751G.13/4–3054: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State
2164. Repeated information Paris 731, Hanoi 396. Decree signed by Bao Dai before departure for Paris gives Binh Zuyen full control Vietnamese Surete effective May 1. Lai Huu Sang, military counselor to General Le Van Vien, Binh Zuyen commander in chief, named director Surete, and Sang’s brother, Lai Huu Tai, now political counselor to Vien, is reportedly soon to be given directorship Saigon–Cholon police. Thus, all civilian law enforcement agencies in south will be in hands of scarcely disguised gangsters.
Binh Zuyen attempted gain power over security service back in January with advent Buu Loc, who wisely would have none of it. Buu Loc has allegedly continued oppose move, but was overruled by Bao Dai.
Probably reason for this move is large concession in return for Binh Zuyen obedience to April 9 decree amalgamating paramilitary forces into Vietnamese national army. More Machiavellian motive ascribed to Bao Dai by French expert in Ministry of Interior is desire get as much money out of Vietnam through use Binh Zuyen, masters of arts of “squeeze” and extortion, before proposed National Assembly drastically reduces his power and income.
French expert considered transfer Surete to Binh Zuyen “catastrophic”, not only because of general lawlessness, kidnappings, gangland rule which would follow, but principally because of threat to Vietnamese unity which move symbolized. Cao Dais and Hoa Haos were now certain also to demand profitable concessions, so that the south would dissolve into greater chaos, and the much discussed unity of Vietnam, which seemed on point realization year ago, would in his view be completely destroyed.
So far as Viet Minh was concerned, French expert believed Binh Zuyen accession to power would not be damaging to Nationalist cause. Binh Zuyen are anti-Communist, not of course by ideology but for profit. Binh Zuyen would also, he thought, be able handle what he expected would be few Viet Minh May Day demonstrations (see Embtel 2163 April 30).1
- Telegram 2163 from Saigon, Apr. 30, which concerned the possibility of May Day demonstrations, is not printed. (700.001/4–3054)↩