Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/5–1154

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Counselor (MacArthur)

top secret

[Washington,] May 11, 1954.

Subject:

• Informal and Unofficial Notes on Meeting at the White House on Indochina, afternoon of May 10, 1954.¹

Participants:

• The President
• Secretary Dulles
• Secretary Wilson
• Deputy Secretary of Defense Anderson²
• Admiral Radford
• Mr. Bowie
• Mr. MacArthur

At Secretary Dulles’ request the meeting was called to consider Paris’ telegram 4287³ which contained a request from Prime Minister Laniel: (1) that a U.S. general officer be sent to Paris to advise on the regrouping of French forces in Indochina; (2) a request from Laniel as to the circumstances and conditions under which the U.S. would intervene in the Indochina conflict and what it might be prepared to do.

With respect to (1) above, it was agreed that General Trapnell was the most qualified officer available and that he should be sent to Paris to discuss the redisposition of French forces with Prime Minister Laniel, Defense Minister Pleven and General Ely. There was agreement that such discussions should take place, if the French Assembly supports Laniel in the debate scheduled to begin May 11. Secretary Wilson mentioned that such discussions might imply U.S. obligations or responsibilities and there seemed tacit agreement that General Trapnell’s terms of reference make clear that the responsibilities of the U.S. were not engaged and that such discussions would not imply a U.S. commitment. It was also agreed that Ambassador Dillon should handle the political aspects raised in point 2 above but that General Trapnell should, of course, have full knowledge of the U.S. position. The President indicated that it would be appropriate for Ambassador Dillon to be present at discussions which General Trapnell might have in Paris. Admiral Radford said he believed Trapnell was on leave at the moment and would have to be called back to the Pentagon for briefing and consultation with the Chiefs which would probably take at least a couple of days.

The discussions then turned to the conditions under which the U.S. might participate in the Indochina conflict. Secretary Dulles handed the President a piece of paper on which he said he had hastily jotted down, following his telephone conversation with the President, conditions which seemed essential from the U.S. viewpoint. (The original of this paper is attached hereto—Miss Bernau has it.)⁴ The President, Secretary Wilson, Secretary Dulles, Mr. Anderson and Admiral Radford then discussed the paper and there was agreement that the points made by the paper were basic conditions which would have to be met.

With respect to the participants in this collective action which the U.S. would join, the President made it quite clear that he would only propose U.S. intervention on the basis of collective action. It was agreed that Thailand and the Philippines in addition to the Associated States were essential to indicate Asian participation and that there should be evidence that Australia and New Zealand would also participate and perhaps eventually the U.K., although that might not be possible initially.

There was fairly detailed discussion with respect to the item which called for French guarantee of complete independence to the Associated States, including an option to withdraw from the French Union. Secretary Dulles said that we were on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, it was essential to eliminate from the minds of the Asians any belief that we were intervening in Indochina in support of colonialism. On the other hand, the truth of the matter was that the Associated States were not in a position to enjoy complete independence. They did not have the trained personnel necessary to administer their respective countries and the leadership was not good. In a sense if the Associated States were turned loose, it would be like putting a baby in a cage of hungry lions. The baby would rapidly be devoured. After some discussion as to whether the French might specify that the Associated States could opt for withdrawal from the French Union either five or ten years after the cessation of hostilities, it was agreed that the exact period of time should not be fixed at this moment. There would, however, prior to action on the part of the U.S. have to be a satisfactory agreement on specific length of such a period and this agreement would have to be entirely satisfactory to the Associated States and could not be the result of French pressure.

The President then said he felt that if the French agreed to the terms, the question of his presentation to the American Congress and people was of great importance. He believed that he should appear before a joint session of Congress, set forth the full circumstances, and seek a Congressional resolution which would enable him to use the armed forces of the U.S. to support the free governments that we recognize in that area. He asked Secretary Dulles to have the State Department start work on a first draft of such a message. He would have to be in a position to indicate that the U.S. was acting in concert with its friends and allies in the area and on the direct and formal invitation of France and the three Associated States. It was also important that he be able to make clear to the Congress that the U.N. was not being by-passed and was involved in the matter. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the question of the timing and procedures involved in the various conditions set forth in this paper would require careful working out but that it should be possible to indicate to the Congress that the basic conditions had been or would be met.

The Secretary also pointed out that thus far we had only a request from Laniel and that the responsibility of the French Government and French Parliament was not engaged by Laniel’s request to Dillon. It was important that our action be based on a formal request which had the backing of the French Government and Parliament.

1. According to the President’s appointment book, this meeting took place at 4:30 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”)
2. Robert B. Anderson, Deputy Secretary of Defense since May 3.

3. For telegram 4287 from Paris, May 10, see p. 1522. Secretary Dulles discussed that telegram with Admiral Radford by telephone at 3 p.m. The Secretary’s files contain the following record of that conversation: “The Sec. called and said he has just seen the advance cable from Dillon re his talk with Laniel. He thinks it is of the utmost importance, and will see that the Adm. gets it. For the first time they want to sit down and discuss the military situation, regrouping of troops, etc. It is encouraging that they seem willing to do business with us so we can move and get Congressional support.”

   The Admiral called back at 4:22 p.m. The record of that conversation read as follows:

   “Adm. R. called and said he had the message and is wondering what the next move is. The Sec. said he was just talking with MacArthur and Bowie about it. In a way it is encouraging, and R. agreed and said it is too bad it wasn’t done two months ago. The Sec. referred to two requests—they are going over the ‘circumstances which’. The big hurdle is should we be willing to act without the British. R. thinks so along with the Sec., but that is political, said the Sec. As far as the military is concerned, R. said it is no help to us. The VP feels we can. The Sec. said he is lunching with the President tomorrow on other matters, and he will bring this up. R. thinks we should move faster. The Sec. said he will call and try to work something out for this p.m.

   “The Sec. called the President, and they will go right over.

   “The Sec. called Radford back and he will be over also with Wilson and/or Anderson.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)

4. The note by Secretary Dulles does not accompany the source text. Reference is to Phyllis D. Bernau of the office of the Secretary of State.