751G.00/5–954: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2298. Repeated information Paris 798, Geneva 73. De Jean last night told me that at 5 a.m. on March 15, that is to say only two days after commencement of battle at Dien Bien Phu, Navarre had called him to say that battle would be lost. This speaks eloquently of French commander-in-chief Indochina and underscores his indecisiveness in failing to mount a relief operation for Dien Bien Phu before it was too late.
De Jean said that Navarre plan ceased to be operational last Christmas when Viet Minh punched across to Mekong at Thakhek. Although enemy had no more than 6 or 7 battalions, French General Franchi with 22 battalions had proved impotent to counter this threat.
De Jean said that time had now come to reconsider whole framework of war in Indochina. I told him of my conversation yesterday morning with Navarre (Embtel 2290 repeated Paris 792, Geneva 69)1 and alternative to defeat would be internationalization of conflict which meant US participation in all arms. I likewise reported to De Jean Navarre’s remark to General O’Daniel that if war did become internationalized he would turn over responsibility for Vietnamese national army to O’Daniel.
I said that I was confident that French Government backed by popular feeling after fall of Dien Bien Phu would not simply scuttle and run from responsibilities here no matter how faint-hearted commander-in-chief might be. I thought that between Navarre’s black and white alternative of US coming in with ground, naval, and air forces in order to gain dubious privilege of training Vietnamese national army, there was a valid middle ground; namely, that French should assume responsibility with such Vietnamese forces as could be spared for defense of Tonkin Delta and that US training command take over Vietnamese national army and whip it into a truly effective combat force.
De Jean seemed personally inclined to agree. He repeated that now is time for us to sit down and go over problem of future relationships of US, France, and Vietnam to continuation of war in Indochina.
By De Jean’s own admission Navarre plan, execution of which was condition precedent to our agreement of September 29, 1953, ceased to be an effective plan last December. US, however, was not notified to that effect nor was US informed that Navarre had given up sponge at Dien Bien Phu only two days after battle began. I think we have ample warrant to call upon French Government to take a new look [Page 1521] not only at September 29 agreements but likewise at entire framework of our military, financial, and political relationships to this conflict.