Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–2554: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

top secret

Saigon, December 25, 1954—8 p.m.

2455. Repeated information Paris 742, Manila 361. Manila exclusive for Radford. Limit distribution. Pass Defense. From Collins. Reference Paris 2601, repeated Saigon 388.¹ Following comments submitted for information State and Defense; all paragraph references are to reference telegram unless otherwise indicated:

1. First paragraph statement that “only suggestion which has been accepted by Diem was appointment Minh as Minister of Defense” is not correct. See paragraph 2A, Part II, my telegram 2250.² Most of actions listed there were taken upon my recommendations of which Ely had been informed.

2. Mendes statement in paragraph two likewise paints unduly black picture. Fact is that when Ely departed Saigon our staffs were still working on details of six programs outlined my telegram 2004.³Ely and I had reached general agreement on each of these programs but until details were further developed, we were not prepared to present them to Diem government. Subsequent to Ely’s departure we have discussed with Diem detailed suggestions for National Assembly. Generally these were received favorably by Diem. US staff officers now actively studying proposals with small committee appointed by Diem. While not conclusive, fairly satisfactory progress is being made. Similarly, statement attributed to Ely in paragraph 6 that “both were now virtually convinced that it was hopeless to expect anything of Diem” is an overstatement. I made no such statement to Ely though he might have deduced this from our discussions, reported in paragraphs 4 and 5 my telegram 2285.⁴ Reference paragraphs 6 and 8, we have not submitted any ultimatum to Diem although I have tried to make clear to him that no decision has been reached by the United States with respect to assumption of training responsibility or direct military aid and have indicated that my final recommendations will be dependent upon the progress actually achieved by his government during the remainder of my stay here. I am in full accord with position taken by Secretary outlined in paragraph 8.

3. I thoroughly disagree with the suggestion made by Mendes in paragraph 9 and by Eden in paragraph 11. As I view situation there are only four acceptable solutions with respect to Bao Dai: either (a) he should return to Saigon and use his full authority and influence to force sects and all other elements of country to support progressive program of Diem, or some other Premier if Diem is replaced; or (b) he should personally assume active direction of the government as Chief of State and Premier; or (c) he should cease pulling any strings from France or asserting any influence, except as specifically requested by French and Americans pending establishment of constitutional monarchy; or (d) he should renounce his authority as Chief of State. I assume that these and perhaps other alternatives will be examined thoroughly in Washington as indicated in Embassy [Department] telegram 2477⁵ and Department [Embassy] telegram 2599, repeated Saigon 386.⁶

4. Quite frankly I was disturbed over the attitude assumed by Mendes as indicated in paragraphs 21 through 24. Inference in paragraph 23 that Vietnamese Government had been breaking Geneva agreements with respect to public utility services in Haiphong is not factual to our best information. I told Ely that I had issued positive instructions to our MAAG and USOM representatives in Haiphong to cooperate fully with French in preventing violations of the Geneva Accord in Haiphong enclave. No single report of violations has been made to date. I wonder whether Mendes’ reference is possibly a removal of US financed mining equipment which French commercial firms and Sainteny Mission may be concerned with. Ely has promised to have more valuable and better conditioned equipment of this character removed. However, Daridan only yesterday said there may be some question as to whether this equipment could be interpreted under the Geneval Accord as pertaining to public utilities.

5. Statement in paragraph 24 by Mendes that Collins–Ely agreement reference military training would have to be studied carefully from legal point of view again raises question authority delegated Ely and extent to which he will be supported by Mendes government in agreements made as indicated by Mendes in last Washington conference. If our conduct of training is to be hedged about with legal interpretations of the character in paragraph 24, then I would recommend that we not assume this responsibility. As indicated in an earlier message, Ely had agreed with me that if necessary, strength of our MAAG training personnel could be increased beyond the 342 figure, if it were done quietly and over a period of months. While I am not a lawyer, I have carefully studied Article 16 of the Geneva agreement with respect to Vietnam and can find nowhere in this Article any basis for interpretations which Mendes appears to place on introductions of US training personnel. Fact is the 342 US total comprised Air Force technicians and MAAG logistical personnel. These must be converted largely to personnel competent to train the Vietnamese Army.

6. After discussing with Radford above details and other factors concerning situation here, we were in accord that if NSC is to reevaluate our policies in late January, to be followed perhaps by US, British-French consultations, it would be desirable for me to be present Washington during these discussions. Even the best modern communications lack the personal touch and give-and-take exchange of ideas which I would think would be essential if we are to make sound re-evaluation of our policies with respect to Vietnam.

Kidder

1. Dated Dec 19, p. 2400.
2. Dated Dec. 13, p. 2362
3. Dated Nov. 29, p. 2315.
4. Dated Dec. 15, p. 2375.
5. Dated Dec. 17, p. 2392.

6. Telegram 2599 from Paris, Dec. 19, read as follows:

   “During yesterday’s tripartite discussions on Indochina Mendes stated that he doubted if, as the subject had been covered so thoroughly, it was any longer necessary to hold the projected tripartite meeting in Washington on December 22, as planned. The Secretary agreed. Eden concurred but with proviso that meeting be postponed but not cancelled which was agreed. There was mention that meeting might be latter half January. Secretary also stated that problems to be decided at that time would be so basic and important that ministers would probably want to decide them personally rather than have them considered by working group. Mendes and Eden concurred but Eden added that working group meeting might be useful anyway for purposes of information and coordination”. (751G.00/12–1954)