751G.5/4–2554: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State
niact
[Received 3: 56 p.m.]
Dulte 3. Repeated information Paris 110. Eyes only for Acting Secretary from Secretary. Referring Paris 4060,1 it is my opinion that armed intervention by executive action is not warranted. The security of the US is not directly threatened. Also, it is not clear that intervention as requested under present circumstances would best protect our long-range interests.
It is not certain, and probably unlikely, that intervention would in fact save Dien Bien Phu. If Dien Bien Phu falls, it is not certain that the French Government will continue the fight even if US had intervened. It is quite possible that another government might be installed which would in fact repudiate US participation and leave US in most ambiguous position, embarrassing our prestige in western Pacific.
Immediate intervention without UK concurrence would gravely strain relations with both UK and Australia and New Zealand, and would make much more difficult future cooperation both Asia and Europe.
There would be no time to arrange proper political understanding with France with reference to independence of Associated States and training of indigenous forces, and once our prestige was committed in battle, our negotiating position in these matters would be almost negligible. This is particularly the case since, as Dillon points out, the full Cabinet probably does not know of the present request, and we have no assurance that the Cabinet, much less the assembly, wants our participation. A wide spread reaction would almost surely be that we had acted to prevent France from making peace. We would almost surely be confronted by a demand to replace French ground forces with our own, and refusal to do so would confirm French view that we were merely trying to keep them stuck in the fight.
My judgment expressed in this telegram takes into full account the possibility, as pointed out by Dillon, that the fall of Dien Bien Phu before our intervention may create a situation where US intervention would not be then accepted by France. For the reasons stated above, I [Page 1405] believe we should accept this risk rather than intervene under present circumstances.
In view of critical nature of situation, I believe it would be desirable for you to have a further meeting with congressional leaders primarily to inform them. You could make point that fundamental elements of situation remain as I presented them three weeks ago, and that meanwhile deterioration militarily and politically in Vietnam as well as Paris has been rapid. If you have such a meeting, you could give them the substance of this cable if President concurs.