Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 218th Meeting of the National Security Council, Friday, October 22, 1954¹

top secret
eyes only

October 22, 1954

[Extracts]

Present at this meeting were the President of the United States, presiding, the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization; the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers (for Item 5); the Director, U.S. Information Agency (Items 4 and 5); the Secretary of the Navy (Items 2–5); the Secretary of the Air Force (Items 2–5); Assistant Secretary of State Robertson (Items 2–5); Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles (Items 2 and 3); Robert R. Bowie and Kenneth T. Young, Department of State (latter for Item 4); the Chairman. Joint Chiefs of Staff (Items 2–5); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Items 2–5); the Chief of Naval Operations (Items 2–5); the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (Items 2–5); the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps (Items 2–5); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

4. Indochina (NSC 5429/2)²

Mr. Cutler observed that the forthcoming reports would assist us in estimating the possibilities of saving the non-Communist areas of Indochina. He then restated the existing policy of the United States vis-à-vis free Indochina, as set forth in NSC 5429/2, and read the gloomy conclusions of the Special National Intelligence Estimate on South Vietnam.³ Mr. Cutler concluded his remarks with a brief reference to the plus and minus factors, noting that Acting Secretary of State Hoover would doubtless expand on both. He then called on Secretary Hoover to read his report (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁴

Secretary Hoover first commented on the continuing political crisis in South Vietnam and the steps which would be necessary to break the political stalemate and to save the area from Communism. He then turned to the program which the OCB had decided on as the first stage of U.S. action.⁵ The major questions before the OCB were the training and force levels of the Vietnamese army. It had been decided that as the first stage a limited training mission should be undertaken immediately as a crash program designed to sustain the Diem government and establish security in Free Vietnam. This amounted to a mission of reorienting the top officers of the Vietnam Army away from Hinh and toward Diem. The next stage, and the longer term program, would involve consideration of the ultimate force levels for Vietnam and Cambodia to carry out paragraph 10–d of NSC 5429/2.

With respect to Cambodia, Secretary Hoover reported that the situation was much more favorable, and a good possibility existed for achieving our objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have given approval of the establishment of a MAAG in Cambodia. FOA has named an Acting Director for Cambodia, and a separate FOA mission will be in operation there in the near future.

Thirdly, Secretary Hoover cited the statistics for the evacuation of North Vietnam through October 15, 1954. The total number of evacuees was estimated at 423,000, of whom 74,000 were military personnel.

There remained to be evacuated between 75,000 and 100,000 individuals. Nearly 100,000 tons of military matériel had likewise been evacuated. Troop movements were slightly ahead of schedule, military cargo slightly behind schedule because of labor shortages and inadequate port facilities.

Some $40 million had been allocated for implementation of the refugee resettlement program. There was, accordingly, no shortage of money, but the refugees from North Vietnam were still living in temporary shelters in the Saigon area. Over 250,000 would ultimately have to be resettled on a permanent basis in the south.

At the conclusion of Secretary Hoover’s report, the President inquired whether any agreement had been reached between the Departments of State and Defense with respect to the crash military training program which Secretary Hoover had just described. Secretary Hoover did not give a direct answer, but again indicated that the objective of the so-called crash program was to reorient existing Vietnamese forces away from Hinh and to Diem.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the OCB had been in the process of drafting a message of instruction to the U.S. Ambassadors in Saigon and Paris and to the Chief of the USMAAG, Saigon, General O’Daniel. Mr. Cutler said he believed that this message had not been wholly agreed to by the Defense Department, and that Admiral Radford would probably wish to comment on it. He then called upon Assistant Secretary of State Robertson to read the proposed message (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁶ After reading the message, Secretary Robertson stressed that this was intended to initiate the crash program to which Secretary Hoover had referred, and that the immediate objective was to ensure the internal security of Free Vietnam.

After indicating his belief that the consent of the French Government would be necessary if this program were to be initiated, the President inquired what would happen if the French refused to concur in the arrangements set forth in the draft message. Secretary Robertson replied that in this contingency we would be completely stymied, since General Hinh was a French citizen, as were several others of the clique who were opposing Prime Minister Diem. This clique was really controlled by the French, and while the French had theoretically agreed to support Diem as a result of recent conversations with our officials in Washington, we had doubts as to whether they were actually living up to this commitment.

The President then inquired whether, under the terms of the Geneva armistice, the United States could legally increase the size of its Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) in Free Vietnam. Secretary Robertson replied that opinions differed on this point. The Legal Adviser to the State Department. Mr. Phleger, believed that we could not legally increase the size of our MAAG. The Defense Department lawyers, on the other hand, believed that if the French would agree to lower the number of French officers engaged in training the native forces, the United States could increase the number of its advisers commensurately.

Mr. Cutler then called on Admiral Radford to explain the objections of the Defense Department to the arrangements set forth in the draft message. Admiral Radford replied that the Joint Chiefs were still strongly of the opinion that it would be most difficult to do a satisfactory job of building up and training the Vietnamese native forces in the absence of a stable government in South Vietnam. The State Department had, of course, insisted that this was a “hen-and-egg” problem, arguing that in the absence of a stronger military posture in Free Vietnam, there could be no political stability. Admitting that there was much in this argument. Admiral Radford said that if it were decided that political considerations were overriding in this matter, the Joint Chiefs would do the best they could to achieve the desired objectives.

There were at least two major problems, continued Admiral Radford. In the first place, all the available native military forces in South Vietnam, which he estimated as about 235,000, would be required simply to achieve the objective of safeguarding the internal security of the country. The cost to train and maintain a force of this size, including pay, food, clothing, etc., but not including cost of equipment, was estimated to amount to about $443 million for Vietnam and an additional $93 million for Cambodia annually. To this sum must be added the cost to the United States of its assistance in maintaining the French Expeditionary Force in Indochina. The Joint Chiefs estimated this amount as somewhere between $330 million and $400 million annually. Hence the total cost for Fiscal Year 1955 would run somewhere between $800 million and $1 billion. Admiral Radford raised the question of where money was to come from for carrying out a program of this magnitude.

In the second place, Admiral Radford indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had restudied the problem the previous evening to see if it were possible to devise some smaller and more immediate program. They felt that if General O’Daniel got instructions to carry out the program set forth in the draft message, he would probably assume that he would have $400 million to spend. General Ridgway confirmed Admiral Radford’s statement by expressing the hope that the Joint Chiefs would be able to consider a smaller revised program that afternoon.

Speaking with conviction, the President observed that in the lands of the blind, one-eyed men are kings. What we wanted, continued the President, was a Vietnamese force which would support Diem. Therefore let’s get busy and get one, but certainly not at a cost of $400 million a year. The President said that he knew something from personal experience about doing this kind of job in this kind of area. He therefore was sure that something could be done and done quickly if we could simply decide on what to tell General O’Daniel to do.

Admiral Radford replied that there were 342 U.S. military personnel now in Vietnam for the purpose of training the native forces. This was much too small a number for carrying out a large-scale training program. Perhaps, therefore, the smart thing was to tell O’Daniel to go to Diem and tell him that the MAAG would try to organize an effective constabulary that would take its orders from Diem rather than from the Army. Admiral Radford also added his belief that the French were not really supporting Diem, since if they chose to call Hinh off he could not continue to operate. Secretary Robertson added that the information in the State Department indicated that if the French would get Hinh out of the picture there would be no further difficulty between Diem and the Vietnamese National Army.

The President then asked why we did not “get rough with the French”. If we didn’t do something very quickly, Diem would be down the drain with no replacement in sight. Accordingly, we ought to lay down the law to the French. It is true that we have to cajole the French with regard to the European area, but we certainly didn’t have to in Indochina.

Secretary Hoover pointed out that General O’Daniel’s hands had been tied up to now, but his personal prestige and influence was very profound, and if given an opportunity to exert it he would have no great difficulty in reorienting Army loyalties to Diem. Mr. Allen Dulles expressed agreement with Secretary Hoover’s estimate of O’Daniel’s influence, and added that the trouble with France arose in part from the preoccupation of Premier Mendes-France with European problems. Mr. Dulles endorsed some such message to Saigon as Secretary Robertson had read, but with the addition of a caveat with regard to the costs.

The President then said that the obvious thing to do was simply to authorize General O’Daniel to use up to X millions of dollars—say, five six or seven—to produce the maximum number of Vietnamese military units on which Prime Minister Diem could depend to sustain himself in power. Admiral Radford said that the time for rapid action was at hand, and that the OCB could redraft the proposed instructions along the lines just suggested by the President.

The President then pointed out that what the United States was undertaking to do in South Vietnam had already been agreed to by the French. Accordingly, we should inform Paris that we will not undertake any further steps in South Vietnam until they get rid of Hinh.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted an oral progress report on Indochina by the Acting Secretary of State, based upon discussion at the last meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board, with particular reference to the Vietnam political crisis, implementation of U.S. military and economic aid programs. Cambodia, the evacuation from North Vietnam, and the refugee resettlement program.

b. Noted and discussed a draft message designed to initiate a U.S. program with respect to the reorganization and training of Free Vietnamese forces, as read by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, based upon discussion at the last meeting of the Operations Coordinating Board.

c. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding a U.S. training program for Free Vietnamese forces, including their recommendations as to ultimate force levels and estimated costs thereof.

d. Noted the President’s directive that the Secretary of State, with the cooperation of the Secretary of Defense, the Director. Foreign Operations Administration, and the Director of Central Intelligence, take immediate steps necessary to authorize the Chief, USMAAG, Saigon, in coordination with the U.S. Ambassador at Saigon, to undertake an urgent program to improve the loyalty and effectiveness of the Free Vietnamese forces, in order to assure the prompt availability of Free Vietnamese forces on which Premier Diem can depend to assist him in establishing and sustaining a broadly-based government in Free Vietnam; utilizing funds up to an amount to be determined by the President on the recommendation of the Secretary of State.

Note: The action in d above as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for appropriate implementation.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Oct. 23.
2. For NSC 5429/2, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East”, Aug. 20, 1954, see volume xii.
3. Reference is presumably to SNIE 63–6–54, Sept. 15; for text, see p. 2028.
4. Not identified.
5. The outline Minutes of the Operations Coordinating Board, 1953–1960, are in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “Minutes.” Periodic reports on “Summary of Action Requirements for OCB Special Working Group on Indochina,” and certain other papers of the Special Working Group are filed in OCB files, lot 62 D 430, “SEA #1–#2.”
6. The draft cited here has not been positively identified. However, for a State-Defense draft of Oct. 21 which may be the document under reference, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 10, pp. 783–788. For the message as transmitted, see telegram 1679 to Saigon, Oct. 22, p. 2161.
7. Points a–d below constituted NSC Action No. 1250, Oct. 22, 1954. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)