751G.00/5–1054: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State
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[Received 10:52 a.m.]
4287. Repeated information Saigon 509, niact Geneva 204. Department and Geneva limit distribution. Saigon eyes only Ambassador. Laniel asked me to come to see him at 10 Sunday night.1 I found him [Page 1523] in a strong and courageous mood reminiscent of the conversations I had last summer at the beginning of the negotiations over the Navarre plan and quite in contrast with his mood of the past few weeks. He stated that he plans to take a very firm position in the National Assembly on Tuesday when Indochina problem comes up again. He plans to say that there are decisions of vital military importance to be taken daily in Indochina and equally important decisions to be taken daily at Geneva. If the National Assembly has someone else in mind whom they can put into office promptly to handle these decisions in a better fashion than he can, they should do so, but that if they are not prepared for the immediate reconstitution of a new government (which they are not) they should stop talking about Indochina and let the government get on with its difficult task.
Laniel then expressed considerable concern regarding (1) the prospects at Geneva; and (2) and more important, the military situation in Indochina. He felt that Indochina phase of Geneva conference2 had got off to a bad start and considered it very likely that in view of the division and weakness among the Western powers, the Communists will not accept the French proposal for a cease-fire with guarantees, but will press for what in effect would be total surrender.
He said it had been made clear to the French delegation by the Communists that they could not have any conversations direct with the Viet Minh at Geneva but must in all cases proceed through the Chinese. This, plus the fact of large scale Chinese intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, made it clear that the enemy France is facing is not the Viet Minh rebels, but Communist China. Laniel observed that Communist China had fought the whole UN to a standstill in Korea. Obviously France alone was no match for China. The strength with which the French could oppose Chinese propositions at Geneva would have a direct connection with the amount of support they received from the other Western powers, particularly the US. In the final analysis, the only such support, which he felt would have any real effect on the Chinese, would be the direct threat of US military intervention. He very much feared that the Communist side would attempt to drag out the negotiations by interminable procedural debates on such subjects as the admission to the conference of non-existent Communist Governments of Laos and Cambodia until such time as they could gain a military decision in the field.
Laniel then turned to the immediate military problem. He said that the Viet Minh had announced that they would not cease operations [Page 1524] this year during the monsoon. Their next objective, after Dien-Bien-Phu, would in all probability be Hanoi. Under ordinary circumstances it should take the Viet Minh approximately a month to move their troops from Dien-Bien-Phu to the Hanoi area. However, it might be possible to reduce this period to two or three weeks if the Viet Minh made an all-out effort. He also feared that in view of the success which the Chinese have had with their military intervention at Dien-Bien-Phu, they would not now hesitate to intervene further with supplies and even with additional personnel, to the extent necessary to gain a knockout victory at Hanoi.
It therefore was vitally important, as a first order of business, for the French to decide how to regroup their forces in Indochina so as best to protect the expeditionary corps. Laniel said that he would much prefer to take these military decisions with the aid of competent US military advice, rather than to take them by himself. He also said that he would have to know, in connection with making his decisions, what, if any, military action the US might be prepared to take in Indochina and under what, if any, circumstances. If there was no possibility of US military help at any point, the regroupment of forces would have to be much more drastic, and the first thing to be done would be the complete evacuation and abandonment to the Viet Minh of the entire territories of Laos and Cambodia. He stated that there were 15 French Union battalions presently in Laos which would have to be redeployed to the Delta or to some area near the sea. In addition, the French-held lines in the Delta would have to be greatly shortened.
As a specific request, Laniel asked that a US General officer, fully familiar with the terrain and conditions in Indochina be sent to Paris immediately to confer with General Ely, Pleven and himself. He said that at least in the first instance, it would be imperative to preserve the utmost secrecy concerning this mission and that the only people who would be informed of it, in addition to the three previously mentioned, would be Bidault and Maurice Schumann. He said that it was impossible to spare General Ely at this time for a trip to Washington, which was the reason for his request that a US officer come to Paris. He emphasized the importance of the US officer being fully up to date and informed regarding the terrain and possibilities in Indochina. In addition to the help which this officer could give, Laniel said that he would also require definite information from me as to what the US Government might be prepared to do in the way of military effort. He emphasized the great need for speed and hoped that he could have an answer in principle very shortly to his request for advice from a US [Page 1525] General. If the answer were favorable, the US General should arrive before the end of the week in order to be fully effective.3
- May 9.↩
- The Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference began on May 8.↩
In telegram 4294 from Paris, May 10, Ambassador Dillon stated the following: “It has occurred to me that an excellent choice for the general officer Laniel has in mind is General Trapnell who was recently relieved of his duties as Chief of MAAG–Saigon. Reports here as to his ability, tact and technical qualifications while in Indochina were of the highest. He is particularly well-qualified to work with French under the present strained circumstances and therefore recommend Department sponsor his candidacy.” (751G.00/5–1054)
Dillon added the following in telegram 4295, also May 10: “Re Saigon’s 298 [798] sent Department 2298 [p. 1520]. Conversation with Laniel last night reported Embtel 4287 indicates that French here are fully prepared to undertake basic re-study of relationships of US, France and Vietnam as described in reference telegram, provided US is willing to give military assistance should war in Indochina continue.” (751G.00/5–1054)
In telegram 2341 from Saigon, May 11, McClintock stated that he thoroughly concurred in the recommendation of Ambassador Dillon as set out in telegram 4287. (751G.00/5–1154)
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