Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751H.5 MSP/12–2454: Telegram

The Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret

Phnom Penh, December 24, 1954—9 a.m.

402. Sent Paris 197; pouched Saigon, Vientiane, Bangkok.

1. Reference Department’s 215,¹ we agree that French are taking steps to consolidate their position in Cambodia as their influence diminishes in Vietnam, as we have reported since June (see Embtel 322 of June 28).² French unwillingness to give up in Cambodia responsibilities she reluctantly prepared turn over to US in Vietnam understandable. France quite naturally has no intention lose by default her long-held influence in this country, and can be expected to take such steps as lie within her power to maintain her position in cultural, economic and military fields.

2. With more or less good grace, France has accepted the inevitable—giving in to Cambodian insistence on absolute independence—but since the Geneva Conference her representatives here have been concentrating on expansion of French footholds in Cambodian Councils and in general have given impression their primary mission is to repair Cambodian fences. They have emphasized French conviction of Cambodian independence and rather successfully assumed role of disinterested elder brother, assiduously offering economic, financial and diplomatic counsel, while exaggeratedly observing respectful forms of relations between two sovereign states.

3. In Cambodia France has proven immensely sensitive to any development which could lend self to interpretation that US in some way supplanting French influence this country. During recent months France has reacted to every US offer of guidance or extraordinary aid to Cambodia with a parallel offer, with exception of financial responsibility for Cambodian Armed Forces. This was true of port, creation of air line, financial advice in establishment of Central Bank, Army radio station, and, when Cambodians approached US for loan of an airplane for King’s Bangkok visit, French hastily offered one instead. Yesterday King told my wife French had agreed to improve Phnom Penh airport. In all these matters Mendes-France’s mendacious “directive” for prior consultation with US representatives in field (Deptel 159 and Embtel 394)³ has been ignored. However, there is no reason we should oppose French economic aid to Cambodia provided it is manifested cooperatively and not competitively.

In military field French straining every nerve to maintain control of doctrinal guidance, and desire keep French training mission here although US takes over direct support of army (see Embtel 394). Politically, we have impression that French representatives, under guise of normal diplomatic exchanges, increasingly attempt guide Cambodian thinking re international problems, and underground of French counselors and technical advisers in key positions throughout government bureaucracy and armed forces obviously profoundly influence conduct Cambodian affairs.

4. Thus in general we can expect that France will at least passively oppose US policy in Cambodia in any case where its realization tends to diminish French influence here. Now that US is committed to granting economic and military aid direct to Cambodia, we will find varying amounts of friction with French and more or less conflict in every implementation of our policy which requires US supervision or control of aid mechanisms or of Cambodian use of our assistance. It will take careful steering to prevent Cambodians from trying to play off French vs. Americans to their own interest. Currently, therefore, French will work against:

(a) Introduction of US advisers in Cambodian economy and financial institutions such as Central Bank, Export Control Boards, production control devices.

(b) Introduction of US instructors in armed forces, and when forced to accept this development will retreat to second line of defense where will try to maintain parity between US and French instructors.

(c) US dominance in planning for Cambodian economic future, in projected deep-seaport on Gulf of Siam, in agricultural development, and particularly as related to major problem outlined below.

5. Most important area of potential conflict depends on future of South Vietnam. If Communist take over this area, and Cambodia has not meanwhile developed deep-seaport and alternative communication with outside world through Thailand, they will have stranglehold on this economy. US position is therefore that development such alternative is essential. French do not disagree but at same time clearly do not share our sense of urgency and following possibility presents itself. Fear has been expressed by our Embassy Paris and by many Cambodians that French will try do business with such future Communist Government of all Vietnam. In case it suits Communist to feign cooperation with French in initial stages, French might be expected oppose any realignment Cambodian economy which would tend reduce traffic in Saigon Port where there is such a great French financial stake. Politically too, French might be expected to desire Cambodian cooperation with crypto-Communist member of French Union, and in this case there would be most important basic conflict between French and US policies in Cambodia.

If, as we anticipate, Embassy Paris prediction proves true and French come to some understanding with Ho Chi Minh, greatest danger is French will drag in Trojan horse of “cultural cooperation” which Ho Chi Minh has already formally offered them. French pride in cultural penetration borders on fatuity, and although they have had ample indication of what their efforts in this direction in Rumania and Balkans generally cost them, French, like their Bourbon kings, never learn and never forget. Communists generally will achieve immensely powerful time bomb if they are able to penetrate French Union under guise of cultural cooperation.

As for immediate problems while we are resolute and willing to spend our money intelligently, there is no argument French can advance which will leave them dominant in either military or economic fields in Cambodia. Unless French are willing to pay for Cambodian Army, they cannot expect indefinitely to train that army.

What is unfortunate in general terms of our Southeast Asian policy is that French for selfish interests will seek to sabotage our effort while at same time maintaining a spurious lip service to Manila Pact. They have neither military nor economic power to assert themselves in Asia, and we should face that basic fact and draw logical conclusions therefrom.

McClintock

1. Telegram 215 to Phnom Penh, Dec. 17, read as follows: “Would appreciate your views as to current and potential areas of conflict between U.S. and French interests and policies in Cambodia

   “We have feeling as diminution French presence Viet-Nam progresses they may take steps consolidate position Cambodia and Laos.” (751H.5 MSP/12–1554)

2. Telegram 178 from Phnom Penh, June 28, sent to Saigon as telegram 322, which reported that “French have no intention to permit US to replace France as chief mentor Cambodian military destinies,” is not printed. (751H.5/6–2854)
3. For telegram 2055 to Saigon, Nov. 20, also sent to Phnom Penh as telegram 159, see p. 2274. In telegram 394 from Phnom Penh, Dec. 21, not printed, Ambassador McClintock reported that French authorities in Cambodia appeared to be completely unaware of the joint directive contained in telegram 159 to Phnom Penh. (751H.5 MSP/12–2154)