Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

790.5/12–1754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Department of State¹

secret

Phnom Penh, December 17, 1954—3 p.m.
[Received 9:55 a.m.]

378. Pouched Saigon; Bangkok; Vientiane unnumbered. Joint Embassy USOM message. Reference Department telegram 181, sent Bangkok 1456, Saigon 2295, Vientiane 133.²

1. We agree that U.S. objectives Southeast Asia would be greatly furthered by strengthening ties between Buddhist countries this area. This task easiest between Cambodia and Thailand which, in spite of recent wartime Thai invasion and annexation of Cambodian western provinces, already have closest ties as outlined our 221 to Department.³ In general terms measures discussed in sections C and D of that telegram provide framework of kind of projects we feel can usefully be taken to strengthen existing ties of race, culture, religion and common problems, and create new ones of trade and of common action to meet these problems.

2. Two most important immediate problems to which projects should be tailored are both in area of communications—one linguistic and other physical. First, educated Cambodians (now French speaking) must be taught English language to enable them to deal effectively with Thailand and other Asian neighbors, and provide channel of communication with them. Second, rail, road, sea and air communications must be expanded and strengthened between two countries.

3. While we hope South Vietnam may be saved from ultimate Communist take-over, it is vital to plan against probability that Saigon port and lower reaches of Mekong, on which Cambodian foreign trade now depends, will soon be in Communist hands. If Cambodia is not provided with other egress to outside world, nation will then be in parlous situation. High priority projects this regard include deep water port on Gulf of Siam (Embassy telegram 234)⁴ and improvement rail and road link with Thailand. Specific projects are:

(a). Immediate renovation of 25 miles railroad track from Poipet to Aranh-Chas (this project now advanced planning stage will be on loan basis, with rails and ties probably coming from stocks originally destined for Vietnam military aid).

(b). Early establishment of through freight and passenger railroad service Bangkok-Phnom Penh. At present freight can be scheduled through if arranged in advance but passenger service not available. Although Thai rolling stock can operate in Cambodia, Cambodian passenger cars too large to transit Thailand tunnels and bridges. Early attention should be given to converting Cambodian stock to standard sizes able to operate in Thailand, or to arranging agreement with Thai Government for use of its cars on through service here. (Thais presently refuse consider latter solution.)

(c). Continued extension of highway maintenance service and early widening of RN 5 and 6 (Phnom Penh-Poipet).

(d). At same time connections must be greatly improved. Although now there are semi-weekly regular flights between Bangkok and Phnom Penh more flight service necessary. MATS Bangkok-Saigon flight should include stop at Phnom Penh; and CAT airline project (Embassy telegram 168)⁵ should be expedited. Also agreement should be reached whereby Thai airlines as well as CAT would make additional stop in Siemreap to assist in developing mutually profitable tourist trade, and take fullest advantage of historic cultural connections between these two countries. Eventually Air India, because of Indian origin Angkor, might be encouraged to develop Indian tourism at Siemreap.

(e). Other useful projects this area would include extension to Bangkok of VHF telecommunication project now under consideration between Phnom Penh and Saigon, and negotiation of agreement for freer Cambodian access to seaports which would provide terminal for sea lane from Cambodian ports to Thailand and outside areas.

(f). At same time uncertainty as to Saigon’s future makes it necessary to obtain Thai permission for use Bangkok port as sea terminus for Cambodian export and imports.

4. To facilitate cooperation and technical liaison, one of most urgent projects is establishment English language teaching program to break down barriers imposed by French culture between Laos and Cambodia and other Asian states. If possible, advance stages this instruction could occur in Thailand, thus achieving at same time second objective of strengthening ties between nationalities.

5. To as large extent as possible common economic and social problems in border areas should be solved cooperatively by Cambodia and Thailand. For example rinderpest control projects should be firmed up and Thailand-Cambodian cooperation encouraged. This would help prevent spread of disease between countries and within them, and remove one possible cause friction between them.

6. Third major project area—training of Cambodian technicians and administrators—can be handled similarly to English language program. To considerable extent Thai training facilities should be used in training of Cambodian administrators and technicians needed in coming stage when Cambodia will be groping to equip itself with techniques necessary for survival in modern world. One such project about to begin is Thai training of Cambodian police personnel (Embtel 207).⁶

7. Fourth project area and most fertile field for strengthening Thai-Cambodian ties lies in Buddhist Church. Common religion, common philosophic attitude toward things spiritual and temporal, constitute one of most important linking factors between two countries. This can be exploited tactfully and quietly. English language training and cultural exchange of bonzes and students in Buddhist schools would be effective ways to encourage better relations. At same time Cambodian priests and students in Thailand would expose them to direct reflection of US attitudes and demonstrate effective western cooperation with oriental country so similar to theirs. No reason why Thai bonzes should not also come here.

8. Re last sentence second paragraph and final paragraph reference telegram, believe it worth re-emphasizing that Cambodia’s principal orientation and most developed ties are with other Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia, which share Indian cultural Thai ethnic origins, and not in framework of former French colonial system. Certainly relations between Cambodia and Vietnam must be improved and all possible ties strengthened or created, but these ties are now tenuous and factors tending to divide these states seem stronger than those linking them. Would thus be dangerously unrealistic to eschew any project which might be useful in bringing Thailand, Laos and Cambodia more closely together because of any fear that this might drive wedge between three former Associated States. At present Cambodians are watching with alarm political developments in South Vietnam and most of them are convinced that area doomed to fall to Viet Minh. Any development or any internal Vietnam project which serves to strengthen free Vietnam Government and bring South Vietnam more fully under its control will automatically better Cambodian-Vietnam relations.

Of first order of importance is Vietnam Government control of seas and consequent stop to lawless Hoa Hao excursions into Cambodia and depredations to Cambodian residents in South Vietnam (Embassy despatch 139).⁷ Secondly and equally important is successful conclusion present quadripartite economic discussions in Paris, particularly as related to Cambodian use of free port area in Saigon and free navigation of Mekong. Until South Vietnam is securely united against Communist threat, there is little chance that individual technical or economic projects can overcome Cambodian fear and long bred dislike for their eastern neighbor. In fact, our own propaganda effort against Viet Minh increases Cambodian enmity and fear of Vietnam.

Although not a fastidious concept, we might as well accept fact that in psychological [terms?] it is easier to incite hatred than friendship. In SE Asia generally it is more practical to fan secular smoldering embers of dread of China than it is to speak wishfully of “strengthening ties with free Vietnam”.

McClintock

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Dated Dec. 7, p. 2349.
3. Telegram 221 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 3, is not printed. (790.5/11–354)
4. Telegram 234 from Phnom Penh, Nov. 6, is not printed. (951H.541/11–654)
5. Telegram 168 from Phnom Penh, Oct. 15, is not printed. (651.51G/10–1554)
6. Telegram 207 from Phnom Penh, Oct. 29, is not printed. (851H.501/10–2954)
7. Despatch 139 from Phnom Penh, Dec. 4, is not printed. (651G.51H/12–454)