751G.00/12–2654: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State1
top secret
Paris, December 26, 1954—5
p.m.
2697. Repeated information Saigon 403. Reference: (a) Deptel 2324;2 (b) Embtel 2601;3 (c) Saigon’s 2455 to Department.4 I have [Page 2426] following comments on reference telegram a. In referring to reference telegram b will use same paragraph numbers as used in reference telegram c.
- 1.
- On rereading reference telegram b, I feel paragraph 15 is not clear report of what took place. Support of Diem was not one of Mendes’ three points which he desired to submit to Collins and Ely for study. Mendes fully agreed that it was necessary to continue full support of Diem until governmental review of problem toward end of January. Therefore is nothing for Ely and Collins to study on this point.
- 2.
- First point which Mendes desired to be studied by Collins and Ely was possibility of appointment of viceroy to live in Vietnam and act as supreme arbiter. This mentioned in paragraph 15 of reference telegram b, but reference telegram does not make clear that this was first of Mendes’ three points which Secretary agreed could be studied by Collins and Ely. Secretary has indicated in paragraph 12 of reference telegram b, made it abundantly clear that he was opposed to this suggestion, so French are on notice as to probable negative reaction by Collins. My own hunch is that this suggestion is a local Paris project which may very well not have Ely’s personal support. Reason behind suggestion may be to provide a suitable means for getting Buu Hoi back to Vietnam where he could be expected to establish some sort of indirect contact with DRV. I feel it would be worthwhile for Collins to discuss this matter fully with Ely in an attempt to discover basic objectives of French in making this suggestion. Collins could naturally indicate his opposition to this idea, and if I am correct as to origin of plan, it is possible that Collins–Ely discussions on this subject could lead to joint Collins–Ely recommendation that idea be dropped.
- 3.
- Mendes’ third point was to study timing. I feel certain that Mendes and rest of French including Ely feel that they have agreement of U.S. that this subject be studied. Language in paragraph 16 of reference telegram b regarding precise recommendation goes farther than anything I recollect. In view paragraph 4 of reference telegram a, I suggest Collins take line with Ely that U.S. feels this subject is of such importance that it must be reserved to governments and that he not authorized to work with Ely toward any joint recommendation. Collins could however receive Ely’s personal views on this subject for transmission to Washington. Ely’s views would be useful to Department in preparing for governmental review of problem in late January.
- 4.
- I am afraid that Collins–Ely memo re training (paragraph 6 of reference telegram a and paragraph 5 of reference telegram c) poses major political problem here which may cause considerable delay. An [Page 2427] agreement giving U.S. primary responsibility for training Vietnamese army would be unpopular with all shades of opinion in national assembly. Socialists and left wing elements would oppose it as provocative and in violation of armistice using same arguments put forward by Mendes. Right wing elements and in particular Gaullists would probably oppose it as an unacceptable abdication on part of France. Public knowledge of such an agreement would form valid reason for interpellation in assembly which Mendes-France Government could probably not survive.
- 5.
- In view of this analysis, I can see only two possibilities of acceptance of document by French Government. First is that Mendes-France may decide that his time as Prime Minister is running out and that Indochina would be a good subject on which to fall. He might then accept document in full knowledge that it would lead to probable overthrow of his government. As assembly is paramount in France, I do not know what continuing value agreement would have if government overthrown on this issue.
- 6.
- Second possibility, provided Mendes survives long enough, is that Collins–Ely agreement could be made part of larger package containing elements that would be welcomed by French assembly and which would make whole package acceptable. Such a package could probably only come out of governmental negotiations at end of January. Essential item in package would be either drastic strengthening of Diem government and in particular installation of strong Minister of Interior or agreement on replacement of Diem. Unfortunately Diem is universally considered in France to be a failure who owes his position solely to U.S. support. French Government has clearly intimated in repeated statements to assembly that Diem is American protegé whom they support in order to ensure continuing American aid to South Vietnam. In order justify agreement to Collins–Ely memorandum, French Government will need either clear proof that Diem has changed his spots and that his government has become effective or agreement that he should be replaced which would entail agreement on his successor. Another welcome item for overall package of course could be an increase in U.S. aid to F.E.C. for CY 1955 over 100 million figure which now more or less generally known in parliamentary circles.
- 7.
- We will of course make every effort to get early approval of Collins–Ely memo in hope that something has been overlooked in formulating above analysis. I expect we will need full support of Department with French Embassy in Washington and of Collins with Ely to get results. In any event Mendes will not be in position to consider this subject until completion debate on Paris accords.
- 8.
- All of the above is based on assumption Mendes-France Government will be successful in upcoming votes of confidence. Attitude of any successor government is utterly unpredictable, particularly so because of strains which would be imposed on Atlantic alliance by rejection of Paris accords.
- 9.
- Paragraph 5 of reference telegram c. In view categoric nature of statement by Secretary in which Radford specifically concurred that U.S. did not intend increase size of MAAG over level at time of armistice and great French concern on this subject, I do not feel we can contemplate any increase in MAAG over 342 figure.
Dillon