751G.00/12–1754: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1
priority
2273. Limit distribution. Collins and MacArthur from Robertson. Regarding Collins’ 2303,2 Senator Mansfield dictated following views:
“On basis of facts contained in dispatches shown me in our discussions, situation in South Viet-Nam seems boiled down to two questions: Will the return of Bao Dai act materially and in manner consistent with our policy to break political impasse in Saigon? What are implications of recommendation of General Collins that we go along with Diem for few weeks and if it still seems that situation is insoluble to consider possibility of withdrawing from Viet-Nam entirely? As for return of Bao Dai, it is difficult see what he could accomplish in Saigon toward unification of factions that he cannot accomplish from France. It is difficult to see how, after universal estimate of him by French and American officials in Saigon and Paris just few months ago to effect he was detrimental factor, he can now become helpful factor. If there are nevertheless reasons for believing that this change has occurred, reasons which are not evident to me from dispatches or conversations, then I would suppose that Department would have to give serious consideration to possibility. It should be kept in mind, however, that Bao Dai has worked with Communists before. Advocacy of his return, particularly if it originates in French quarters, may well be part of French strategy to work out some sort of modus vivendi with Communists [Page 2394] in north. (We believe Senator mistaken regarding Bao Dai working with Communists. He joined Viet Minh when it was nationalist rebellion but deserted it after he discovered its Communist direction.)
“As for second question relative to possible disengagement of United States from situation South Viet-Nam, it seems to me that following questions are relative: (1) Is Quat or persons like Bay Vien or Tam, persons apparently not now acceptable to Bao Dai, essential to development of an independent, stable, non-Communist Viet-Nam? (2) Is Diem completely opposed or unamenable to the inclusion of such persons in his Government? I cannot advise on the making of these judgments from an office in Washington. It would seem to me that even the Department cannot make them without fullest evaluations from field from men who are fairly familiar with the intricacies of personalities and totality of factors involved. In the event, however, that the answers to above questions are in the affirmative, then General Collins’ recommendation is extremely pertinent. If we do withdraw in manner suggested by General, we may expect in my judgment that Diem Government will fall and that French will choose its successor with an eye to carrying out whatever policies they have in mind in connection with Viet Minh Communists under Ho Chi Minh. From our national point of view, it seems to me that actions which we contemplate in this or any other crisis which may arise in Viet-Nam should cut through personality squabbles. Actions can easily be distorted by these and should be based on one question: Will actions contribute to development of stable, independent non-Communist Government in Viet-Nam and are they within our prudent capacity to discharge. If they are not then in my judgment they should be avoided.”