751G.00/12–2254: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
top secret
Washington, December 24, 1954—2:28
p.m.
2585. For Collins and Dillon from Secretary. Pursuant my talks concerning Viet-Nam with Mendes-France and Eden Paris (Paris 2601 repeated Saigon 388)2 I feel it good occasion for us all review basic factors Viet-Nam problems and spell out some guidelines our actions in near future.
- 1.
- Although there many complex and difficult factors confronting Free Viet-Nam, there no reason admit defeat. During past five months since Geneva, situation has not disintegrated. People fundamentally anti-Communist. They have major resources in south. Hinh problem solved and resettlement proceeding reasonably well. In some ways, developments better than we predicted. Collins and Ely have contributed greatly this situation and their cooperation is major asset. Direct aid, reduction FEC and provisions Manila Pact all positive factors which will affect developments. Pace may not please us but major changes such stage of transition as Viet-Nam going through comes more slowly than in West. We must not overlook fact Communists also face formidable problems and if we create situation such that they can only take over by internal violence, we will have faced them with serious dilemma because of unfavorable effect such action on Asian countries like India. Their recent increase anti-Diem and anti-American propaganda may well be result realization magnitude what they face and chances ultimate Free World success.
- 2.
- Withdrawal our support would hasten Communist takeover Viet-Nam and have adverse repercussions all Southeast Asia. Consequently, investment Viet-Nam justified even if only to buy time build up strength elsewhere in area. We are going have maintain flexible policy and proceed carefully by stages Viet-Nam. Simultaneously we are thinking of ways and means strengthen Cambodia, Laos and Thailand against contingencies. But we basically and immediately faced with problem strengthening Free Viet-Nam and must devote best efforts that task.
- 3.
- Under present circumstances and unless situation Free Viet-Nam clearly appears hopeless and rapidly disintegrating, we have no choice but continue our aid Viet-Nam and support of Diem. There no other suitable leader known to us. Can any successor make up for Diem’s deficiencies without also lacking Diem’s virtues? Could we anticipate [Page 2420] stable process of succession and not worse confusion and weakness than now exists. These tough questions and would appreciate your views.
- 4.
- I agreed with Mendes-France at Paris four items concerning problem of Diem. (reference telegram) While study of alternate leaders among these points I did not agree Generals Collins and Ely should establish deadline for replacement Diem by another man. It agreed that Collins and Ely would report late January on overall situation.
- 5.
- I do not consider Bao Dai’s return Viet-Nam would really solve our basic problems there. Neither do Mendes-France or Eden. Nor do I see merit in French suggestion of viceroy, which Mendes-France did not press after suggestion was analyzed. I see little point taking time create such machinery when no successor in sight and which would only add to intrigues.
- 6.
- Early approval of France and then Viet-Nam of Collins–Ely memorandum understanding regarding training is basic need. We should make every effort ensure discussions with Viet-Nam proceed rapidly and effectively. Only when we have taken steps reorganize and revitalize National Army can we hope for improved security condition and lessening Communist influence Free Viet-Nam. This will also require very best native leadership available and I hope either General Ty or Vy is up to that task.
- 7.
- There also extremely delicate problem our influencing Diem along right lines. I know how frustrating Collins’ experience now and Heath’s in past have been. Land reform has powerful propaganda value, which Communists already not failed exploit. Something should be done on our side, with our help, put this emotional and basic element to work for us.
- 8.
- Although there many other factors consider I am sure if we concentrate on solving problems listed above we will make headway. I would appreciate your comments.
Dulles