751G.00/10–2654
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Tyler)
Subject:
- Indochina.
Participants:
- The Secretary
- The French Ambassador
- Mr. Tyler, WE
Ambassador Bonnet called on the Secretary at his own request. He said that he had not been instructed to make a démarche but had come on his own initiative to express his misgivings and deep anxiety with regard to the course of events in Indochina. He said that the information he had received officially, and in personal communications from General Ely, led him to feel that the chances of Diem succeeding in forming a government of national unity and of acquiring authority were very slight.
He said that General Ely, in whom he had unbounded confidence, had done everything he could to bring about a settlement of the Diem–Hinh quarrel. He had succeeded in obtaining from Hinh the undertaking that he would limit himself entirely to military affairs and would [Page 2187] stay away from politics. He had brought Hinh to the point where he had agreed that he would take orders from Diem. However Diem had on his part been adamant and is insisting on getting rid of Hinh. This deadlock has created a dangerous situation in which some of the younger officers behind Hinh are beginning to agitate to the point where the possibility of civil disorder cannot be excluded. Should this happen, the French Expeditionary Force would in no circumstances go into action against Vietnamese troops but would only look toward its own security.
The Ambassador commented in a rueful tone that “France now had everyone against her in Indochina,” He said that the President’s letter to Diem had created a sensation, in Saigon and was being interpreted as superseding the Washington agreements, by which Ambassador Heath need no longer consider himself bound. It was felt that the President’s letter had given Diem full rein without requiring of him as a preliminary condition that he should first succeed in forming a strong and stable government, even though this preliminary condition had been part of the basis of the Washington agreements.
A further aspect of the President’s letter which is giving the French concern is the use which the Viet Minh could make of this step in relation to the Armistice agreement. The Ambassador said that the Viet Minh would doubtless wish to exploit this possibility, especially if the situation were to deteriorate further. In addition to the French Expeditionary Force now located in Southern Viet Nam, there was the matter of the troops in Haiphong, which were not to be evacuated until May 1955. All this added up to a very delicate situation, potentially dangerous and of uncertain prospects. The Ambassador said that in all good faith, and despite the best will in the world to make the Diem experiment work, the outlook seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. He was also concerned by what seemed to him to be a lack of Franco-American coordination with regard to the course of action to be taken in Indochina and said he hoped it would be possible for us to consult each other again more closely, and bring our positions together.
The Secretary said that he was giving the situation in Indochina the greatest attention, and he agreed that it was a difficult and delicate problem. He pointed out that Diem needed all the support that he could get from every quarter and that it was not enough to say that one was going to support Diem but that he hadn’t much chance. The support must be positive and continuous in order to be effective. The Secretary said that he had had a talk with Premier Mendes-France in Paris on Indochina and that he would shortly be sending him a message about the situation there.