751G.00/12–1754: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State1
[Received 3:16 p.m.]
Secto 11. Limit distribution. Secretary and Eden had general discussion last evening on Indo-China. Eden mentioned recent reports from McDonald and stressed the British concern re Vietnam. While situation in Cambodia was reassuring, and in Laos seemed improving, Vietnam was very vulnerable. There was some discussion re Diem during which Graves2 indicated Diem lacked support of sects, army, police and Catholics of center. In fact he had little support and lacked ability to spark free Vietnam into energetic action. While he might be useful as figurehead, he did not have necessary qualities of leadership.
Secretary recognized Diem’s deficiencies but said he had not heard of any acceptable substitute. Therefore to discuss alternatives to Diem [Page 2386] when there no acceptable alternative was simply to undermine him. He mentioned Senator Mansfield’s views on the situation as indicative of general feeling in Foreign Relations Committee.
Secretary said he understood possible alternative to Diem might be Bao Dai’s return to Vietnam and asked Eden’s reaction. Eden took dim view and said he had no confidence in Bao Dai to whom he referred as a “baccarat king”. Graves said Bao Dai’s return at present would be premature but that this was a possibility which might seriously be considered in the relatively near future if it was clear Diem had failed.
Secretary then outlined General Collins’ concept re composition and mission of Vietnamese forces explaining cost to U.S. of such a program would be about $300 million, adding that over-all program for three Associated States was in order of magnitude of $500 million. Secretary explained this included $100 million for FEC and gave Eden latest info on French thinking on reduction of FEC. This was a tremendous investment, but Secretary believed we should do everything possible to try to hold south Vietnam and at least try in time to bolster Laos and Cambodia. Eden agreed and was obviously impressed with the magnitude of the cost.
Secretary then outlined U.S. views re training Vietnamese.
He told Eden that U.S. had no intention of increasing MAAG beyond the level obtained when Geneva agreement was signed. This raised real problem with respect to training Vietnamese and would require continuing use of French military personnel. He also explained that certain U.S. administrative personnel would be replaced by training personnel, but we did not plan to go beyond the ceiling imposed by Geneva accord. Eden seemed much reassured and expressed full agreement with what Secretary had said, adding that continuation of French training personnel in Laos was vital.
There was general discussion on desirability of engaging India’s responsibility with respect to preventing Laos and Cambodia falling into Communist hands. The Secretary said that anything Eden could do in this direction would be of great importance and commented that if India would be willing to effectively guarantee Laos and Cambodia against Communist domination, the U.S. would be glad to bow out of the picture. Eden said it would be very helpful if he could pass on to Nehru the Secretary’s thoughts about the importance of the role which India could play as outlined by the Secretary and the Secretary agreed that he could do so. Eden also indicated Pakistan, India and Burma were moving in direction of recognizing Laos and Cambodia which would also be helpful.
As meeting was on point of breaking up, Secretary said he understood there had been suggestion of an informal tripartite (US–UK during [Page 2387] French) meeting in Washington. He said he agreed to such a meeting but that it should be kept informal and serve as a focal point for an exchange of views on Indo-China. Need for meeting to be secret was stressed in view of unfavorable reaction which would be caused in Australia and New Zealand and the Associated States if word leaked out the Big Three were discussing Indo-China. Eden fully agreed. Atmosphere during meeting was extremely cordial with Eden expressing great appreciation for info and views given him by Secretary.3
- Secretary Dulles was in Paris for the North Atlantic Council Meeting, Dec. 16–18. Briefing materials for the use of the Secretary in discussions on Indochina during his stay in Paris are in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 421.↩
- Sir Hubert Graves, former British Ambassador in Vietnam who had recently returned from that country for retirement.↩
- Counselor MacArthur, who accompanied Secretary Dulles to Paris, pursued the question of Indochina in a discussion with Denis Allen of the British Delegation on Dec. 17. MacArthur’s memorandum of that conversation is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 421.↩