751G.00/4–2554: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (McClintock) to the Department of State

secret
priority

2110. Sent Paris priority 706, Geneva priority 7, repeated information London 42, Bangkok 153, Singapore 67, Tokyo 81, Manila 212, Taipei 27, Seoul 23. Our army attache has been queried by his Department re immediate political and military consequences of fall of DBP. I suggested to army attaché that immediate political consequences would be:

1.
An instant feeling of panic among French civilian population in Indochina.
2.
A covert and later open feeling of pride on part of Vietnamese that Asiatics had triumphed over whites, coupled in Cambodia and Laos reaction that “DBP is none of our business”. This might stimulate attempt by certain Vietnamese groups to come to terms with Viet Minh.
3.
A secondary shock wave of mounting panic in Vietnam that achievement of complete independence should coincide with military disaster thus leaving Vietnamese, at time when French may be prone to withdraw, almost completely defenseless before victorious Viet Minh. Unless prompt action (not words) by free world is taken, Vietnamese might be increasingly impelled to make their own arrangements with Viet Minh.

As possible antidotes I would suggest:

(a)
Immediate statement by the Three Western-Powers represented at Geneva reiterating determination already expressed by Secretary that Indochina will not be allowed to fall to Communists;
(b)
If possible statement from free Asiatic nations aligning themselves with declaration suggested in Pact A;
(c)

Indications by our information media that loss of DBP militarily means only loss of 15 Franco-Vietnamese battalions at cost to Viet Minh of between 15,000 and 17,000 casualties.

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Fact that DBP saved Laos from invasion and prevented Viet Minh from mounting contemplated decisive onslaught in Tonkin delta.

(d)
Foregoing amounts, however, only to words. People in Asia generally and in Indochina specifically will want to know what deeds are contemplated.

McClintock