Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, “Project ‘Clean Up’, Indochina”

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Cutler) to the Under Secretary of State (Smith)

top secret

Washington, April 30, 1954.

1. The draft of formal record of action of the NSC Meeting, April 29/54,¹ reads:

“Agreed that, despite the current unwillingness of the British Government to participate at this time and without awaiting developments at the Geneva Conference, the United States should continue its efforts, undertaken pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086b(1),* to organize a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., France, the Associated States, and other nations with interests in the area, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area.²

*NSC Action No. 1086b(1), April 6/54, reads:

“Agreed that the United States should direct its efforts prior to the Geneva Conference toward:

(1) Organizing a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., the U.K., France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and the Philippines, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area.”

2. For the benefit of the Planning Board at its later meeting on April 29/54, I orally expanded the above formal language, as follows:

1) Without awaiting the outcome of the Geneva Conference and despite the negative UK attitude, the State Department would continue to explore the possibility of forming a regional grouping in the Far East without the British; immediately taking up the matter with Australia and New Zealand.³ Such a grouping might include the ROK.

2) Intervention by U.S. with combat forces would still depend on invitation of indigenous nations; a sufficient regional grouping so that it would not appear that the U.S. was acting alone to bail out French colonies and to meet Congressional sentiment, and on Congressional authority. No intervention based on executive action.

3) The State Department should hint to France that U.S. is continuing to explore possible bases upon which to found an approach to Congress for authority to act.

4) The State Department should indicate to the British that, despite UK negative attitude, the U.S. is continuing to explore as indicated in 1) and 3) above.

5) Final action should not be taken until the Secretary of State’s return from Geneva.

3. The following points developed in the Planning Board discussion at the April 29/54 Meeting:

a. It appears France and Vietnam have signed only an agreement later to execute independence papers. The French Cabinet is unwilling to give independence for a further two months (i.e. after Geneva Conference). Accordingly, a basic condition for Congressional authority has not been met. Furthermore, it is impossible to meet the President’s requirement that the indigenous peoples invite and actively desire U.S. intervention. (This has been told to President.)

b. Should decision be made now as to U.S. intention to use “new weapons”, on intervention, in Vietnam on military targets? Would one “new weapon” dropped on Vietminh troop concentrations in reserve behind DBP be decisive in casualties and overwhelming in psycho effect on Vietminh opposition? (Query: could one “new weapon” be loaned to France for this purpose? Could French airmen make a proper drop? Would French Government dare take step?)

c. If U.S. decides that it will use “new weapons” on intervention

(1) Should it tell its proposed associates in regional grouping at outset? Would the effect upon them be to frighten them off?

(2) Will France and Britain take alarm, with possible repercussions on U.S. air bases overseas? If they should seek to cancel our bases on such a ground, how valuable are our allies and these bases?

d. View was expressed that U.S. use of “new weapon” in Vietnam would tend to deter Chinese aggression in retaliation, and that failure to use the “new weapon” in Vietnam would tend to increase chance of Chinese aggression in retaliation (i.e. the Chinese would feel the U.S. was afraid to use its one massive superiority).

e. View was expressed that neither USSR nor China wants a “new weapon” war now, at a time when U.S. had manifest superiority in “new weapons” and delivery capability. Chou En-lai is talking big to bluff the U.S.

Note: Bo had opportunity to discuss generally the foregoing with the President and Vice President this morning.⁴ Their opinion was (1) that the regional grouping should be formed without announcing our intention about the “new weapons”; (2) that the U.S. would unquestionably be asked by its associates what its attitude was toward the use of “new weapons”; (3) that it was very unlikely that a “new weapon” could effectively be used in the jungles around DBP, and that well piloted Corsair strikes with HE bombs and Napalm bombs would be more effective; (4) that we might consider saying to the French that we had never yet given them any “new weapons” and if they wanted some now for possible use, we might give them a few;⁵ (5) that the declarations which we had already made relative to what we would do if China overtly intervened in Indo-China was the important deterrent to Chinese intervention, rather than whether or not we used the “new weapon” in Vietnam; (6) that the important thing was to get a regional grouping together as rapidly as possible.

Robert Cutler

1. See memorandum of discussion at the 194th Meeting of the Council, Apr. 29, p. 1431.
2. The following handwritten addition appears at this point on the source text: “final recommendation in the above regard to await the return and report of the Secretary of State.”
3. The following handwritten marginal notation appears at this point on the source text: “Not able to do so before departure but will have full ANZUS meeting in Geneva on arrival.”

4. In his memoirs Richard Nixon provides the following account of the meeting under reference:

   “The next morning I met with Eisenhower and General Robert Cutler, his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Cutler reported that the NSC planning board had been discussing the possibility of telling our allies that if we went into Indochina, we might use the atom bomb. Eisenhower asked me what I thought about this idea; I said that whatever was decided about using the bomb, I did not think it was necessary to mention it to our allies before we got them to agree on united action. I emphasized, as I had at the NSC meeting, that it might not be necessary to have more than a few conventional air strikes by the united forces to let the Communists see that we were determined to resist. Eisenhower turned to Cutler and said, ‘First, I certainly do not think that the atom bomb can be used by the United States unilaterally, and second, I agree with Dick that we do not have to mention it to anybody before we get some agreement on United action’.” (Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 154)

5. The following handwritten marginal notation appears at this point on the source text: “question of law.”