PSA files, lot 58 D 207

Report of the Joint United States–United Kingdom Study Group on Southeast Asia1

[Extract]

secret

Terms of Reference

By agreed minute of the meetings between the President and the Prime Minister a joint UK–US Study Group was established in [Page 1848] Washington “to prepare agreed recommendations” with respect to Southeast Asia.2

Meetings and Membership

The Study Group held its first meeting July 7, 1954. In all the group held six meetings, the closing meeting being held on July 17. Chief US participants were General Walter Bedell Smith and Mr. Douglas MacArthur II. The chief UK participant was Mr. R. H. Scott.

Recommendations

Our recommendations are contained in the enclosed report to which are attached three annexes. The recommendations are submitted by the members of the Study Group without commitment on their respective Governments.

Publicity

The Group agreed that nothing should be said to the press about the work or the recommendations of the Group, and that the line should be taken that these meetings were technical and exploratory, without commitment on either side.

  • Douglas MacArthur, II
  • R. H. Scott

[Enclosure]

The Report

item i

Terms of Reference:3

“Assuming France-Associated States and Viet Minh reach agreements on Indochina, which the US and UK are willing to respect—

(a)
the precise terms on which the UK and US might be willing to be associated with such agreements; and
(b)
the basis on which the free Asian and other interested non-Communist states might be brought into association with the agreements.”

1.
There was discussion of the methods of association with such agreements. The U.K. members preferred a multilateral declaration to be signed by all the countries taking part in the Indochina phase of the Geneva Conference and as many other interested South and Southeast Asian states as possible. The U.S. members stated that provided [Page 1849] the agreements met U.S. specifications, the U.S., at the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, would be prepared to make a unilateral statement of U.S. policy to the effect that the U.S. would respect the agreements in the sense of applying thereto the non-force principles of Art, 2(4) and (6) of the UN Charter. The U.S. would gladly welcome non-Communist co-signers. The U.S. members were not prepared to envisage negotiating the terms of such a unilateral statement of U.S. policy either directly with the Communists at Geneva, or indirectly through discussion of the terms with the Indians or other countries.
2.
The U.S. members defined an agreement which the U.S. could respect as being one which (a) in its view substantially fulfilled the seven points communicated to the French by the U.K. and U.S. and subsequently accepted by France (July 14, 1954);4 and (6) the Associated States accepted.
3.
The United Kingdom members pointed out that the United Kingdom would wish to make a declaration in a form which as many as possible of other interested States might feel able to use. Some of these countries might not be members of the United Nations, or not represented there. The United Kingdom might therefore wish to avoid too many detailed references to provisions of the Charter, and refer only to the general principles of the United Nations, in order to secure as wide agreement as possible on the substance and terms of a declaration in respect of an Indochina settlement.
4.
On the assumption that agreements are reached on Indochina which the United States and United Kingdom members are willing to respect, the UK members stated that the free Asian and other non-Communist states should be encouraged to bring themselves into association with the agreements on the same basis as the US and the UK. The UK members considered that the first step in securing the support of these powers for a collective defence system would be to induce them to associate themselves with an Indochina settlement. This would not only help to make that settlement durable and effective; it would also be valuable in the event of violation and in the event of an appeal to the United Nations.
5.
The U.S. members agreed that it would be valuable to have free Asian and other interested non-Communist states associate themselves with whatever declarations the US and the UK might make. The US members stated, however, that the value was not so great that the U.S. would be disposed to exert political pressure on other non-Communist countries to associate themselves with the declaration which the U.S. might make.
6.

Agreed Recommendations on Item I

The Study Group agreed that provided agreements are reached which the two Governments can respect:—

a.
The U.S. and U.K. should each issue a declaration of policy in respect of the agreements;
b.
The terms of the U.S. and U.K. declarations should be as similar as possible.
c.
These declarations should conform to the purposes and principles of the U.N. and should contain a statement that the issuing Government would not use force to disturb the agreements.
d.
It would be desirable for as many interested non-Communist countries as possible to issue similar or identical declarations.

. . . . . . .

  1. For documentation on the proceedings of the Study Group, including the portion of this report not printed here, see volume xii. The entire report may also be found in telegram Tosec 563 to Geneva, July 17; for text, see vol. xvi, p. 1410. Additional material on the work of the Joint Study Group is in file 751G.00.
  2. The Agreed Minute of June 27 establishing the joint study group specified that agreement should be sought on terms for United States and United Kingdom association with the Geneva settlement, and on terms for a collective security pact for Southeast Asia depending on the outcome of the Geneva Conference. For text of the agreed minute, see volume xii or vi.
  3. The quotation which follows is taken from the Agreed Minute of June 27.
  4. See U.S.-French position paper of July 14, p. 1830.