751G.00/12–1754: Telegram
The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State
[Received December 18—1:22 a.m.]
2334. Repeated information Paris 727. Paris for MacArthur. From Collins.
I.
1. I saw Ely off for Paris 16th. Ely said he had told Diem previous day that while he accepted appointment of Minh as Defense Minister, he continued feel strongly Quat should be in government. Diem replied to Ely that sects strongly opposed Quat and feared him as potential successor to Diem.
2. Diem also told Ely he now felt army backed him fully, that every where he went people applauded him, and there was evidence of growing popular support for his government. He added that reports of Viet Minh penetration and activities are greatly exaggerated. Ely commented to me that Diem appeared surprisingly satisfied and optimistic, and gave him the impression of being “a man in a dream”.
3. I told Ely I had reports that Diem had said Ely agreed with Prime Minister that this was no time to risk political upheaval by naming Quat to Defense against wishes of the sects, and that Diem had indicated Ely’s approach to present problems was very different from mine. (This reported to me by Fishel.) Ely denied that anything he had said to Diem could justify such inference, and reminded me one of Diem’s tactics was to attempt to create divisions between French and Americans. He repeated he had urged Diem take Quat into government. Before boarding plane, Ely told me he had repeated this recommendation to Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, who was also at airport, for transmittal to Diem.
[Page 2397]II.
4. Later same morning I called on Diem and said I had been informed of his decision not to appoint Quat, but to promote Minh to head Defense Ministry. I said such decision was of course within his prerogatives but that I continued believe failure take Quat into government was grave mistake.
5. Diem said that now army problem is resolved, he will leave all defense administrative matters to Minh and concentrate on urgent reforms and other matters he had to neglect during army crisis. I asked if Minh would be authorized prescribe Vy’s duties as inspector general. Diem said he had asked Vy put in writing his ideas of what his job should be. I asked if decision this matter would be left to Minh. Diem replied determination would be made by Minh and “chief of government”.
6. I remarked to Diem his failure name Quat seemed confirm veto power of sects over any cabinet appointments. Diem said sects must be handled tactfully until army has reached degree of training, reorganization and redeployment which will permit government impose its will on sects. I asked how long this would take. Diem replied two months.
7. I asked Diem if he had given further thought to naming Interior Minister. Diem said he had been trying find suitable candidate, but that all men he had approached were reluctant take on job until problem of sects was resolved. I asked if Diem would consider naming Bay Vien (Binh Xuyen) to Interior. Prime Minister said Binh Xuyen already have Police and if they were given rest of Interior, sects would cause trouble. Moreover, Diem would be unwilling turn over entire internal administrative machinery to Binh Xuyen. Although Binh Xuyen have so far acted correctly in directing Police, Diem is fearful they may ultimately attempt action against government and is anxious for army to be made effective counterbalance to Binh Xuyen power. However, Diem is prepared to name Bay Vien Minister of State, give him seat on National Defense Council and charge of Youth Ministry. I commented that in view of Bay Vien’s past history, his appointment to head Youth Ministry would cause adverse reactions in US.
8. I remarked to Diem that he had probably seen reports of news stories published in Washington to effect US and France had agreed on national army force levels and a US program of direct military aid and training. I said the story was inaccurate in that no such decision would be taken without prior consultation with Vietnamese, and that US Government has not, in fact, reached decision as to furnishing military aid to Vietnam. Diem registered no reaction.
9. Diem concluded conversation by saying there are many favorable aspects in present situation. He said my arrival and settlement of quarrel [Page 2398] with Hinh had caused wave of hope. Government can now concentrate on constructive programs and is already taking measures to increase its appeal to the people.
III.
10. Reference Deptel 2444.1 I had already had conversation with Diem described part II this message before receiving reference telegram, and since Minh’s appointment as Defense Minister is now official there is nothing to gain at this point from using Mansfield’s name to support Quat for the post. However, I shall not fail to tell Diem that Mansfield hopes Prime Minister will be able take Quat into his government.