Editorial Note
In his memoirs, President Eisenhower provides the following account of the discussion on Indochina and the Geneva Conference which occurred at the 194th Meeting of the National Security Council, April 29, 1954:
“That afternoon Acting Secretary of State Bedell Smith reported on behind-the-scenes movements in Paris and Geneva. Eden’s position was that the British would support any peace agreement the French would make and would be willing to guarantee it; i.e., to put their weight behind its enforcement. They were not willing to enter into any regional defense agreement with non-Communist countries to safeguard Southeast Asia until after the Geneva Conference.
“Bedell’s report included the statement that Australia and New Zealand had withdrawn from their original position favorable to united action. More encouraging was the news that the French had signed a new, preliminary agreement with the Associated States the day before in Paris, and that nearby Thailand was showing that they recognized the Communist danger to themselves by asking us to increase the level of our military assistance.
“The French kept alive the possibility that we could solve some of our ‘constitutional problems’ and launch a unilateral air strike—on their terms. They were said to be trying to prevent the fall of Dien Bien Phu for three weeks in this hope.
“The situation at Dien Bien Phu, however, had now become impossible. The French defense area had shrunk to a perimeter fifteen hundred yards in diameter, making it extremely difficult to drop supplies to the garrison. The French force was down to. 8500 effective infantrymen and 1200 artillerymen—against a Vietminh force of 40,000. One relief column of 3000 native troops had made a feeble effort to rescue Dien Bien Phu, but obviously could not affect the battle.
“We discussed once more the possibility of United States intervention by an air strike in Indochina. Although the three service chiefs—Army, Navy, Air Force—had recommended against this course, there was some merit in the argument that the psychological effect of an air strike would raise French and Vietnamese morale and improve, at least temporarily, the entire situation.
“During the course of this meeting I remarked that if the United States were, unilaterally, to permit its forces to be drawn into conflict in Indochina and in a succession of Asian wars, the end result would be to drain off our resources and to weaken our over-all defensive position. [Page 1449] If we, without allies, should ever find ourselves fighting at various places all over the region, and if Red Chinese aggressive participation were clearly identified, then we could scarcely avoid, I said, considering the necessity of striking directly at the head instead of the tail of the snake, Red China itself.
“But in the meantime, the problem was to solve the current dilemma. Even without a mechanism for united action, we could still go on giving the French considerable material aid. Moreover, Bedell Smith at my direction was to go to Geneva the next afternoon and invite the ANZUS deputies to meet with him that evening. Bedell was not at all sure that merely because the British had turned down our invitation to join a regional grouping we should abandon the whole effort.” (Mandate for Change, pages 354–355)
In his memoir account, Richard Nixon adds the following:
“At the end of April the situation at Dien Bien Phu took another turn for the worse, and it did not look as if the French forces could hold on much longer. I made a diary note on April 29:
“The NSC meeting started at ten o’clock and did not end until one. The last hour and three-quarters was spent discussing Indochina.
“Radford reported on the military situation and on his conversations with the French and British. Bedell Smith read a message from Dulles which indicated considerable pessimism but that Dulles was going to stand firm for the American position.
“The President was extremely serious and seemed to be greatly concerned about what was the right course to take.
“After the reports were made, Harold Stassen said that he thought that decision should be to send ground troops if necessary to save Indochina, and to do it on a unilateral basis if that was the only way it could be done.
“The President himself said that he could not visualize a ground troop operation in Indochina that would be supported by the people of the United States and which would not in the long run put our defense too far out of balance. He also raised the point that we simply could not go in unilaterally because that was in violation of our whole principle of collective defense against communism in all places in the world.
“After Stassen’s proposal had been discussed, I said that in my judgment winning the war in Vietnam was not necessarily a question of committing a lot of ground troops to combat. Sending an Air Force contingent representing a unified alliance would have the double effect of letting the Communists know that we were going to resist further expansion in the area, and of bolstering the morale of the French and the Vietnamese troops. I suggested that we explore the possibilities of developing a Pacific coalition without the British, an alliance with Thailand, the Philippines, Indochina, Australia, New Zealand, and whatever other nations would join.” (Memoirs of Richard Nixon , pages 153–154)
For the pertinent portions of the memorandum of discussion at the 194th Meeting of the NSC, see page 1431.