751G.00/12–2754: Telegram
The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State
top
secret
priority
priority
Saigon, December 27, 1954—2
p.m.
2460. Repeated information Paris 744. From Collins for Secretary. Re Deptel 2585, repeated Paris 2324.1
- 1.
- My considered judgment regarding Diem government, as seen from local point of view, is contained my telegram 2108, repeated Paris 6652 and 2303 repeated Paris 724.3 See also my comments (Embtel 2455, repeated Paris 742)4 reference Paris telegram 388. My analysis of situation has not changed. However, am prepared to accept estimate as outlined in referenced telegram, except that I would urge no final decision regarding possible return Bao Dai be made now.
- 2.
- Our local judgment should be discounted to some extent because of inadequacies of intelligence reference two basic questions: (a) What is likely to be the real reaction sects to progressive program of government, particularly as to agrarian reforms and reduction their private armies; (b) actual extent of Viet Minh penetration in South Vietnam. I intend to concentrate activities of all U.S. intelligence agencies on these two essential elements of information in next three weeks.
- 3.
- The gravest present threat to free Vietnam is the disunity of sects and powerful individuals who oppose any program that is likely to curtail their private vested interests. This disunity is abetted by French business interests as well as French governmental and military [Page 2429] personnel, who appear at times more concerned with national prestige and investment returns than in preventing fall of Vietnam to communism. Though by no means ready to throw in sponge, I am still highly doubtful that Diem has sufficient leadership qualities to persuade sects and other able individuals or groups to subordinate their private interests to the common good, or to so vitalize public opinion behind his government that the army and the public would fully support military operations against sects. Diem seems to admit he cannot control sects without at least threat of military action against them. This may be correct but if only alternative to Bao Dai’s return is civil war, we would have little hope of overcoming resultant Viet Minh propaganda and penetration.
- 4.
- Right now it appears to us on the ground that Bao Dai is the only one who might persuade the sects that the only practical alternative to unified support of a free Vietnam government is surrender to Ho Chi Minh. Bao Dai’s return under conditions listed paragraph three, part II, my telegram 2250 repeated Paris 7065 is not necessarily in contradiction to our continued support of Diem.
- 5.
- We should know better the ultimate stand that will be taken by sects when cold fact becomes known that we will support only a single national army, in which limited elements of sect forces will be integrated under control of Minister of Defense. Sects position will be further clarified and brought into the open when proposed edicts regarding land reform are published.
- 6.
- I understand that nothing in reference telegram negates my proposed course of action contained in paragraph 10 my telegram 2303 repeated Paris 724, until action is taken by French government on Ely, Collins agreement on organization and training of Vietnam’s forces. It should be understood this combined with reluctance of Vietnamese to accept reduced force goals as reported my telegram 24536 repeated Paris 740, will doubtless result in failure to consummate agreements with Vietnam government for our assumption of training responsibility and direct military aid on 1 January 55.
- 7.
- Meanwhile, I propose, subject to Department’s approval, to sound out Diem, at an appropriate time, as to his reaction to possible return of Bao Dai. I will be interested in Department’s reaction to my proposal contained in paragraph six, my telegram 2455 repeated Paris 742.
Kidder