Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 194th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, April 29, 1954, 10 a.m. ¹

top secret
eyes only

April 29, 1954, 10 a.m.

[Extracts]

The following were present at the 194th Meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were Elbert P. Tuttle for the Secretary of the Treasury; Stanley N. Barnes for the Attorney General (Items 2 and 3); Samuel W. Anderson for the Secretary of Commerce (Item 1); the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Item 4); the Administrator, Reconstruction Finance Corporation (Item 1); the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (Item 4); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President (Items 1, 7 and 8); the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

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7. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Director of Central Intelligence stated that the intelligence community had just completed a National Intelligence Estimate on the consequences of the loss of Dien Bien Phu.² Its conclusions, some of which Mr. Dulles read to the Council, added up to the belief that from the military point of view the fall of the strong point would be very serious but not catastrophic. The political repercussions of the loss of the fortress would be more grave than the strictly military repercussions. Even so, the fall of Dien Bien Phu would not signal the immediate collapse of the French Union position in Indochina. In conclusion, Mr. Dulles pointed out that the intelligence report had had unanimous acceptance by all the agencies.

Admiral Radford, while admitting that the situation described in the Estimate was highly speculative, said the conclusions appeared to him overly optimistic. General Ely, for example, felt strongly that if Dien Bien Phu fell the whole Vietnamese army would melt away.

In reply, Mr. Dulles stated that G–2 had actually wished to present more optimistic conclusions than those reached in the Estimate, and added that he himself had a feeling that, thanks to the way Dien Bien Phu had been played up in the press, we had all become a little panicky on the results of its fall. Mr. Dulles admitted, however, that anything could happen if the fall of Dien Bien Phu caused a psychological collapse.

Admiral Radford pointed out that General Cogny, who in the Admiral’s opinion was an abler officer than General Navarre, was convinced that the Vietminh forces would infiltrate into the delta area very promptly after the fall of Dien Bien Phu. The French were likewise very fearful of Communist-inspired riots in the large towns of Indochina, as occurred in 1946.

. . . . . . .

8. Reports on the Geneva Conference and the Indochina Situation (NSC Action No. 1086)³

Mr. Cutler first called on Secretary Smith to brief the Council on the latest news of the Geneva Conference.

Secretary Smith pointed out that the United States had entered the Geneva Conference with a lesser degree of common understanding and position with its allies than it had entered any previous international conference. When Secretary Dulles had gone to London and Paris before the opening of the Conference, it had looked as though he had obtained a meeting of minds. Such had not previously existed. At least this was the case with the British, even if the French remained very skeptical and pessimistic with respect to the effectiveness of Secretary Dulles’ plan for a regional grouping in Southeast Asia. However, subsequent to the Secretary’s return to Washington, the understanding with the British became unstuck, and the French position veered as a result of the change in the military situation in Indochina.

Secretary Smith then outlined Foreign Secretary Eden’s present position on Indochina. This, in effect, stated that the British would support at Geneva any settlement satisfactory to the French Government and, indeed, would be prepared to discuss the possibilities of some kind of joint guaranty of such a settlement if reached at Geneva. They were unwilling, however, to make any commitments with respect to entering into a regional organization such as proposed by Secretary Dulles, at least until the conclusion of the Geneva Conference. This change of heart on the part of the British had been very disappointing to us, said Secretary Smith, since we had been counting on the British to help us buck up the French at Geneva. However, we could not change the British position, and Mr. Eden had become very irritated when Secretary Dulles attempted to do so.

The Secretary had had one talk with Molotov on Indochina,⁴ and just a few hours earlier Secretary Dulles had sent in his latest appraisal of the situation as it confronted the U.S. at the present time. Secretary Smith then read Secretary Dulles’ appraisal (April 29, 6:10 a.m.),⁵ which contained the following main points.

(1) There may be a change in the French Government after Dien Bien Phu falls, and after the members of the Chamber of Deputies return from their vacation. This change would probably result in a government further to the left, which would be committed to liquidate the French position in Indochina.

(2) The French plan to accept a settlement at Geneva which would permit them to hold certain enclaves in the delta, in the center of Vietnam, and in Cochin China. These enclaves would enjoy U.S. sea and air protection, and they would be used as areas in which indigenous forces could be trained. This would involve additional U.S. economic assistance. Admiral Davis believes that this French plan is not militarily feasible. But it seems the best hope of keeping France in the war. If France and the United States agree to support such a plan, Australia and New Zealand might go along with it, but the U.K. would initially try to prevent the adoption of such a plan. Thailand would join if U.S. action were prompt enough.

(3) The attitude of the Russian and Chinese Communists at Geneva makes Secretary Dulles feel that open U.S. intervention in Indochina would be more likely to be followed by open Chinese intervention, with the strong possibility that general war would result.

(4) The U.K. attitude is one of increasing weakness—fear of atomic attack has badly frightened them.

(5) Our allies are obviously very important to us, but Secretary Dulles believes that they will follow a strong and sound U.S. leadership, not necessarily a warlike one.

Secretary Smith commented that the last point made by Secretary Dulles, in favor of strong U.S. leadership, greatly appealed to him. Secretary Smith also read certain statements from the press ticker made by Chou En-lai, which were extremely truculent in tone and accused the United States of every imaginable outrage, including occupation of Chinese territory, namely, Formosa. Secretary Smith speculated as to whether the tone and content of Chou’s remarks had not heightened Secretary Dulles’ apprehension that the Chinese Communists would intervene in Indochina if the U.S. did.

The President stated that at his press conference earlier this morning he had been asked whether it was true that the British were preventing us from affording the assistance to the French which they desired. The President said that he had replied to this question by pointing out that we had done a great deal already to assist the French, although we had not provided combat assistance. He also pointed out that the British had had nothing whatever to do with our decisions with respect to assisting the French. The President then went on to say that in spite of the views of the Secretary of State about the need of leadership to bring the French and British along, he did not see how the United States, together with the French, could intervene with armed forces in Indochina unless it did so in concert with some other nations and at the request of the Associated States themselves. This seemed quite beyond his comprehension.

Secretary Smith said that the preliminary agreement between France and the Associated States had been signed at Paris yesterday. He was not as yet aware of the details and implications of this agreement, but with respect to other states concerting with the United States, he said that Thailand was already asking us to increase the level of our military assistance. While it was disappointing that Australia and New Zealand had withdrawn from their original favorable reaction to the Dulles plan, Secretary Smith said that it was quite possible that Australia and New Zealand would join the regional grouping after the conclusion of the national elections in Australia. Secretary Smith went on to point out his belief that the French would try to prevent the fall of Dien Bien Phu for three weeks at least, in the hope that during this period we would solve our “constitutional problems” and intervene with an air strike. The French want, if possible, to avoid a military debacle, and they realize that American intervention would have a highly salutary effect on French morale and French public opinion.

The Vice President inquired of Secretary Smith whether the French would actually be willing to settle at Geneva on the basis of a partition of Vietnam which would permit them only the three enclaves. Secretary Smith said that he could not reply with certainty to this question, since he knew nothing about the enclave plan beyond the fact that it had been studied by a pre-Geneva working group in Paris.

Mr. Cutler then called upon Admiral Radford to report to the Council on his conversations with Sir Winston Churchill, the British Chiefs of Staff, and French representatives in Paris and London between the 24th and 26th of April on the subject of Indochina.

Admiral Radford read his report from a written summary which had been prepared on the basis of memoranda of his various conversations. A copy of Admiral Radford’s summary as read to the Council is filed with the minutes of the meeting.⁶

Admiral Radford said that he arrived in Paris on the afternoon of April 24 and immediately conferred with Secretary Dulles on the current attitudes of France and Britain toward Indochina. Thereafter, he and Secretary Dulles met with Anthony Eden.⁷ Admiral Radford informed Mr. Eden of the views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with respect to the deteriorating situation in Indochina and the serious results which would ensue. In particular, he pointed out the U.S. view that Southeast Asia would not be militarily defensible after the loss of Indochina. Mr. Eden said that the presentation by Secretary Dulles painted a worse picture of the Indochina situation than the French had given to the British. He was therefore revising his plan to go directly to Geneva, and was returning to London that night in order to talk over the matter with the Prime Minister and the British Cabinet before proceeding to Geneva.

Admiral Radford saw Secretary Dulles again after the latter’s conversation with Laniel, who again emphasized to the Secretary the seriousness of the French situation in Indochina and the urgent necessity of U.S. intervention to prevent a catastrophe.

At the urgent request of General Ely, the Chairman of the French Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford met with him on Saturday night.⁸ Ely stated that he came to Radford as a representative of the French Government as a consequence of a Cabinet meeting just ended. Apparently, said Admiral Radford, Ely had been sent to talk to him by Bidault and Pleven as one military man to another. Ely said that he came to ask for American intervention, realizing that such intervention could have no direct bearing on Dien Bien Phu. The point he wanted to stress was that American aid should be given before Dien Bien Phu fell, for the psychological effect in France and in Indochina, and to prevent deterioration. He added a personal opinion that the French Cabinet included a few strong members—Laniel, Bidault and Pleven. The balance of the Cabinet was weak. He was not optimistic as to the number of days Dien Bien Phu could hold out. He therefore urged prompt action by the U.S., and inferred that refusal of the United States to render aid at this critical time could have severe implications for future relations between France and the United States.

Admiral Radford said he reported this conversation to Ambassador Dillon, who passed it on to Secretary Dulles with his interpretation. Dillon felt that the leaders of the French Government had never informed the full Cabinet of their request for U.S. armed intervention which had been made by the stronger individuals who were willing to take responsibility for the request on the basis that everything possible must be done to save Dien Bien Phu. Dillon felt that if such aid were given the French they would continue to fight in Indochina regardless of the outcome. If such aid were not rendered, it would become public knowledge and involve a very adverse reaction from French public opinion. This, in Dillon’s view, would result in the overthrow of the Laniel government and its replacement by a government which would pledge to withdraw from Indochina.

Admiral Radford said he had discussed this conversation with General Ely and with General Gruenther, who stated that he had never observed the morale in high French governmental circles to be so low as at the present time.

On Monday, Admiral Radford arrived in London to meet with the British Chiefs of Staff.⁹ He was met by Ambassador Aldrich, who informed him of the British decision not to take any action now, but to await the outcome of the Geneva Conference.

The analysis of the British Chiefs on the situation in Indochina was largely in accord with that of the U.S. Chiefs, particularly with respect to our appreciation of the serious possibilities resulting from the loss of all or part of Indochina either through military action or negotiation. The British Chiefs, however, seemed to maximize the risks of expanding the war by intervention at this time, as well as the requirements for ground forces to be furnished by the Western powers to achieve a victory. They seemed confident of being able to hold Malaya in any event, and their approach to the Indochina problem seemed strictly and narrowly in terms of local U.K. interest, without adequate regard for the future of other areas of the Far East, including Japan.

On Monday evening, Admiral Radford dined with the Prime Minister at Chequers.¹⁰ The Prime Minister took the same line as that taken by the British Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Eden. He is aware of the serious implication stemming from the deterioration of the French position in Indochina and the later loss of all the other areas of Southeast Asia. He realized that this would probably lead to a worsening of the French position in North Africa and have its effects on NATO, particularly in case a more neutralist-minded government came to power in France.

While deploring these possibilities, the Prime Minister was determined to commit forces and incur risks only to hold Malaya, both politically and militarily. This he felt could be done. He brushed aside the potential threat to Australia in the event that Indonesia fell into the Communist camp, and he did not seem to appreciate the effect of the loss of Southeast Asia on the future of Japan.

In connection with NATO, the Prime Minister stated that we had waited long enough for the French to make EDC a reality. Therefore the U.K. and the U.S. should “get on” with rearming the Germans themselves.

The Prime Minister repeatedly referred to the loss of India to the Empire, making the point that since the British people were willing to let India go, they would not be interested in holding Indochina for France. He discoursed at length on the atomic threat to the U.K., which he cited as a factor which required the utmost caution in dealing with the situation in the Far East. He favored a personal and intimate conversation between President Eisenhower, Malenkov and himself, as the only way to settle the big problems of the world.

Admiral Radford said he gathered the distinct impression that Sir Winston was presently unprepared to participate in collective action on any matter involving commitments of British resources or incurring any risks unless some British territory is under imminent threat. His personal appraisal of action which can be taken to halt the spread of world communism seems now limited to talks, as he says, “at the summit”. Whether this stems from a personal conviction, a real fear of atomic attack on Britain, or a fear that the British people will not approve a stronger course of action, Admiral Radford said he did not know.

At the conclusion of the reading of this summary statement, Admiral Radford went on to brief the Council on the military situation in Indochina, with the aid of maps and charts. He first spoke of “Operation Atlante” in the southern part of Indochina. This operation had not only come to a standstill; the French were actually on the defensive and in some trouble.

Two Vietminh battalions had made an incursion into Cambodia ten days ago and had caused consternation.

Vietminh action in the delta area had been concentrated against communications, especially those linking Hanoi and Haiphong. One whole Vietminh division had recently infiltrated the delta.

With respect to the situation at Dien Bien Phu, Admiral Radford pointed out that the area now held by the French had shrunk to about 1500 yards in diameter, making it very difficult to drop supplies to the garrison. He estimated the garrison’s minimum requirements for supplies at about 200 tons a day. He estimated the total French casualties to be about 5500. There were nearly 1000 litter cases being cared for in underground dispensaries. There were 2000 walking wounded who were able to make some contribution to the defense of the position. The French forces were now estimated to total about 8500 infantrymen and 1200 artillerymen. Against this force the Vietminh had marshalled an estimated 40,000. General Navarre feels that the Vietminh will succeed in taking Dien Bien Phu by asphyxiation, and Admiral Radford was inclined to believe that this was true. Accordingly, there was less likelihood of another mass assault by the Vietminh. The relief column, of which there had been so much notice in the press lately, consisted of about 3000 indigenous troops officered by Frenchmen. In their progress north they had now about reached the beginning of the relatively good road which led to Dien Bien Phu, a distance of 29 miles. The column, said Admiral Radford, was not strong enough to affect significantly the outcome at Dien Bien Phu unless it were reinforced by the airdrop of additional troops. Admiral Radford expressed the belief that such reinforcement was feasible.

The French were continuing to drop paratroopers into Dien Bien Phu, though in recent days the number of men dropped into the fortress did not equal the casualties, which amounted to between 120 and 150 a day.

A brief interval of silence followed Admiral Radford’s briefing, after which Governor Stassen said that he wished to express his views. It seemed to him that the time was now at hand when the Council should make its ultimate decision as to the U.S. course of action. In his view, if the French folded, and even if the British refused to go along with us, the United States should intervene alone in the southern areas of Indochina in order to save the situation. Governor Stassen said that he realized that this would require Congressional permission, but he was convinced that if we managed to keep a portion of Indochina from Communist domination, and exhibited strength and determination, this course of action would enable us to save the rest of Southeast Asia. Governor Stassen said that, recognizing the appalling weakness of both the British and the French positions, he felt that we should not allow this weakness to render the United States inactive and impotent. Everything, therefore, counselled that the United States at this time determine the ultimate lengths to which it would be willing to go to save Southeast Asia. Even though it might prove unnecessary to go to the ultimate limits, a determination to do so if necessary would greatly strengthen the Secretary of State in conducting the negotiations at Geneva, and might produce a much better settlement at Geneva than we could otherwise anticipate. Of course, if the French remained in the fight and did not fold, there would be many additional possibilities of building real strength for the free world side in Southeast Asia. Failure of the United States to determine at this time to take a strong ultimate position would not only critically endanger its interests in Southeast Asia, but would have the gravest repercussions on the United States position throughout the free world. Difficult as this decision was, Governor Stassen expressed confidence that the Congress and the people of the United States would support direct intervention in Indochina by the United States if the Commander-in-Chief made it clear to them that such a move was necessary to save Southeast Asia from Communism.

The President expressed considerable doubt as to whether Governor Stassen’s diagnosis of the attitude of the Congress and the people in this contingency was correct. He furthermore accused Governor Stassen of making assumptions which leaped over situations of the gravest difficulty. It was all well and good to state that if the French collapsed the United States must move in to save Southeast Asia, but if the French indeed collapsed and the United States moved in, we would in the eyes of many Asiatic peoples merely replace French colonialism with American colonialism. The President reminded the Council of the views expressed to him earlier by the Ambassador from Vietnam with respect to the very small number of the indigenous population of Vietnam who had any confidence in French promises of independence. Such skepticism, said the President, indicated to him that the people of the Associated States had failed to comprehend the cause for which the free world was fighting. Finally, continued the President, where could the United States quickly find military forces to replace the forces which the French would withdraw? In short, where and how could the United States intervene in Indochina?

Replying to the points the President had made, Governor Stassen insisted that the obvious fact that the Vietnamese did not trust the French was no reason to argue that they did not trust us. He perceived no insurmountable difficulty in this respect if the United States were to take over from France. He was confident that the Associated States would be glad to invite U.S. intervention, and he furthermore believed that if the French did decide to get out of Indochina, circumstances would compel them to phase their withdrawal in such fashion as to permit the orderly introduction of U.S. forces.

The President admitted the cogency of Governor Stassen’s last point, but said that what he feared was a French decision to get out of Indochina made at Geneva and made in such a way as to prevent the United States from taking over the French responsibilities.

Governor Stassen replied that he very much doubted if the French would agree with the Communists at Geneva to get out of Indochina unconditionally and thus close the door to the United States. In any case, Governor Stassen said he certainly did not think that the United States should go into Indochina in any sense as partners of the French with a view to bolstering the French position. We should take command of the situation in such a way as to enlist the loyalty and support of the indigenous forces as the French had failed to do. He reiterated his conviction that an orderly transition from French to U.S. responsibility could be carried out unless the French actually dropped their arms and ran from the field, which he thought was quite unlikely.

The President then expressed his own conviction that if the United States were to intervene in Indochina alone, it would mean a general war with China and perhaps with the USSR, which the United States would have to prosecute separated from its allies.

In response, Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that the Chinese Communists were unlikely to intervene if the United States contented itself merely with occupying and holding the southern areas of Indochina and did not attempt to roll back the Vietminh beyond the border between China and Indochina.

The President remained skeptical in the face of Governor Stassen’s argument, and pointed out our belief that a collective policy with our allies was the only posture which was consistent with U.S. national security policy as a whole. To go in unilaterally in Indochina or other areas of the world which were endangered, amounted to an attempt to police the entire world. If we attempted such a course of action, using our armed forces and going into areas whether we were wanted or not, we would soon lose all our significant support in the free world. We should be everywhere accused of imperialistic ambitions.

Governor Stassen took issue with the President’s argument and pointed out that the peoples of the Philippines and of South Korea certainly did not consider us to be imperialists. Where we were so considered was precisely in those areas of the world where we were found supporting British and French positions. We plainly had thrust upon us the leadership responsibility for the free world, and, said Governor Stassen, we should determine to meet this responsibility.

The President replied that to him the concept of leadership implied associates. Without allies and associates the leader is just an adventurer like Genghis Khan.

Governor Stassen said that there was no need to despair of associates. We could almost certainly count on Thailand, Australia and New Zealand to go along with us. If, however, we lacked the courage to make the assault, we would presently find that we lacked any followers in the free world. On the other hand, if we do manifest our leadership, there will be plenty of others who will gradually return to our fold.

Dr. Flemming inquired of the President as to the likelihood that the Associated States would invite the armed intervention of the United States. The President replied that he could give no precise answer to Dr. Flemming’s question. Up to now the Associated States had not been entirely their own masters and in any case had made no request, direct or indirect, for such intervention. The President again repeated his conviction that if the United States were to permit its ground forces to be drawn into conflict in a great variety of places throughout the world, the end result would be gravely to weaken the defensive position of the United States. Before doing that, it almost appeared that we would have to choose between actually launching an attack on Soviet Russia or gradually permitting ourselves to be exhausted in piecemeal conflicts, as had been the fate of the British.

Governor Stassen suggested that it would be possible to take some of the U.S. forces out of Korea for use in Indochina, but the President pointed out that President Rhee was screaming and yelling because we had already redeployed two divisions. Moreover, it was well to remember that there were a million Chinese soldiers across the border ready to pounce on South Korea if its defenses were weakened. Governor Stassen observed that he thought that the ultimate sanction of an all-out attack on Communist China if they renewed their aggression against South Korea, was sufficient to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on South Korea in the event more of our own forces were withdrawn. The President, however, insisted on his view that if the United States fought unilaterally against the Vietminh in Indochina, the Chinese Communists would move against Korea.

Governor Stassen replied that in any event it would be impossible to let the Communists take over Indochina and then try to save the rest of the free world from a similar fate. This was the time and the place to take our stand and make our decision.

The President answered that before he could bring himself to make such a decision, he would want to ask himself and all his wisest advisers whether the right decision was not rather to launch a world war. If our allies were going to fall away in any case, it might be better for the United States to leap over the smaller obstacles and hit the biggest one with all the power we had. Otherwise we seemed to be merely playing the enemy’s game—getting ourselves involved in brushfire wars in Burma, Afghanistan, and God knows where. To this Governor Stassen replied that it was perfectly possible to prevent dissipating our military power in local wars. We could do this by the threat of general war if the Communists crossed any national boundary. The situation in Indochina, however, was different, since the Communists had already got into Indochina before President Eisenhower and the new Administration had come into power in the United States.

The President said that perhaps Governor Stassen’s diagnosis was correct, but went on to say that before he would be prepared to commit U.S. divisions to Indochina—six, eight, ten, however many were required—he would earnestly put before the leaders of the Congress and the Administration the great question whether it would not be better to decide on general war and prepare for D–Day. The cause of the free world could never win, the United States could never survive, if we frittered away our resources in local engagements. This process would go on indefinitely, with the Communists trying everywhere to involve the United States in indecisive engagements which would ultimately sap its strength.

Secretary Kyes said with great emphasis that the President was as sound as anyone could be. The people of the United States would rather hit Soviet Russia than put a single man to fight in Indochina.

The President said he was frightened to death at the prospect of American divisions scattered all over the world, and now it was suggested that we put six more in Indochina. It was obvious that we should have to go to general mobilization if we followed this course.

Secretary Smith said he believed that there might be an alternative to doing too much on the one hand or doing nothing on the other. The Congress had rejected the idea of the United States providing combat assistance to Indochina unless we were assured of support by our allies for this course of action. Since the Congress took that position regarding an air strike to save Dien Bien Phu, we have come to recognize that the fall of Dien Bien Phu need not necessarily amount to a military disaster or involve the complete failure of the Navarre Plan for victory in Indochina. The French are now pressing for U.S. assistance in the air even if Dien Bien Phu should fall. They argue that such air strikes by U.S. planes would enable them to continue the fight in Indochina. If they really mean this we might well avoid having to commit any U.S. ground forces in Indochina. After all, there were plenty of ground forces available now if they could be properly trained and used. Would it be possible, therefore, that even without Britain the United States could induce some of the Asiatic states to join with us in intervening in Indochina? If so, we would meet the basic condition set by the Congress (concerted action) and would be able promptly to give the French what they were asking for—air strikes by U.S. planes.

The President interrupted to say that in a general way this was what he had hoped might come to pass, until Australia had collapsed and indicated its refusal to join the regional grouping.¹¹

Secretary Smith then continued. If, as a result of a Congressional resolution permitting U.S. armed intervention in concert with willing states, the French were prevailed upon to continue the struggle, they might even permit the United States to send in a considerable military mission which would take over responsibility for the training of the native forces. Thus it might be possible to carry out the objectives of the Navarre Plan. All this, said Secretary Smith, represented a possible course of action which we should investigate without waiting to see what happens at the Geneva Conference. Secretary Smith concluded by expressing agreement with the President that we could never get the U.S. public to allow us to send U.S. divisions to fight with the French alone in Indochina. The public would insist on some allies, on the desire of the Associated States to be saved, and upon avoiding identification with colonialism.

The Vice President noted the invariable tendency to thinking of armed intervention only in terms of ground forces. Nevertheless, there were more than enough ground forces potentially available in Indochina. The effect of U.S. air strikes on current battles in Indochina, such as Dien Bien Phu, might not be decisive, but the effect of such air strikes on the climate of opinion throughout the free world might well prove decisive. It would amount to the United States saying to the Communists, “This is as far as you go, and no further.” Secondly, continued the Vice President, he thought that we would put ourselves in the worst possible position if we decided to stay precisely where we now are. To do no more than we have done would be tantamount to giving Britain a veto on U.S. action in Southeast Asia. The French have asked us for help. They have asked no one else. But if the French are made to realize that we cannot give them the desired help unless some other nations join with us, they might be brought to agree to the intervention of a coalition of nations including the United States. Certainly Thailand and the Philippines would join such a coalition. So probably would Australia after the national elections are completed. What he kept getting back to, said the Vice President, was his unwillingness to let the British have a veto over our freedom of action. He thought that we should soberly consider what we should do in Southeast Asia. We should then do this with the British if they will come along, but without them if they won’t. Our chief assets in this area are the Associated States themselves, and the Vice President said he would even follow this course if Australia failed to join us. The truth of the matter was that, at least in the Far East, our close tie-up with the British was a painful liability.

The President said that he would agree with the Vice President if he could be sure that the Vice President was correct in assuming that the French would stay and fight in Indochina. If they proved willing to do so, the President said that he would agree to put this proposal up to Congress.

Mr. Cutler called attention to the position of the British Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of additional outside ground forces would be essential and that the commitment of air forces alone would not save the situation. Was not this, he asked, also the view of our own Chiefs of Staff? Admiral Radford replied that this was not quite the case, since our objective was to hold in a given situation rather than to achieve a victory at once.

Secretary Smith reminded the Council that it had agreed to underwrite the Navarre Plan chiefly in order to increase the indigenous forces. He still thought the Navarre Plan fundamentally sound if it was carried out right. At the present time the success of the Navarre Plan was threatened not so much by a military disaster as by a psychological collapse. If it were possible to prevent a collapse of the French will, and to keep the training plan for the indigenous forces alive by means of a U.S. training mission and by U.S. air strikes, we might ultimately save the situation in Indochina without being obliged to commit U.S. ground forces. General Navarre, however, would have to go. He had proved incompetent. We should also have to have absolute assurances from France for the complete independence of the Associated States. Certainly we could not, repeated Secretary Smith, go into Indochina with the French alone. At any rate, something like this seemed to him the only possible kind of formula.

The Vice President said that we should get all of our associates in this enterprise to join with us in guaranteeing the complete independence of the Associated States. The President said he was still uncertain whether the Associated States would actually invite U.S. intervention. Governor Stassen, however, expressed confidence that they would do so now that their independence had been declared and established. In his experience, the natives of these States were friendly to U.S. personnel and liked the United States. Secretary Smith pointed out that the Cambodians had wanted to raise the issue of the Communist invasion in the UN, but that we ourselves had counselled against such a move.

Secretary Smith then said that he had two concrete suggestions for action by the National Security Council. He pointed out that he was leaving for Geneva tomorrow afternoon. He suggested that he invite the ANZUS deputies to meet with him this evening. At this time he would discreetly indicate that although the British had turned down our invitation to join in a regional grouping, we were by no means sure that we would abandon the effort because of this refusal and would not go on to make our declaration with such other nations as would join us. Secretary Smith would say no more to the deputies, but let them think this point over.¹²

The second step, continued Secretary Smith, would be taken when he conferred with Secretary Dulles in Geneva on Saturday and secured the Secretary’s reaction to this plan as well as his latest appraisal of the situation at Geneva. Meanwhile, we could give hints to the French that we have not made a final decision as to our intervention in Indochina. This would help to keep the French going, and Secretary Dulles would be back next week, at which time a decision might be made in the National Security Council.

The President agreed with the proposed action, but stated that he wanted to end the meeting with one word of warning. If we wanted to win over the Congress and the people of the United States to an understanding of their stake in Southeast Asia, let us not talk of intervention with U.S. ground forces. People were frightened, and were opposed to this idea.

The National Security Council: ¹³

a. Discussed the situation with respect to Indochina in the light of oral reports by the Acting Secretary of State and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on developments with respect to the Geneva Conference and the Indochina situation.

b. Agreed that, despite the current unwillingness of the British Government to participate at this time and without awaiting developments at the Geneva Conference, the United States should continue its efforts, undertaken pursuant to NSC Action No. 1086–b–(1), to organize a regional grouping, including initially the U.S., France, the Associated States, and other nations with interests in the area, for the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist efforts by any means to gain control of the countries in this area; final recommendation on the above to await the return and report of the Secretary of State.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate action.

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Apr. 30. For Eisenhower and Nixon memoir accounts of this meeting, see editorial note, p. 1448.
2. For text of NIE 63–54, “Consequences Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu,” Apr. 30, see p. 1451.
3. See memorandum of discussion at the 192d Meeting of the National Security Council, Apr. 6, p. 1250.
4. The discussion was summarized by the Secretary in telegram Dulte 15 from Geneva, Apr. 27; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 579.
5. Reference is to telegram Dulte 21 from Geneva; for text, see ibid., p. 605.
6. No copy of the summary has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library. The files of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contain a six-page document dated Apr. 28 which presumably is that read by Admiral Radford. It is titled “Résumé of Conversations with French and British Representatives by Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Paris and London, 24–26 April 1954 on the Subject of Indochina.” (CJCS 091 Indo-China)
7. See memorandum of the Dulles–Radford–Eden conversation at Paris, Apr. 24, p. 1386.
8. Admiral Radford reported on his meeting with General Ely in telegram 4060 from Paris, Apr. 25, p. 1402.
9. For Admiral Radford’s report on his meeting with the British Chiefs of Staff, see telegram 4725 from London, Apr. 26, p. 1416.
10. Regarding the meeting, see footnote 3, ibid .
11. For documentation on the attitude of Australia on the question of collective defense in Southeast Asia, see volume xii .
12. No record of the proposed meeting has been found in Department of State files.
13. Points a and b below constituted NSC Action No. 1104, Apr. 29, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)