751G.00/7–1954: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
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248. Repeated information Paris 93, niact Geneva 51. Prime Minister Diem sent for me this afternoon to say that his government would not ratify any accord which failed to provide an “enclave” in Tonkin Delta. Later he amended his statement to say that his government would accept an “international administration” of Hanoi-Haiphong area plus bishoprics of Bui Chu and Phat Diem. In later continuation of conversation with acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Duong Don, latter said to me that it was more important to retain Hanoi whether as part of enclave or under international administration than two bishoprics.
In accordance with Department’s telegram sent Geneva Tosec 557, Saigon 210,1 I told Diem that US Government fully recognizes justice of claim of Vietnamese Government to sovereignty over entire national territory and that it regards loss of northern areas, which it cannot accept as final, as dictated by harsh military necessity. I informed him also that in discussions with French and British we had emphasized great importance of maintaining an enclave.
Diem said that if no enclave or internationally supervised area in north were maintained, it would be impossible to build a solid, defensible state in south. It was not a question of losing Tonkin to Viet Minh but of losing it to Communist China whose lackeys Viet Minh were. With China occupying not merely entire north but also northern and valuable part of central Annam, remaining Vietnam could never be in security.
Our conversation was interrupted here by another appointment and Diem asked me to continue conversation with acting Foreign Minister. [Page 1854] Latter said that any government signing an armistice which failed to provide an enclave in north could not hope to enjoy popular confidence or survive. In reply to my question, he said that while Diem would not ratify an accord implying complete loss of north, he would not at this time attempt to oppose it by his own forces or attack French orally or otherwise, nor would he bring Vietnamese units in French Union Forces to disobey French commands. Neither, Don thought, would Diem or his government resign. Don went on to say that government was entirely “realistic” and understood necessity of maintaining French Expeditionary Force in Vietnam, whether that force fought Viet Minh or not. Its mere presence there, although not in combat, would prevent military vacuum which China and Viet Minh would immediately attempt to fill. He said government was perfectly aware that Vietnamese army as presently constituted and disciplined could not hope to withstand Viet Minh alone. He knew that at best it would take several months to build that army up into a real fighting force. Object of government was to gain time. Another reason for government’s refusal to approve a complete cession of north was, while French and Vietnamese forces would in fact withdraw from that region, Viet Minh would not really withdraw from zones in center and south they now occupy. They might bring out one-fifth or onetenth of their forces in central and southern zones but bulk of them would be left there with hidden arms, ready to revolt when time was ripe, meanwhile terrorizing population and preventing any effective administration. Vietnamese government was not, he said, anti-French and realized necessity of French aid.
To that I remarked that Tran Van Chuong, Ambassador-designate to Washington, seemed to hold other views, since in memorandum left with Secretary (Paris telegram sent Department 219, Saigon 16)2 he had said that withdrawal of French troops from Indochina would present no danger, because Vietnamese Government would have no difficulty in replacing every French unit with a Vietnamese unit. Don said there must be some misunderstanding since that was not government’s policy. He suggested that Chuong meant that French troops might be withdrawn when Vietnamese army had completed its instruction and formation.
Neither Diem nor Don seemed inclined discuss Vietnamese Foreign Minister’s note to French delegation (Geneva telegram sent Department Secto 633, Saigon 51)3 beyond stating that although they had no desire to see Vietnam become “a mandated power” under United [Page 1855] Nations, that would be preferable to partition at sixteenth or even eighteenth parallel.
- See footnote 1 to telegram 226, p. 1847.↩
- Telegram 219 from Paris, July 16, is not printed. See, however, footnote 8, p. 1840.↩
- The reference telegram, dated July 17, contained an unofficial translation of a note from the Vietnamese Delegation at Geneva to the French Delegation protesting the imminent partition of Vietnam and asking that the entire country be placed provisionally under the control of the United Nations. For text, see vol. xvi, p. 1418.↩