751G.00/5–854: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
priority
[Received May 9—7:27 a.m.]
2290. Sent priority Paris 792, priority Geneva 69, London 52, Hanoi 425. During course of conversation with General Navarre reported Embtel to Department 2289,1 Commander-in-Chief made a number of comments on political situation both international and national.
Navarre said that he was certain that, following Secretary’s statements earlier this year re possibility of using United States power of retaliation and specifically his statement that participation of Chinese experts at Dien Bien Phu was perilously close to Chinese intervention in Indochina war, Communist side had been hesitant for fear United States might in fact come into this conflict militarily. However, following request for United States air intervention at Dien Bien Phu which had been turned down and evident signs of vacillation re United States policy, Communists had been emboldened and had thus decided to wind up Dien Bien Phu forthwith.
If Geneva did not result in an armistice, there was no alternative between defeat and internationalization of war, which meant active military participation by United States. Navarre was certain that France would not find it possible to send necessary additional forces and equipment to carry on struggle alone with Vietnamese.
Meanwhile he was certain that Communist China was prepared to step up its aid to Viet Minh in weapons of all types other than aircraft. Navarre’s estimate of situation is that Chinese would only intervene in use of air power if United States itself came in in similar fashion. [Page 1519] However, in hope that United States would not thus intervene, Chinese would be loath to send aircraft as they were fearful of United States power of retaliation on Chinese cities.
Navarre said that he intended to be very frank even if he might sound critical. He said that United States policy over several years of encouraging Vietnamese to obtain complete theoretical independence had resulted in a situation where Vietnamese had all benefits of independence but neither know-how nor sense of responsibility to defend their independence. He said Vietnamese Government is a “band of marionettes” with no real national leader and that energies of what leaders had appeared were devoted to promoting factional difference and personal advantage. He said National Army was a rabble despite fact that Vietnamese soldier, as his Viet Minh brother had so effectively proved, could be as good as any other soldier in the world. There was no cadre, professional private armies refused to enter national armed forces and two top leaders, Hinh, Commander-in-Chief, and Quat, Minister of Defense, were at swords-points.
It had not been possible to give adequate training to Vietnamese units because, since war was going on continuously everywhere, units once formed were immediately needed in combat. This was in contrast to practice in Korea where, according to Van Fleet’s account, it had been possible to withdraw ROK divisions from the line for rest and retraining.
General Navarre, in discussing problem of making a truly combat-worthy Vietnamese army within scant framework of time which is left, said with considerable irony that if war were internationalized, his first official act would be to request that General O’Daniel assume complete responsibility for Vietnamese National Army. He said, “If, however, you do take over this responsibility, you must be able to put the screws to these people. They will not cooperate by themselves and they will have to be made to.”
I am certain on basis of my previous conversations with Navarre that his offer to General O’Daniel is genuine but only on condition that United States come into this war with all arms. By “internationalization” he means only this; not as General O’Daniel is inclined to hope, a form of internationalization whereby United States would assume responsibility for training and leadership of Vietnamese army and French would assume responsibility for continuing military operations, particularly in Delta.2
- Supra.↩
- In telegram 2292 from Saigon, May 8, McClintock made the following additional comments. He had not attempted to present a rebuttal to Navarre’s criticism of U.S. policy in view of the personal tragedy the General had just experienced in the fall of Dien Bien Phu. McClintock warned, however, that Navarre’s version of events underscored the possibility that “we may expect to see renewed and more calculated attempts by French and others to lay blame for their failures on United States.” (751G.00/5–854)↩