751G.13/10–2254: Telegram
The Ambassador in Vietnam (Heath) to the Department of State
niact
1536. Sent Paris 505. For the Secretary. Reference Paris telegram 209.1 For more than 40 days Diem and General Hinh have been deadlocked. And 40 days have been largely lost which government with necessary cooperation of army should have employed in establishing its authority over provinces, extirpating Viet Minh infiltration and terrorism, and winning rural population. Fault certainly initially was Hinh’s but failure to find compromise solution is in large part due to Diem’s lack of personality, his inability to win over people of opposite views, his stubbornness and intransigence, his general political ineptitude, and his slowness in decision and action. We have by our advice partially remedied some of his deficiencies. We have kept him from doing certain things that would have been bad for his government, and have gotten him to take certain steps to improve his administration, but we have had to compete with his own willfulness and entourage of personal friends and family members whose advice has generally been bad.
Since he has neither police nor army backing him and the two sects he has finally won over with some assistance from us are insufficient to give him a force basis, it was obviously necessary for him to compromise with General Hinh and with General Bay Vien who controls police. He has arrived in principle at compromise with latter but with Hinh at present refuses to treat further or envisage any other solution except that Hinh be ignominiously dismissed. Hinh by his own cleverness and government mistakes has fairly well succeeded in making his cause army’s own. Menace of cutting off American aid [Page 2152] which pays bulk of army’s budget has not so far deterred influential element of officer corps from making common cause with Hinh. General Ely’s and my representations have so far kept Hinh and his camarilla from overthrowing government by force and our joint influence persuaded Bao Dai not to raise again his implied request that Diem resign.
I believe there has been every reason to have upheld Diem to date since he does represent an ideal and he enjoys certain prestige and confidence among masses of population. He has largely lost during course continuing deadlock, prestige and confidence of literate, articulate sections of Vietnamese community. There is still no worthy successor in sight, and we must gain time to prepare what Mendes-France calls “another structure of government”. We cannot however lose much time. Everyone in Embassy is convinced that Diem cannot organize and administer strong government.
Diem somewhat as a constitutional European president without direct control over day to day operations of government might make useful contribution. In such position he could influence government policies, he could get out and visit villages where he still retains some popularity and confidence. To date, however, he has hardly left presidential palace, where indeed he had been working eighteen hours a day largely due to his inability to organize and to delegate responsibility. In order fill this role Diem would have to leave actual operation of government to capable people. He has already demonstrated, unfortunately, that he is little capable of delegating responsibility. Such a role, moreover, would be counter to his fanatic sense of personal mission. It is also doubtful he would accept any limitation of his authority.
Diem has put his difficulties up to Bao Dai and hopes against hope that latter will order army, Binh Xuyen, and General Xuan to cooperate with Diem Government. I entertain no such hopes because Bao Dai has no such authority. Bao Dai has replied to Diem that he is sending answer to his cable by personal messenger, Diem’s brother Luyen, who will not arrive here before two or three days at earliest.
We agree with Mendes-France that it is important to maintain for a while “thread of legitimacy deriving from Bao Dai”. Until there is a provisional legislative body and probably a provisional constitution issuing therefrom for Vietnam, Bao Dai should probably remain. We will probably have to use Bao Dai’s “thread of legitimate authority to compel Diem either to constitute efficient government or, if he remains intractable and inept, to resign in favor of some person or persons capable of forming a government strong enough to keep free Vietnam from going Communist. We must work out from Paris Embassy some system of keeping contact with and of influencing Bao Dai.
[Page 2153]We cannot leave that job entirely to French. Mendes-France’s policy and actions to date and those of Commissioner General Ely have been loyal and cooperative. But there are too many French officials and officers below Prime Minister Mendes-France and Ely who are neither loyal nor cooperative. Hinh and his camarilla of officers have been more than tacitly encouraging French officers and individuals and general attitude of French officers and officials is, except to extent that it is checked by Ely, to get rid of Diem even if he were efficient chief of government because he is “anti-French”.
La Chambre has returned to Saigon and I will have long talk with him tomorrow.
I am still confident that a government and a solid army can yet be built in free Vietnam.