751G.00/7–1854: Telegram
The Consul at Hanoi (Cameron) to the Department of State
66. Repeated information Saigon 86, Paris 23. I called on Triumvirate1 July 15 and took First Secretary Meloy along. We found stairs leading to office lined with tommygun carrying Vietnamese soldiers in battle dress and in office the Triumvirate lined up to receive us, Hoang-Co-Binh wearing military uniform without insignia. Dr. Binh did most of talking, Tran-Van-Dung joined in occasionally, General Van only when cued.
Binh said they had returned from Saigon on July 10 to find Hanoi “a lost city” from morale point of view. They had immediately assumed power and in several days of energetic action had restored confidence and felt that they had situation well in hand. Then referred to proclamation, radio address, posters and inspections as means they had used to restore popular morale. They urged us to report what in their minds was the marked change in atmosphere in Hanoi.
According Binh, committee has decided already on certain basic measures, including program political education, plans militarize Hanoi police force and formation youth organizations. He said they felt they had made good beginning and if they had six months that they could redress situation here.
General O’Daniel and I saw committee on July 16 and they returned the General’s call at my house later same evening. Committee stressed importance holding present Hanoi-Haiphong complex and discussed their hope, if this occurred, to retake after several months preparation Bui Chu area by amphibious operation. I could get no clear idea from [Page 1851] their discussion of what they might do in case negotiations resulted in partition. If the Annamese government recognizes such an agreement, they seemed to think that it would be impossible to persuade Vietnamese army units to leave for South even if their families could be moved there.
General O’Daniel instructed the committee in the military facts of life. He stressed as essential to both parties that Vietnamese and French maintain and strengthen their unity at this crucial moment. He urged committee take strenuous measures prevent desertions from Vietnamese units, pointing out that desertions since they were contagious could become even worse enemy at present time than Viet Minh.
Comments: I received a better impression of committee during sessions in which O’Daniel participated than when I had seen them previously. Am inclined to think, however, this was because O’Daniel brought them down to earth. Even assuming soundness of their approach, they are in an impossible position since time is rapidly running out for them.
Unfortunately for their claim that in several ways they have restored morale of Hanoi, we were here during this period and saw no change in atmosphere.
- Reference is to the three officials provisionally in Chargé of the government of North Vietnam.↩