Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

033.4111/5–1054: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

Paris, May 10, 1954—5 p.m.
[Received 1:18 p.m.]

4292. Eyes only Secretary. Re Deptel 4003.¹ Since fall of Dien Bien Phu all leading Frenchmen with whom I have talked have gone out of way to be extremely critical of British and in particular of Churchill, whom they picture as 1954 version of Chamberlain at Munich. This includes Laniel, Maurice Schumann, Rene Mayer, Mrs. Paternotre, Christiaens (Secretary of Air Force), General Fay and others.

French presently feel that there is marked divergence in US and UK policy toward Indochina and that US is endeavoring to persuade British towards concept of united action. The hope that US either will be successful in persuading British or will eventually act without British is a real sustaining force in French governmental circles today.

Churchill and Eden visit would inevitably be looked upon by French as culmination of attempt to reconcile US and British policy in Southeast Asia. As a result French would follow meeting with bated breath to see what progress it made toward laying foundation for “united action.” French reaction to meeting would depend entirely on its outcome. If British agreed to proceed with some effective form of united action, French would regard meeting as triumph for US and French points of view and would be most happy about it. If on the other hand, there was no progress toward united action concept and US seemed to accept British point of view, present French inclination to feel that they are being abandoned by their friends in face of the Communist enemy would certainly be strengthened. This would naturally tend to strengthen neutralist thinking here and to weaken forces favoring EDC.

Thus if we cannot move British toward united action, and if we wish to maintain French spirit, it will be most important to clearly indicate that we are not letting British tie our hands. In short I feel French reaction to Churchill visit will depend primarily on results of visit on US policy toward Indochina and secondly on results of visit on UK policy toward Indochina.

Dillon

1. In telegram 4003 to Paris, May 10, the Department of State reported that British Prime Minister Churchill had suggested that he visit Washington. The Embassy in Paris was asked for an estimate of the French reaction to such a visit. (033.4411/5–1054) For documentation on the Churchill visit of June 1954, see volume VI.