751G.00/10–2154: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris1
niact
Tedul 11. Eyes only Secretary from Acting Secretary. Eyes only Heath. Dulte 5.2 For your ready reference we quote paragraph 4 of the September 29 Minute of Understanding:
“With respect to Viet-Nam, the representatives of France and the United States agree that their respective governments support Ngo Dinh Diem in the establishment and maintenance of a strong, anti-Communist and nationalist government. To this end France and the United States will urge all anti-Communist elements in Viet-Nam cooperate fully with Government of Ngo Dinh Diem in order count vigorously the Viet Minh and build a strong free Viet-Nam.”
Brief estimate political situation South Viet-Nam follows:
- 1.
-
While General Hinh’s threat to execute military coup seems to have been averted, Hinh and his associates Xuan and Bay Vien continue hold virtual veto power over Diem and his government. Prolongation of crisis leads to inevitable deterioration of government’s position and prospects, even if it is no longer menaced by violent overthrow.
We do not feel that sufficient effort has yet been made to carry out above quoted U.S.-French agreement. While Ely seems to have attempted honestly carry out this agreement, fact that many French elements have never accepted Diem solution must have weakened Ely’s efforts and encouraged Hinh camarilla in its recalcitrance. (In this connection see Paris 1660).3 We remain of opinion that military personalities now opposing Diem are more susceptible to French pressure and influence than any other similarly powerful elements in Viet-Nam.
Broad government of national union around Diem has not been achieved. Until the current civil-military sect conflict is resolved any successor Prime Minister would be faced with substantially similar problem with which he might be even less able to cope than Diem, except on conditions prejudicial to establishment of government of integrity.
- 2.
- Current jockeying for power and struggle for cabinet positions is resulting in paralyzing impasse. Positive moves are necessary by France and the U.S. if this impasse is to be broken. We remain convinced that if anything is to be saved in Viet-Nam we cannot sacrifice indispensable qualities of honesty, incorruptibility and nationalism represented more conspicuously at this moment by Diem than by anyone else.
- 3.
- Mendes-France’s use of term “another structure of government” suggests French hankering to reestablish political system similar to that of 1946 Cochinchinese Republic, founded on police and military power to be exercised by such figures as Tam and Hinh. In addition to such pro-French figures, system might involve direct colonial-type controls by French. Such a formula in French eyes would have advantage of facilitating elimination of Bao Dai and non-Cochinchinese elements like Diem. A development of this sort in our view would create conditions in South Viet-Nam analogous to those which ended by delivering to Viet Minh northern half of Viet-Nam, even though it might in the short run restore internal order.
- 4.
- We agree with Mendes-France’s feeling that perpetuation of Bao Dai in present role preserves thread of legality. We believe however that when some legislative body can take over from him his present [Page 2151] appointive powers the time will have come to remove him from the scene.
- 5.
- OCB on October 20 approved initiation military training program by MAAG Saigon to be undertaken soonest with personnel and other resources now available there. Necessary instructions to MAAG and Embassy now in process. We hope this step, together with delivery of President’s letter to Diem, will strengthen Diem in his relations both with French and other Vietnamese.
- 6.
- In summary, unless Diem receives unreserved U.S. and French support, his chances of success appear slight. With such support, his chances are probably better than even.