Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

751G.00/10–2754: Telegram

The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Saigon, October 27, 1954—10 p.m.

1609. Rptd info Paris 536, Department pass Defense. This is joint Embassy MAAG message in which all members country team concur. Re Department’s 1678² and 1679.³ There follows proposed crash program designed implement directions contained reference telegrams. This program is based on three yet untested assumptions:

(1) That Diem can be persuaded to accept these proposals; (2) that Hinh will actually carry out his assurances of loyal behavior to General O’Daniel reported Embassy telegram 1575;⁴ and (3) that French cooperation will be in fact as well as name and extend through all echelons.

I. Kick-off:

We envisage kick-off of crash program to consist of two statements:

(1) Statement by Diem against communism, outlining general program designed strengthen country in common fight in which all forces of nation, including army, have roles to play. Army would be assured that its development would be fostered, its integrity preserved and its legitimate military rights protected.

(2) Hinh declaration of loyalty of army to present legal government.

Timing these statements still to be worked out, but, in view Hinh conversation with O’Daniel (Embtel 1575), it is possible Hinh’s statement may precede that of President. Both have stated to O’Daniel that proposed statement by Hinh should be made first.

Immediate implementation of Hinh’s declaration of loyalty should be joint investigation (see [III] C below) of Nha Trang affair in which it is alleged that armed forces took over civil government. Disciplinary action and restoration of civil government as may be necessary.

II. Diem:

(A) House clean presidential office.

(B) Persuade to bring into Cabinet capable individuals, such as Quat, possibly as Secretaries of State attached to Presidency or Ministers without portfolio with longer range purpose of reorganizing Cabinet to retain these individuals, eliminating incompetent and corrupt members, and reducing relative representation of the sects. Indication that US may be willing take over subsidy of sect would be weapon.

(C) Concrete steps must be taken in direction of solving most pressing problems.

(1) Reestablishment security and effective local government throughout free Vietnam. Presidential directives mentioned III B to be issued by November 8.

(2) General statement re land reform program.

(D) Diem must be persuaded to dismiss ultimately present Cao Dai and Hoa Hao Secretaries of State, Interior Ministry and appoint immediately an effective, capable energetic Minister of Interior.

(E) Diem must get out of Palace and among people, including inspection tours of Armed Forces. First these tours prior mid-November.

(F) Coordinated and effective publicity campaign on large scale through Vietnamese Information Ministry with support and advice from USIS and other appropriate US agencies. Since present Information Minister is Cao Dai, there will have to be safeguards to prevent this program from becoming Cao Dai aggrandizement campaign.

III. General Hinh and Army:

(A) Government and Hinh accept, with Ely’s concurrence by November 1 presence of American officers in headquarters with view to establishing and extending American influence in Army. We visualize immediate introduction three MAAG officers into headquarters staff Vietnamese Armed Forces, one MAAG officer into Defense Ministry and one MAAG officer in each of three Vietnamese Regional Military Headquarters.

(B) Actions by Armed Forces in pacification program: Based on directives from President, Army prepared and issues by target date November 15 detailed instructions concerning

(1) Chain of command for pacification operations

(2) Allocation of forces for pacification duty

(3) Schedule of developments required to carry out pacification program

(4) Relationship between military forces and Gamos

(5) Earmarking and training forces to be used in pacifying areas yet to be evacuated by Vietminh

(6) Methods to be employed in conducting pacification operations.

Primary emphasis will be addressed to exemplary conduct of troops and thorough system of screening, registration and follow-up checks on all centers of population. Appropriate inspection of selected pacification operations by US officials.

(C) After Nha Trang Affair has been investigated and corrective measures as may prove necessary have been taken, General Hinh should issue general directive prohibiting members of Armed Forces from engaging in political activities. French and MAAG officers to accompany investigating committee composed of representatives of Ministry of Interior, Minister of Defense and Vietnamese Armed Forces.

(D) Obtain agreements from Hinh and Ely that French Officers holding key posts in Vietnamese Armed Services will be gradually supplanted by Vietnamese Officers. French Officers to remain as advisers. Initial group French Officers to be replaced by December 1.

IV. Three Generals:

Negotiations between Diem and Generals Xuan, Hinh and Bay Vien, who were basing their claims on Bao Dai telegrams, should cease. Bao Dai must be persuaded to support our program and refrain from encouraging generals in their demands.

(A) Xuan is definitely out and we will oppose his being brought into government in any capacity.

(B) Bay Vien’s control of police makes it temporarily desirable that he be brought into government on conditions acceptable to Diem and his colleagues. However, Bay Vien should under no circumstances be given Ministry of Interior or key post therein.

V. French:

(A) Ely must be kept informed of crash program activities and his advice, cooperation and support solicited and geared into program.

(B) Ely must be persuaded to police more effectively his subordinates and although it is realized that legalistic substantiation of charges might be impossible we must name names if necessary. Continued tacit encouragement of opposition to Diem on part subordinate French officials should be grounds for US request to French Government for their removal. Possibly a request should be made for the transfer of General Renucci.

VI. Details concerning implementation MAAG part this crash program will be subject separate cable.⁵ Progress reports will include suggested modifications as may be indicated by situation as it develops.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Also sent as Tedul 14, Oct. 22, p. 2159.
3. Dated Oct. 22, p. 2161.
4. Dated Oct. 25, p. 2172.
5. Telegram MG 3381–A from Saigon, Oct. 27, not printed. (751G.00/10–2754)