Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”
The Director of the Foreign Operations Administration ( Stassen ) to the Secretary of State 1
personal
Dear Foster : When you reach Washington I will be in Paris for the OEEC ministers session. Randy Burgess and Sam Waugh are with me and we have reached agreement on the U.S. position on the anticipated issues. It is an important session with a number of difficulties, but I believe we can get a reasonably satisfactory result.
As you may have heard, I raised the question of further Indo-China policy decisions in the NSC on Thursday.2 May I express my views to you for your consideration. I know that many, if not all, of the views I express are held by you, and I set them out in a complete summary so that you may have definite knowledge of my judgment.
The cables from you and from Admiral Radford, reflecting the U.K. refusal to go along, or to suggest alternatives, and the reports made to the NSC session on 29 April, caused me to conclude that we were then in a position of weakness, without an effective stand, and without sufficient strength of position to carry through Geneva or to prevent the complete fall of Indo-China to the Communists. It seemed imperative to me that you should at once receive, while you were still in Geneva, some indication of future consideration by the NSC and the President of a strong stand, notwithstanding the U.K. attitude.
The complete fall of Indo-China would make it extremely difficult to prevent the fall of Southeast Asia. The fall of Southeast Asia would have a catastrophic effect on Japan, on India, and on Europe, and, of course, on the U.S.
[Page 1464]Thus I feel that we should now take the ultimate policy decision that we will not permit the complete fall of Indo-China. This, of course, means a decision that we will, if necessary, use U.S. combat forces to prevent the complete fall, and the authorization should be obtained from Congress for the Commander-in-Chief to use U.S. combat forces, if essential, and to the minimum extent necessary, and with maximum assistance obtainable from other free nations, to prevent the complete fall of Indo-China to Communist domination, because of the disastrous consequences which would follow such an event.
If we make this ultimate decision promptly, and receive from Congress at an early date this last ditch authority, then we have a policy of strength at the end of the string. We can proceed more effectively to attain a more desirable result through either the accord of our friends, or the concessions and compromise of the Communists, or both.
If we make this ultimate decision, I believe there is a fair chance that some solution better than the ultimate can be obtained, either by an accumulation of joint action of others, such as Thailand and Australia, or by partial yielding by the Communists.
If we make this ultimate decision we can negotiate more firmly with the French over their relations with the Associated States, their training of Viet Nam, and other matters. We can also follow through firmly with the French on EDC
If we do then need to go in, it should be under clear conditions of sovereignty for the Associated States and on their invitation. It should be with a U.S. combined command so that vital control over strategy, tactics, and training will be unquestioned, so that the indigenous population will trust the result, for they do not fear U.S. imperialism, but they do fear French imperialism backed by the U.S. It should be with U.S. Marines as the sole critical U.S. ground force as these forces are now in the Far East, are experienced in jungle fighting, and public opinion will accept Marine action better than Army division action.
If we go in we should make it clear at all times that we are doing so to prevent the complete fall of Indo-China to the Communists, that we do not intend to drive to the China border, and that we will continue to be willing to have a settlement satisfactory to the Associated States negotiated. If we attempt with U.S. troops to completely defeat the Communists it will make Chinese Communist intervention and a Chinese war and a world war an odds on probability. It would also take heavy casualties, whereas the southern half can be held, a stalemated or divided Indo-China can be established, Southeast Asia can be saved, without heavy casualties and with a minimum danger of a Chinese war or a world war.
The Indo-Chinese war was going on when the new Eisenhower–Dulles policies were established. It requires special action to resolve. [Page 1465] The world knows of our analysis of its vital nature to U.S. interests; the U.S. cannot then be impotent or the result will be very, very bad.
On the other hand, in the absence of a settlement, the Communists are unlikely to accept a complete U.S. victory in Indo-China without going to war. A complete Viet Nam victory attained over a period of years with well trained native troops and native generals may be a possibility without a Chinese war.
The present Korean situation is not a desirable one, but it is better than a Chinese war, and it is better than a Korean loss. It was attained through U.S. strength of position under your brilliant diplomacy last year. Indo-China is in many respects parallel, and in other respects similar to the Greek situation in 1947. U.S. action in Indo-China, which combines the lessons of these two experiences, appears to me to be the most desirable alternative of a series of unattractive alternatives with which we are faced.
May I elaborate a bit on certain of the points I have stated. The United States does have the strength, even though only the non-Communist people of Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia join with us, to prevent the complete fall of Indo-China. The French, as a minimum, would phase out in an orderly manner as the British did in Greece. As a maximum they would continue their present effort under a combined U.S. command and with sovereignty granted to the Associated States, in order that they would participate in a favorable final conclusion, instead of withdrawing in demoralized defeat. Thailand would almost certainly join us, at least in the use of her airfields by U.S. forces and in receiving U.S. Army divisions for reserves. Australia may join after her national election. After that I believe the U.K. may reverse her stand and join us. But whatever the sequence, the first step for strength is a firm U.S. decision not to let Indo-China fall.
If Communist China comes into the war in response to this defensive Southeast Asia approach on our part, if she insists that Communism take over Indo-China, it means that she will insist on Communist control of Southeast Asia as a price of peace. Such a price would be the down payment on war with China rather than a payment for peace. Thus, if Communist China insists on this and is willing to go to war for it, we must meet it now, grave and conclusive though it be.
This is one of the moments of history when the U.S. as leaders must decide, as leaders must act, and proceed to mobilize the maximum of followers, but not permit the followers to make the primary decisions.
If the U.S. does decide and does act, even though I accept the full risks involved, I am convinced that a reasonably satisfactory conclusion can be attained. The new strength of Germany and Japan will then increasingly follow the U.S. in its policy of strength, and the vacillating elements of the free world will also follow, perhaps with [Page 1466] reluctance and with irritation, but follow nevertheless. Weakness of U.S. leadership will open divisive chasms in the non-Communist world which cannot be bridged, even though the weakness in U.S. position is in itself a concession to other non-Communist nations.
I am certain that a direct request of the President, personally delivered to the Congress, with full explanation, will result in such authority being granted by more than a two-third’s vote.3 The authority should be obtained promptly, prior to any certainty that it will be used. The free world would at once be essentially strengthened and inspired in its resistance in every respect to aggressive Communism.
I have written of my views, as I spoke at the NSC session, solely for the purpose of contributing toward your consideration and analysis. I will, of course, accept and thoroughly support your conclusions and those of President Eisenhower.
Only General E. W. Porter, my member of the Planning Board of the NSC, knows of this letter. Your use of it is entirely at your discretion.
Sincerely,
- Gen. R. W. Porter, FOA representative on the NSC Planning Board, signed this letter for Governor Stassen. A typewritten note at the bottom of the source text states that it was transcribed without changes from a handwritten text of May 2.↩
- For extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 194th Meeting of the NSC, Apr. 29, see p. 1431.↩
- By letter of May 11, Stassen sent the following documents to Secretary Dulles: 1) “First Preliminary Draft of Senate Resolution to Follow Up Presidential Message Personally Delivered to the Joint Session of Congress;” 2) “First Preliminary Draft—Outline for Suggested Address of the President to a Joint Session of the Congress.” A notation on the signed original of Stassen’s letter by Roderic O’Connor, Special Assistant to the Secretary, indicates that no reply was transmitted. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Indochina”)↩