Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Meetings with the President”
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Memorandum of Conversation with the President
Sunday, July 18, 1954—5:00 p.m.
I told the President that the cables which I have received this morning from Geneva indicated a likelihood that there would be an armistice concluded1 and that I thought it might be useful to interject from here the idea that, if these negotiations failed, the United States would take so serious a view of the situation that the President would feel under a duty to make a report to the American people. I said that the knowledge that we would take this grave view of the situation would itself tend to buck up Mendes-France on the one hand and also lead the communists to make some concessions on the other hand.
The President raised the question of possibly going to a Joint Session of Congress. I said that I doubted whether this was advisable [Page 1852] at the present time as we were not yet in a shape to ask for any authority from Congress whereas if he made a talk to the American people, he could speak in terms of personally supporting a presentation of the situation to the United Nations as a threat to the peace, and he could do so directly or with U.S. support through others, without Congressional authorization. Also I felt that at this juncture the important thing was to let the Geneva Conference know that the President would take a very grave view of the failure of the Conference as creating a likelihood of the war being intensified and enlarged, both in terms of the area of combat and of the belligerents.
The President agreed with this procedure and authorized me to inform General Smith who in turn would be authorized to let Mendes-France know. The President spoke over the telephone with Mr. Hagerty to find out whether he could probably get time on Wednesday night on an emergency basis if this seemed desirable. Hagerty indicated that he felt no doubt about this.2
After leaving the President I dispatched to General Smith a cable informing him of the President’s intentions and authorizing him to inform Mendes-France which he did.3 Subsequently on Monday morning I telephoned to General Smith to ascertain his views as to whether or not some announcement or “leak” should be made from here as to the President’s possible speech. General Smith was of the opinion that matters were going better from the standpoint of prospective settlement [Page 1853] and that what had already been done was sufficient. I informed the President and he concurred.4
- The cables under reference have not been identified specifically. For certain telegrams received from the Delegation at Geneva on the morning of July 18, see vol. xvi, pp. 1424 ff.↩
Press Secretary Hagerty received the President’s call at Columbia Country Club. His diary records that conversation and also summarizes a subsequent telephone conversation with Secretary Dulles as follows:
↩“Dulles called back in about a half hour and explained that it might be necessary in the war of nerves game that we had to play in Geneva for the Communists to realize that if they turned down reasonable French demands the United States through the President would move dramatically through one or two possibilities.
“The first possibility, which Dulles did not like himself, would be to have the President go to the Congress on Wednesday and ask for immediate wartime powers. This would cause anxiety here in the country, would scare everybody to death and would be too drastic. The second was the possibility of a report to the people by the President, in which the President would end up by proposing that the United States would immediately take steps to bring the whole question of Indochina and the peace settlement there into the United Nations itself. Dulles explained that the second step was, of course, more likely than the first but what was more important was that the Communists had gotten the impression that we would not stand for much nonsense and were ready to move rapidly to counteract any stalling that they might pursue.
“Of course, Mendes-France made a major political and diplomatic mistake in setting a deadline of July 20th. The Commies will never let the free world meet such a deadline and Mendes-France should have known that before he made it. Dulles and I agreed to meet Monday morning in the White House to further discuss this situation.” (Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty papers)
- For text of the Secretary’s cable to Under Secretary Smith, Tosec 568 of July 18, see vol. xvi, p. 1436. Smith reported having informed Mendès-France in telegram Secto 665, July 19; for text, see ibid., p. 1455.↩
The Secretary’s office record of the telephone conversation with Smith is not printed. The record of his subsequent call to the President read as follows:
↩“The Sec. said Smith feels that a settlement is more likely than he had thought heretofore. He thinks it unwise to make an announcement that if there is no agreement the Pres. will make a speech. That will have a disturbing effect. The Pres. asked what should we tentatively do about timing. The Sec. said his feeling is if it is not announced, we should take an extra day to be sure. The British are taking a pretty good line if there is a breakup. The Pres. will tell Hagerty it is postponed at least 24 hours and possibly longer.” (Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “Telephone Conversations”)