Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler)1

top secret
personal and private

RC’S Summary of Principal Points Made by the President in Talking With Republican Leaders2

1.
Attached is outline of points given by R. C. to the President before the meeting.3
2.
The President referred to the weeks, and even months, of consideration which the Executive Department had been giving to all aspects of the Indochina situation. Despite the rash of advice by [Page 1462] columnists, he had seen nothing new that had not already been canvassed.
3.
There was no truth in the story that the United Kingdom stopped the United States from “going in alone”. As he had often told the leaders, the U.S. would never intervene with combat troops solely as a partner of France.
4.
With respect to Dienbienphu, the original position of the French had been that even if it were lost, the enemy casualties would be so great that the French Union forces would really have won a victory. Now, however, France has changed its story, and claims the loss of Dienbienphu may be decisive to the Indochina war. The President expressed the view that the French had been overplaying the loss of Dienbienphu, and that its loss should not be militarily decisive.
5.
Last week the French from Paris requested American help in improving three Laotian airfields. A few days later, General Navarre and the Chief of the French Air Force in Indochina questioned the military desirability of this request. The President remarked that it looked as if the French from Paris were trying to get us to do something for its political effect. While he did not indicate whether or not we would agree to help with these airfields, he re-emphasized the American desire to observe the principle of collective security.
6.
The U.S. had to go along with the idea of the Geneva Conference, because so many of our allies wanted it. When the Conference is over, we will have to have some plain talking with our allies.
7.
It was gratifying to note that New Zealand, Thailand, and Magsaysay had evidenced great readiness to go ahead. Perhaps because of the Australian election, this meant Menzies would take a more hesitant position than Casey had at first indicated. He thought the Australian and New Zealand people were on our side.
8.
Perhaps there is going to be an internal political struggle in Britain, which will lead to a general election. Churchill is probably going to retire. It does not look now as if Britain will participate in general discussions until after the Geneva Conference. (Note: The President did not refer to the Eden memorandum of May 1,4 indicating Britain’s desire for “secret joint talks”).
9.
Secretary Dulles’ original desire for a regional grouping was not to enable intervention, but so that it might not be necessary to intervene. We are continuing to pursue the idea of a regional grouping.
10.
The President agreed, and several times mentioned the desirability of having Dulles thoroughly brief the Congressional Leaders on his return (it was not made clear whether Bi-partisan or Republican [Page 1463] briefing was intended). Immediately on Dulles’ return, the President will have a good talk with him, and try to raise his spirits, which must be somewhat depressed by his experiences at Geneva.
11.
The Vice President pointed out that Nehru at the Colombo Conference had been able to carry along with his neutralist point of view only Indonesia. Pakistan (our friend) had taken the lead in influencing Ceylon and Burma toward a point of view not hostile to the collective grouping. It was significant that the Asian countries were not following Nehru’s leadership at this crucial time.
  1. The source text was transmitted by Cutler to Acting Secretary of State Murphy on May 3. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it was seen by Secretary Dulles, Murphy, and MacArthur.
  2. According to the Presidential appointment book, the following individuals were present at the meeting of May 3: Vice President Nixon; Senators Knowland, Ferguson, and Millikin; Representatives Martin, Arends, and Allen; James Bassett of the Republican National Committee; and members of the White House staff. (Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower records, “Daily Appointments”)

    Another account of this briefing, prepared by Arthur Minnich, Assistant Staff Secretary to the President, read as follows:

    “At the May 3rd conference, the President expressed his amazement at newspaper handling of the question in terms of the United States being taken by surprise. Such was certainly not the case. Also, it was untrue to say that the British had stopped the United States from going into Indo China, for we had never considered going in alone. He noted our current effort to stiffen the French will to continue the fight after the fall of Dienbienphu, especially as the French could regard the fight there as a moral victory because of the vast number of enemy casualties.

    “Turning then to some specific happenings, the President noted how the French had asked our help in developing three airfields in Laos. Just when we were prepared to haul in materials and supervise construction, we were confronted with a statement from the battlefront that the airfields were not wanted. Perhaps the whole matter had been an effort by the French to get the United States involved in giving some sort of support independently of the other free nations.

    “The President concluded that we would have to have some hard talk with our allies after the Geneva Conference. Except for President Magsaysay of the Philippines, the other nations appeared to want to delay any action until after Geneva, in some instances perhaps because of impending elections as in England and Australia. He reported Sec. Dulles’ phrasing that we wanted a concert of power not for the purpose of intervening but for the purpose of obviating any need for intervention.” (Eisenhower Library, White House Office, “Legislative Leadership Conference”)

  3. The one-page outline is not printed.
  4. In a memorandum presented to Secretary Dulles at Geneva on Apr. 30, Foreign Secretary Eden suggested secret bilateral talks on the problem of collective defense in Southeast Asia. See the memorandum of conversation with Eden, Apr. 30, vol. xvi, p. 622. See also volume xii.