Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/12–1654: Telegram

The Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, December 16, 1954—7 p.m.

2303. Sent niact Paris 724. Department pass Defense eyes only Hensel, Davis and JCS. Department eyes only Acting Secretary and Robertson. Paris eyes only Secretary State, Secretary Defense and Radford. From Collins. Re Embtels 1830,¹ 2108,² 2250,³ Department 2285⁴ (paragraph 8) repeated Paris 602, 665, 706, 717.

1. Decision of Diem not to appoint Quat Defense Minister is final development that convinces me that Diem does not have the capacity to unify divided factions in Vietnam, and that unless some such action is taken as indicated in paragraph 7 below, this country will be lost to communism. Reasons for Diem’s decision probably compounded of (1) unwillingness to delegate control of Vietnam armed forces to any strong man; (2) fear of Quat as potential successor; (3) opposition of sects; (4) influence of brothers Luyen and Nhu; (5) desire to retain Minh in government.

2. Whatever the reasons, the failure to utilize Quat epitomizes lack of unity among Vietnamese and lack of decisive leadership on part of Diem. Minh refused to submerge his personal ambitions, even for a few months transition period under Quat or anyone else. Luyen again demonstrated his ability to cause Diem to reverse a decision already taken (Diem had told me prior to Luyen’s return from Paris that he would appoint Quat). The veto power of the sects over any changes in the government that are likely to result in a weakening of their private domains has been confirmed. Another strong positive man, Quat, has been blocked from having a hand in reorganizing and controlling the armed forces. And all of these negative results have required a month of lengthy discussions, evasions of basic issues, and wasted opportunities.

3. Minh is a good man, though young and inexperienced. O’Daniel feels that if Diem delegates full authority to Minh, the latter may be able to heal wounds of Diem–Hinh, Ty-Vy, Phan Rang-Phan Thiet affairs and bring stability and sanity to government-army relationships. But it is highly doubtful to me that Minh, or anyone else under present conditions, can create a single, cohesive national army from the five separate forces now existing—the Cao Daist, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, national guard, and the present national army. With anticipated opposition from the sects and some from Diem himself, who is loathe to disband his own private force (national guard), it will take stronger leadership from Diem and Minh than either has shown to date to reduce and amalgamate these forces.

4. What is true of the armed forces is likely to be true in the resettlement of refugees and land reform. When I told Diem recently that our FOA people were having difficulty in getting down to business with the Vietnam agriculture officials, Diem reminded me that the Minister of Agriculture is a Hoa Hao and the Hoa Hao are fearful of the effect of land reform on their extensive control of rice lands. Government officials hesitate to place refugees on French-owned rice lands or in the French-owned rubber plantations. And so on, one excuse for inaction after another.

5. Fact is that of the fine program of reforms announced by Diem in September, no definite progress has been achieved in converting words into deeds in any field.

6. I had hoped Diem would broaden and strengthen his cabinet by addition of Quat and perhaps even Bay Vien. Latter, despite his lurid past, has demonstrated organizing ability and his recently indicated desire to become “honorable” and to assist government. With Quat in government, Quat might have done much gradually to get sects in line and through his practical political ability have injected some flexibility and drive, both of which are now woefully lacking. At same time Quat might have acquired greater stature in public eye which might later have rendered him more eligible for higher post if later found necessary replace Diem. Unfortunately, this was probably deduced by brother Luyen and Diem also. I feel sure that fear of Quat’s ability is at root of sects and Diem’s opposition.

7. After weighing all available evidence, I am now convinced that in face of the positive threat of Ho Chi Minh’s regime, it will take decisive action and dramatic leadership from the Vietnamese themselves to save free Vietnam. Neither French nor Americans can substitute for such action and leadership. Apparently the only Vietnamese who might be competent to galvanize the country into unified action is Bao Dai. Though I do not know the man, and realize his many disabilities, it is possible he might furnish the necessary impact if he were to return and take active direction of the government, whether he retained Diem or appointed Quat or someone else as Premier, or assumed the office himself. Almost all Vietnamese with whom I have talked, including Diem, look instinctively to Bao Dai as the ultimate source of authority. Of course, if we and the French were to support his return, specific conditions would have to [be] stipulated in advance, generally as indicated in Part II, paragraph 3B, Embtel 2250. I realize also that Bao Dai’s return would furnish excellent propaganda material for Communists, but if they don’t have such material in hand they will manufacture it anyway. So we should not permit this aspect to determine our course, after weighing all other factors.

8. I recognize that we must continue to support the Diem Government for some time at least. But I recommend that we not now consummate an agreement with the Vietnamese to assume on 1 January responsibility for training their forces or for giving direct military aid. We should continue to place American officers with staff of Vietnam army and aid in developing training plans and pacification plans. We should continue to talk with Vietnamese with a view to reaching common accord on size and composition of forces. But we should not conclude formal agreements on training or support for specific force levels until decision reached in Washington as to our ultimate policy and commitments here. Similarly, planning should go on for initiation of direct military aid commencing 1 January, but we should not commit ourselves to any given volume of aid until US has adopted definitive policy with respect to Vietnam. Meanwhile I would strongly urge consideration of bringing Bao Dai back under one or other of the variants indicated in paragraph 7 above and paragraph 2 Embtel 2250. (See also paragraph 5, Embtel 2285, repeated Paris 717, for Ely’s views.) Therefore my present recommendations are:

a. Continue to support Diem along present lines for short while longer but without committing US to specific aid programs;

b. Consider urgently, as possible alternative, the early return of Bao Dai;

c. If after short period of further test Diem Government fails to achieve substantial progressive action, and if return of Bao Dai is acceptable to US Government, to support his prompt return;

d. If return of Bao Dai is not acceptable to US Government, assuming Diem Government continues to demonstrate inability to unite free Vietnam behind an aggressive program, I recommend reevaluation of our plans for assisting Southeast Asia with special attention to proposal contained in paragraph 6, Part II Embtel 2250.

9. I am sorry to have to make such a discouraging report, but in all honesty I have to present to you my present convictions because of their possible effect on US 1956 budget about to be presented to Congress. Should it be determined that in view of the unsound situation in Vietnam the US should gradually withdraw its support from this country, then it would be necessary, in my opinion, to increase the aid to the French expeditionary corps so that it would remain strong enough during the next year to permit the US to withdraw essential equipment which might otherwise fall into Communist hands. It appears to me, therefore, that we should retain as much flexibility as possible with reference to financial aid for the FEC.

10. Conclusion: It is possible that by a month from now some radical improvement will have come about but I strongly doubt it. Meanwhile, I feel that we should make a sober reevaluation of the situation here before we commit over $300 million and our national prestige under current conditions. I will continue to carry on along same lines I have been following, but will await instructions while temporarily dragging feet, if necessary, with respect to definite commitments, as indicated in paragraph 8.

Kidder

1. Dated Nov. 15, p. 2250.
2. Dated Dec. 6, p. 2341.
3. Dated Dec. 13, p. 2362.
4. Reference is to telegram 2285 from Saigon, Dec. 15, p. 2375.