Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
Memorandum of Discussion at the 219th Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, October 26, 19541
eyes only
[Extracts]
Present at the 219th Meeting of the National Security Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; Herbert Hoover, Jr., [Page 2184] for the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration;2 and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; William F. Tompkins for the Attorney General (Item 3); the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Items 1 and 3); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; Assistant Secretary of Defense Pike; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; General Pate for the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.
There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.
. . . . . . .
2. Indochina (NSC Action No. 1250-d)3
Mr. Cutler reminded the Council of its agreement at its last meeting to inaugurate a crash military program in South Vietnam (NSC Action No. 1250) as set forth in a draft message which was to be prepared for transmission to the Ambassador and to the Chief of the MAAG, Saigon. He then asked Under Secretary Hoover to report on the follow-up of this Council decision.
Secretary Hoover said that the message in question had been sent that evening to Saigon, as had a message to the Secretary of State in Paris.4 The Secretary had discussed with Premier Mendes-France the proposed crash program,5 and had got a delayed but very violent adverse reaction. The French contended that we had violated not only our recent agreements with the French themselves in the Washington conversations on Indochina, but that our proposals also violated the terms of the Geneva Armistice Agreement with the Communists. From this reaction, Secretary Dulles felt that the French were probably being put on the spot because they had made some sort of secret agreement with the Vietminh in the course of the Geneva Conference. There was no proof of any such agreement, said Secretary Hoover, but we have certainly not violated the terms of the Geneva Armistice [Page 2185] Agreement as we know those terms. In any event, we are going ahead with our plans vis-à-vis Diem and Hinh, and Secretary Hoover believed the situation in South Vietnam now looked a good deal better.
The President inquired whether the French irritation was simply the result of the fact that we were cutting down on our cash handouts to them. Secretary Hoover replied that there seemed to be more to it than that, and again suggested the possibility of a secret agreement between the French and the Communists at Geneva, in which the British also may have been implicated.
The President reacted strongly to this latter suggestion, and said that if there were any question about British participation, Secretary Dulles should confront Eden and get the “lowdown”, or, if the Secretary preferred, he himself would take the matter up with Sir Winston Churchill and would do so in his own fashion.
Secretary Humphrey speculated as to the possibility that the French were trying to reconvert what was left of free Indochina into a French colony. Admiral Radford pointed out that the British had also protested the creation of a USMAAG for Cambodia, despite the fact that we had every right to do this according to the terms of the Geneva Agreement.
Mr. Allen Dulles thought it likely that the French wanted to concentrate their hopes and their powers on preserving Cochin China as a French colony, having more or less renounced any hope of holding Annam. The Acting Director of FOA, Mr. Lloyd, cited the fact that the United States had spent $231 million on Indochina and that $554 million earmarked for carrying out the Navarre Plan remained unspent. He thought this fact had strongly influenced the French. The President replied with some heat that these large sums had not been offered the French in order to enable them to carry out a colonization project, but to assist them in fighting a war. Whatever the explanation of the French conduct, the President added that he wished to be kept informed of developments in this area, especially in the event that our allies are again dragging in colonialism.
Secretary Wilson said that in his view the only sensible course of action was for the U.S. to get out of Indochina completely and as soon as possible. The situation there was utterly hopeless, and these people should be left to stew in their own juice. The President replied by pointing out to Secretary Wilson that what we were doing in Indochina was being done for our own purposes and not for the French. If we continued to retreat in this area the process would lead to a grave situation from the point of view of our national security. Accordingly, the President expressed a preference for Admiral Radford’s earlier view that we should try to get the French out of the Indochina area. To the President’s point Secretary Wilson replied that if we had ever [Page 2186] been in control of Indochina, as we had once been in the Philippines, he would feel differently about it. As matters stood, however, he could see nothing but grief in store for us if we remained in this area.
Mr. Cutler asked Secretary Wilson directly whether he was proposing that the Council reverse the action which it had agreed to recommend to the President only five days ago. Secretary Wilson replied in the negative, but pointed out that the earlier policy had been adopted by the Council on the assumption that the United States would have French and British support which, in point of fact, we did not now appear to have.
. . . . . . .
The National Security Council:
- a.
- Noted an oral report by the Under Secretary of State on developments pursuant to NSC Action No. 1250-d.
- b.
- Requested the Secretary of State to keep the Council informed on further developments pursuant to NSC Action No. 1250—d.
Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State.
. . . . . . .
- Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Oct. 27.↩
- Glen A. Lloyd, Deputy to the Director.↩
- NSC Action No. 1250 is included in extracts from the memorandum of discussion at the 218th Meeting of the Council, Oct. 22, p. 2153.↩
- See telegrams 1679 to Saigon and Tedul 14 to Paris, Oct. 22, pp. 2161 and 2159, respectively.↩
- See telegram 1717 from Paris. Oct. 23, p. 2165.↩