751G.00/12–1754: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
top secret
niact
niact
Washington, December 17, 1954—10:26
p.m.
2274. Limit distribution. Saigon tel 2303 rptd Paris 724.2
- 1.
- Re para. 8areftel, concur in principle. Department concerned lest indications US delay consummating agreements add to confusion and defeatism we are trying to remove. However, any postponement few weeks could be explained by number procedural or mechanical reasons. But agreements or understandings must be flexibly drafted with escape provisions in case Vietnamese civil and military authorities reveal unwillingness or inability carry out undertakings.
- 2.
- Re para. 8b, we do not consider return of Bao Dai is inconsistent with continuance Diem Government. Luyen told Heath in Paris that he favored Bao Dai’s return around first of year. Recently in Paris Bao Dai expressed continuing support Diem and on his return to Vietnam would conceivably continue Diem as Prime Minister. Question is whether Bao Dai can exert more influence on Vietnamese political situation from France or in Saigon to stimulate urgently needed actions and amalgamate national army. During LaChambre and Mendes-France talks Washington, French opposed his return Vietnam and sought our views on plan for his eventual elimination. Suggest Secretary ascertain Mendes-France views on Bao Dai return to Saigon in near future. Despite possibility unfavorable reaction in US, France and free Asian countries to his return, we would be prepared to accept it provided that he would exert his authority towards prompt initiation of agrarian and other reforms.
- 3.
- As prerequisite possible US aid and undertakings Vietnam, Department believes Diem should quickly and clearly indicate willingness take or allow immediate actions set in motion urgently needed army reorganization and agrarian reform program. These are obviously of primary importance in combatting Communists. Inauguration of these reforms in turn depends on ability and drive of responsible members Vietnamese Government. If Generals Ty and Vy are up to their jobs and given free hand by Diem they should be able with Collins’ guidance and American training and financial assistance to build strong cohesive army. Against such development the problem of the separate armies of the sects and other problems as well might well diminish in importance during next six months.
- 4.
- In Department’s opinion crucial test of Diem’s ability to govern Free Vietnam and stem Communist propaganda and infiltration among the masses is energetic and immediate initiation of army reorganization and land reform. Complexities of land reform in South Vietnam including problem of large holdings of Vietnamese French and the church are realized. It is not expected there would be any immediate and radical division of large holdings in favor of landless peasants. But real start should no longer be delayed. The experience of land reform in Formosa should be useful.
- 5.
- While regrettable in view of his past Department has no fixed objection to suggestion in your previous telegram that Bay Vien be made Interior Minister provided that he would agree divest himself of the gambling concession which runs out we understand in February next. The Department understands that Diem has no fixed objections to Bay Vien’s Sureté Chief Sang of whom Diem has said he has efficiency and a basic if somewhat overlaid honesty and patriotism.
- 6.
- These comments are of course affected by our awareness of the importance you attach to avoidance of conditions militating against successful development of London–Paris agreements on European security.
- 7.
- As interim solution of Dr. Quat problem and to prepare him for possible future responsibilities Department suggests for Saigon’s consideration he be sent to States on brief medical travel grant.
- 8.
- Robertson saw Mansfield today re Collins 2303 and 2285.3 Senator’s view in subsequent telegram.4
Hoover