751G.00/5–854: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
priority
[Received May 9—6:15 a.m.]
2289. Sent Paris 791, Geneva 68, Hanoi 424, repeated information Tokyo 95, Manila 240, Singapore 77, Bangkok 161, London 51, Hong Kong 68. General O’Daniel and I called on General Navarre this morning to present our official and personal homage to General De Castries and his heroic men at Dien Bien Phu.
Navarre gave us following account of end of battle.
Enemy commenced all-out attack at 9 p.m. May 6 and fighting was continuous thereafter for twenty hours. There was exceedingly heavy artillery barrage and for first time in Indochina war French Union forces were subjected to long-range rocket fire of type case from “Stalin organs”. These were undoubtedly of Russian manufacture.
Last contact with De Castries was at 1700 hours yesterday when he reported that Viet Minh were within ten meters of his command post [Page 1517] and that he was destroying his radio forthwith. Air reconnaissance yesterday afternoon revealed that sporadic fighting was continuing in and around central redoubt up to 1900 hours last night.
Navarre said that an agreed sortie plan was made operational by command yesterday morning, on hypothesis that as usual enemy would cease hostilities at dawn. However, Viet Minh continued battle with utmost ferocity throughout day with result that it was impossible for De Castries to carry out this sortie which would have been past “Isabelle”, joining with two and half battalions in that strong point, entire garrison then seeking to fight its way out of Dien Bien Phu basin in general direction of Muong Sai and Luang Prabang, whence relief column of four battalions would have moved north to meet remnants of garrison. However, plan failed. General O’Daniel suspects that probably since De Castries was receiving orders by voice radio enemy command intercepted orders and thus pressed all-out daylight battle to frustrate sortie. Navarre probably with more exactitude says that decision for final all-out uninterrupted assault was timed to cause downfall of fortress on eve IC phase of Geneva conference.
Navarre said that last night on instructions battalions in “Isabelle” sortied but met with superior resistance and were unable to break out. He had no information as of 1100 hours this morning whether “Isabelle” garrison had returned to its old position to continue a last-ditch fight or whether it was being chopped to pieces outside “Isabelle” with possibility of some survivors straggling south.
At commencement of last assault evening of May 6 there were 1,200 wounded of whom 500 were litter cases. These figures do not, however, include large number, perhaps 1,500 in all, of walking wounded who were still in combat. Navarre estimates that following yesterday’s carnage number of severely wounded must be not less than 2,000 and that out of a total garrison of 8,000 men probably four [forty?] percent were in some degree wounded. He thought it possible that Communists in a dramatic play for world opinion might now agree to evacuation of wounded. He agreed with our estimate that had Communists played their hand more cleverly at Geneva, delaying final assault on Dien Bien Phu and offering a cease-fire, it would have been impossible in light of French public opinion to resist accepting such an offer.
Navarre was icily calm but obviously a man who had gone through great strain. He said, although Giap’s losses had been terrific—latest assault waves of Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu were made up 55 percent of raw recruits—he still have [has] capability of bringing his divisions over to Tonkin delta. Navarre, unlike DeJean, did not think that rainy season would stop him since his troops were perfectly [Page 1518] capable of going overland on any terrain. However, with rains it would be more difficult for enemy to move his artillery and heavy equipment. This gave opportunity to French Air Force “now that it had little else to do” to attempt interdiction bombing and strafing on route which Giap would be forced to use. Nevertheless, there was a distinct possibility that within one month Viet Minh would be in force in delta and, if Geneva conference still dragged on, decision might be taken to continue all-out war in delta despite difficulties of water and hot weather. If this happened Navarre said it would be beyond means of Franco-Vietnamese forces to prevent a defeat and that only other alternative would have to be internationalization of war.