751G.00/5–354: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon ( McClintock ) to the Department of State
2188. Repeated information Paris 747, Geneva 38. Geneva’s 10, repeated Department Secto 32, Paris 1391 makes very wan reading in light of recent decree by Bao Dai as reported Embtel 2164 repeated Paris 731, Hanoi 396 April 30, which hands security forces of South Vietnam to gangster Binh Zuyen. This measure, which is indirect personal responsibility of chief of state, is comparable to city of Chicago placing its police force in hands of Al Capone during latter’s heyday.
As indicated Embtel 2164, this measure has had shattering effect on nascent movements toward national unity. It is one more evidence of Bao Dai’s consistent policy to divide and rule. However, it comes at time when unity not division is what we need. Under these circumstances I continue question whether it is sound policy to center our hopes on Bao Dai. In fact we stand in perilous analogy to situation we found ourselves in with China, supporting corrupt Kuomintang against disciplined and fanatic Communists.
Ambassador Heath, it will be recalled, has officially congratulated both Bao Dai and Prime Minister Buu Loc on new Vietnamese Government’s insistence that graft and corruption must be stamped out of national life. Therefore, I recommend that Ambassador Heath call on Bao Dai and remind him of his government’s public stand on this point. I feel likewise that time has come for US Government to indicate very plainly to this chief of state that he cannot expect American support for his regime if he cooperates on immoral basis outlined in Embtel 2164.
In addition to recall to Bao Dai of his obligations as monarch, we should ask him to take immediate remedial measures. These could include either rescission of decree handing security forces to Binh Zuyen or at very minimum refusal of Bao Dai to carry out his proposed intention to place police force of Saigon–Cholon in hands of Sang’s brother, Lai Huu Tai. Bao Dai ought also in our opinion to send his Prime Minister back to Vietnam to give more immediate control to government now riven as never before by internal dissension and personal animosity (wide open hatred expressed by Quat for Hinh and Hinh for Quat).
[Page 1461]If some such measures as these can be taken forthwith, aspirations set forth Geneva 10 to Saigon might have some chance of implementation.
Department pass Embtel 2164 to Geneva.
- In telegram Secto 32 from Geneva, Apr. 29, the U.S. Delegation discussed measures which would have to be taken by the French and Vietnamese to counteract the effects of the fall of Dien Bien Phu. For text of Secto 32, see vol. xvi, p. 607.↩