favor of Paris. Schumann and Laniel agreed that Paris would be preferable to Washington and accordingly it can be accepted as agreed that negotiations along lines of reftel will continue to take place in Paris.
I then outlined requirements listed in paragraphs 2 and 3 of reftel. Laniel and Schumann listened very quietly and seriously and on the whole appeared well pleased with this clarification of U.S. position. They said that naturally they did not have any info regarding the views of other countries in the area and they would appreciate being kept informed by U.S. of progress toward fulfilling condition indicated in paragraph 2(b) which was beyond their control. They were particularly impressed and pleased by indication in that paragraph that actual participation by U.K. was no longer a prerequisite to U.S. action.
Laniel and Schumann had one serious objection to U.S. conditions. This, as expected, was to the condition that France publicly accord to Associated States right of withdrawal from French Union at any time. When I explained U.S. reasons for this position as outlined in Deptel 4064,3 they said they could see how such a statement might be of some help with Nehru but that French public opinion would never understand why it was necessary to make such a statement when it had never been requested by any of the three Associated States. They then pointed out the fact that the Viet Minh armistice proposals, dishonest though they were, nevertheless looked toward the possibility of the Viet Minh joining the French Union. (Comment: I am certain that unless we can find some way to get around this requirement, French will never ask for outside assistance.) After hearing strong statement on the subject by both Laniel and Schumann, I said that I hoped we could continue conversations on this subject in order to find a formula [Page 1568] that would satisfy U.S. requirements and at the same time could be accepted by the French parliament. Laniel and Schumann agreed that we should talk further on this subject.
Laniel and Schumann had one other question referring to subparagraph 2(e) which states that forces from U.S. would be principally air and sea “and others”. They asked me to find out what was meant by other forces. Laniel indicated that it would be very important to have artillery forces as well as some ground forces. In this connection, they mentioned the possibility of the use of Marines. (Comment: I feel that while French Govt would not look forward in present circumstances to the necessity of any substantial involvement by U.S. ground forces, they nevertheless feel that it is very important that we provide at least some token ground forces so that our participation is not limited strictly to naval and air forces.)
Both Laniel and Schumann accepted without question as being wholly justified U.S. requirement that conditions be accepted by French Cabinet and endorsed by National Assembly. They then said that they would probably want to speak to me over the weekend after they had had time to think further regarding U.S. conditions. I made it clear that conditions as outlined represented present high level thinking in Washington and did not represent as yet any commitment on the part of U.S. Govt. Schumann then said that negotiations should be pursued in the greatest secrecy until such time as full agreement had been reached. He said that premature press leaks could make things most difficult and he referred to an AP press story today from Washington. Laniel and Schumann then said that they hoped that negotiations could continue rapidly and that when and if full agreement had been reached, we would be in a position to make public declaration of a sort which would influence Communist negotiators at Geneva.